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ABSTRACT
UPDIKE, MORRISON, AND ROTH: THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN IDENTITY
by Christopher Steven Love
December 2013
My dissertation analyzes American identity in the works of John Updike, Toni
Morrison, and Philip Roth. Specifically, I examine American identity in Updike’s Rabbit
tetralogy (1960-1990); Morrison’s trilogy of novels Beloved (1987), Jazz (1992), and
Paradise (1998); and Roth’s trilogy comprising the novels American Pastoral (1997), I
Married a Communist (1998), and The Human Stain (2000). The studied texts of these
three novelists, I argue, attack national myths and undermine exclusive narratives that are
incongruent with the nation’s ideal identity as a pluralistic and democratic nation.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION:
JOHN UPDIKE, TONI MORRISON, PHILIP ROTH AND “THE AMERICAN
CENTURY”
On February 17, 1941 Henry Luce, creator of the popular and influential
American magazines Time, Fortune, and Life, published an essay titled “The American
Century.” Advocating America’s entry in World War II, Luce argued that the United
States was already at war and that the nation should use the war as an opportunity to
spread democracy and to replace Britain as the leader of the free world. Luce framed his
argument for American dominance by invoking one of the country’s foundational myths:
that America was destined to become the world’s shining example of freedom and
democratic republicanism:
[This] nation, conceived in adventure and dedicated to the progress of
man - this nation cannot truly endure unless there courses strongly through
its veins from Maine to California the blood of purposes and enterprise
and high resolve. Throughout the 17th Century and the 18th Century and
the 19th Century, this continent teemed with manifold projects and
magnificent purposes. Above them all and weaving them all together into
the most exciting flag of all the world and of all history was the triumphal
purpose of freedom. It is in this spirit that all of us are called, each to his
own measure of capacity, and each in the widest horizon of his vision, to
create the first great American Century. (Luce 65)
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Although Luce couched his plan in humanitarian terms (“We must undertake now to be
the Good Samaritan of the entire world”), he declared that the United States had a right
“for such purposes as we see fit . . . to exert upon the world the full impact of our
influence” (Luce 64).
By invoking a foundational American myth, Luce attempts to tie his very
practical definition of American identity to its ideal identity as a beacon of freedom and
democratic republicanism. National identity stems from what a nation imagines it shares
in common, and a nation’s myths often play an important role in the making of a nation’s
identity (Anderson 6). A national myth may be derived from actual historical events, but
the contexts for these events are ignored, or as Ernest Renan and Benedict Anderson put
it, national myths require its members to forget details of history in order to make the
myth function as desired. Therefore, national myths dehistoricize historical events and
reorganize them into a grand narrative that serves as a transcending and controlling story
for the rest of the nation. I use “grand narrative” in the general meaning of Jean-Francois
Lyotard from The Postmodern Condition. In this sense, a grand narrative, or alternately
“metanarrative,” is a type of sweeping narrative meant to tell the story of a nation,
totalize and universalize the national experience, and legitimize policies as leading to the
destined outcome of the nation’s “story.” Thus, the policy itself, as in the example of
Luce’s essay, is framed to become a part of the narrative. The grand narrative may be the
originating myth or a derivative from it that supports the overarching myth. Thus, the
myth is often invoked to justify, explain, or decide the nation’s policies and actions.
National myths, then, are ideological narratives through which a nation state derives a
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core set of political and cultural values that seek to unite its people.1 From these values,
expressed and enacted in law, culture, and social expectations, paradigms for concepts of
a nation’s identity come into being. Ideally, members of the nation, then, also adhere to
the paradigms and, thus, signify that they belong to that nation. One result of a national
identity is that the nation will set out to fulfill its identity through its political and legal
policies. Therefore, the nation uses its apparatuses in order to enforce such policies. As
members of the nation who adhere to the paradigms of national identity, the people
support and help enforce the nation’s missions. Thus, the application and enforcement of
such policies would reveal a nation’s practical, or to borrow from Louis Althusser, its
material identity, or its identity as reflected by its actual practices, which might be either
in accordance with or in opposition to its ideals. But national identities are problematic
first because conflicting national narratives often pervade a nation and second because of
disconnect between its material identity and ideal identity (the harmony between a
nation’s practices and its ideals). In addition, people of a nation interpret the meanings of
a nation’s practices differently with respect to the ideal.
This has been especially true in the United States. American identity is a complex
concept since competing narratives not only emanate from conflicting political parties
and the cacophony of mass media but also from the nation’s tremendously large and
diverse population. In order to bolster definitions of American identity, powerful factions
(i.e., political, business) often invoke the nation’s myths in order to align a definition with
the nation’s ideals, such as freedom and individual rights. However, how they use and
interpret these myths is often arbitrary in order to impose the will of those who wield the

1

By “nation state,” I mean a politically sovereign nation, such as the United States, in which many
of its people believe that they share basic common values and customs.
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power to enforce their definition for their varying purposes, even if their purposes are
unfaithful to the ideal that they invoke (as Luce’s essay exemplifies). Second, versions of
America’s identity are derived from distinct groups of people who each conceptualized
America differently, such as the seventeenth-century Calvinist Puritans and eighteenth
century Enlightenment founders. Therefore, America’s foundational ideological
narratives even contrast with one another. As Sacvan Bercovitch notes, for example, the
“American self” (as he calls it) reflects a mixture of both the religious and the secular.
Certainly, the Puritans specifically understood America as the prophesied land they
interpreted from scripture, but resistance to Puritan interpretation is as much a part of
America’s Protestant history as its millennialist tendencies (Bercovitch, The Puritan
Origins of the American Self, 137). In addition, throughout the nation’s history many
laws of the United States have defined American identity along racial, ethnic, gender, and
economic lines in direct contrast to the ideals expressed in the Declaration of
Independence and the basic rights delineated in the Constitution’s Bill of Rights. Since
the late eighteenth century, the history of American identity has been the struggle to align
the nation’s material identity with its ideal identity as expressed in these founding
documents.
As derived from the Declaration of Independence, American identity is
historically unique because it established the supremacy of unalienable rights and
equality as the foundation of a nation; these “truths,” as Thomas Jefferson put it, would
be codified twelve years later in the Bill of Rights. 2 This Jeffersonian American identity
does not come through a national myth but from a set of ideals. Indeed, historian Garrett
2

Although he did not attend the Constitutional Convention, Jefferson argued that a bill of rights
was essential to the success of the nation, and his thinking persuaded James Madison to include a bill of
rights in the Constitution.
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Ward Sheldon explains that in writings before the Declaration of Independence Jefferson
had first attempted to justify the American Revolution on mythic terms—that America
was trying to return to the “Ancient Constitution” of the pre-Norman Anglo-Saxons. But
the Ancient Constitution was a myth, a narrative that conceptualized pre-Norman
England as a prelapsarian realm, the “golden age of English liberty” (Sheldon 26). This
myth first had been used to help seventeenth-century parliamentarians “beat the
traditionalists at their own game by situating their historical claim to liberty in a period
antedating the monarchy” (27). By the late eighteenth century, the myth was being
recognized as dubious at best. Therefore, when it came time to write the Declaration of
Independence, Jefferson realized that the mythical justification for the American
Revolution could not reasonably hold. As a result, Jefferson justified the revolution
philosophically, based on Lockean principles of natural rights (40).
Therefore, as derived from these founding documents, American identity is not
predicated on a shared ethnicity, race, language, religion, or even history as with many
nations. Instead, with equality and basic rights as its foundation, the nation embraces its
plurality, and its democratic republican government is conducive to such an ideal. Since
national identity is based on what a nation imagines it shares in common, American
identity, despite the differences among the nation’s people, rests in the belief in the
unifying concepts of equality, democratic republicanism, and that people’s rights as
articulated in the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights must receive equal
protection under the law.
However, this idealistic American identity has had to compete with an array of
conflicting concepts and narratives that are and seem counter to the ideal. Jefferson
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himself embodied such contradictions because he attempted to circumvent the
subjugation of African Americans by reasoning that they did not qualify as fully human,
and his paternalistic views toward women prevented him from imagining women as equal
to men. Jefferson’s concepts of race and gender typify some of the bases for slavery and
racist and sexist laws. In addition, America’s national myths often show a
reconceptualization of the nation’s idealistic notions. Therefore, these national myths can
be used to form grand narratives that threaten to override the nation’s ideal identity.
For example, in Luce’s invocation of an American myth, Luce alludes to
Jefferson’s notion of an “empire of liberty” in which Jefferson envisioned the eventual
expansion of democratic republican principles—Jefferson’s version of America’s ideal
identity. However, as historian Bernhard Sheehan explains, Jefferson did not mean this
expansion to be imperialistic, nationalistic, or militaristic in nature since this would be in
opposition to his democratic republican ideals. Instead, Jefferson believed that
“republicanism transcended any particular nation” and that by example the United States
would inspire other nations to replicate democratic republican principles within their own
borders (Sheehan 354). Second, Jefferson imagined this phenomenon only occurring in
the Western Hemisphere so that the US would have good relationships with neighboring
countries (354). Thus, a very practical idea like Jefferson’s becomes mythical once it
becomes part of the nation’s story and purpose and emptied of historical context, as in
Luce’s handling. Luce creates a grand narrative for the “American Century” that is
distinct from Jefferson’s meaning in at least this regard: Luce believed that the United
States had a right to go wherever it wanted to go and do whatever it wanted to do in order
to spread democracy and capitalism throughout the world.
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According to Luce, Americans could no longer practice isolationism, a mistake,
he asserts, that the United States had made at the end of World War I and had continued
to make under President Franklin Roosevelt. Luce’s essay proved prophetic. After the
war, his vision played out through the United States’ simultaneously defensive,
aggressive, and interventionist foreign policy as articulated by President Harry Truman in
what became known as the Truman Doctrine. While President Truman announced his
administration’s plan to protect “free peoples” against “armed minorities” or “outside
pressures,” the United States was already involved in the Greek Civil War (1946-1949), a
war between government and communist factions (Truman). It also had enacted the
Marshall Plan in Europe and continued to occupy Japan. In addition, Truman, ignoring
Ho Chi Minh’s plea for the US to aid Vietnam’s struggle against colonialism, supported
France’s claim to Indochina. In the Korean War (1950-1953), the United States would
pay a heavy price for its first hot war against communism, losing almost as many men in
the three years of fighting as it did in nearly a decade of the Vietnam War. Indeed, Gail
McDonald explains that “Luce laid out a controversial agenda that would continue to
affect American politics for the remainder of the century” (177). Therefore, Luce’s grand
narrative helped frame a new national identity for the remainder of the twentieth century
by appropriating America’s ideals and reconceptualizing them for his geopolitical
ambitions for the United States.
Although Luce’s version of America’s identity affected American policies
throughout the twentieth century, variations of American identity proliferated in the
aftermath of World War II. In order to complement America’s new identity as a global
power, a conglomeration of government, corporate, and scientific interests exhaustively
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sought to establish, once and for all, a cohesive American identity in order to prevent
disloyalty, the spread of communism, and racial discord and to stabilize economic
prosperity. The government invested an unprecedented amount of time and effort
sponsoring studies, broadcasts, and campaigns designed to define essential elements of
American identity as a way to counter Nazi and communist political ideologies.3 Such
paradigms of American identity include patriotic consumerism, traditional religiosity,
capitalism, tranquil suburban domesticity, global hegemony, vague notions of
individualism, and American exceptionalism. Disseminated by various media and
institutional outlets such as radio, television, film, print publications, and academia, such
nationalist propaganda pervaded American culture to such an extent that leading
intellectuals and publications (Luce’s, for example, and Reader’s Digest) began to
describe postwar Americans as “homogenous,” united by common values who shared
“traditional beliefs” (Karl 22). 4 Media theorist Armand Mattelart explains that “few
countries asked as much as the United States of their apparatuses of mass communication
. . . [to] become the very cornerstone of a project of mass integration” (71). Indeed,
through manipulation, regulation, and outright intimidation of communicative sources,
the government and complicit industries were able to transmit characteristics of
American identity that were consistent with their goal of national unity. 5 Augmenting the
drive toward a comprehensive national identity were postwar historians who “discovered
a new national consensus” and saw America as a unified society that had begun to fully
3

Although Nazi Germany was defeated, in the postwar years there remained fears that fascism
might persist and remnants of Nazism might coalesce. Orson Welles’s 1946 film The Stranger dramatizes
such anxieties.
4
For example, Karl refers to those who participated in two symposiums on American culture in
the early 1950s for the Partisan Review (e.g., Lionel Trilling, David Riesman, etc.)
5
The House Un-American Activities Committee’s (HUAC) infamous investigation into the
supposed communist infiltration of Hollywood serves as a prime example of government coercion of a
particular medium.
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realize the promise of the country’s founding: a classless American society devoid of any
real ideological divisions (Iggers 43). As Tom Englehardt argues in The End of Victory
Culture, the US’s global victory bolstered the myth of American superiority as never
before, effectively building “a national consciousness” that appeared “so natural, so
innocent” and “little contradicted by the realities of invasion or defeat” that soon gave
way to “triumphalist despair” when the Cold War began (5, 9). The government and other
nationalist organizations’ rush to establish authentic paradigms of American identity after
World War II was initially designed to corral disparate ethnic and racial groups under one
red, white, and blue banner of American-ness.6 Luce’s essay was, in fact, prescient. The
propaganda was not limited to the postwar period, but spread throughout and beyond the
Cold War, regaining momentum with the onset of the Reagan Era.7 Indeed, President
Reagan and his administration attempted to recapture a lost American essence by dusting
off themes of American identity from the immediate postwar period. The protests against
the Vietnam War had exposed many Americans’ fatigue with the incessant ideological
and military struggle with communism and the us vs. them mentality and propaganda of
the Cold War. Additionally, the Civil Rights Movement gave voice to underrepresented
Americans who felt that the United States was itself an oppressive nation ruled by a white
male elite and that therefore needed dramatic changes to its fundamental systems of

6

Such organizations included the Council for Democracy and the Common Council for American
Unity, both established circa 1940.
7
Sean Wilentz argues that Reagan’s legacy has been far reaching, and he posits that President
Clinton’s election in 1992 was not the end of the Reagan Era for several reasons. First, Reagan led the
conservative resurgence in the United States beginning with his presidential candidacy in 1974 and the
continuation of many of Reagan’s policies (e.g., a robust, heavily funded US military; the Republican
Party’s now dogmatic creed of low taxes and limited social programs). His book The Age of Reagan
stretches the Reagan Era time frame from 1974-2008, a period that encompassed two of John Updike’s
Rabbit novels and the entire trilogies of Toni Morrison and Philip Roth. Reagan’s attempt to return to the
atmosphere of the postwar era, thus, demonstrates the impact of the cultural and political climate of the end
of World War II.
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governance. But the Reagan Era ushered in the resurgence of a nationalist conservatism
that once again deemed communism to be the country’s chief enemy, encouraged a
robust military buildup, targeted civil rights legislation for repeal, and sought to
deregulate the financial industry. Reagan’s mantra was an idealized American past,
America before the social tumult of the 1960s (Combs 76). 8 Consequently, Reagan
wanted to return to a national identity that predated the Civil Rights Movement and the
Vietnam War.9
Because of World War II, American identity became for the first time the subject
of academic inquiry. Although sporadic studies of the American character had been
periodically published throughout the 1920s and 1930s, Philip Gleason explains that the
circumstances of World War II led to the proliferation of studies that sought to define and
understand the nation (Gleason, “Americans All: World War II and the Shaping of
American Identity,” 505). The US government and scholars, for example, obsessed over
the concept of American individualism, and the government coerced the film industry to
portray a prescribed brand of individualism, mainly in economic terms, while J. Edgar
Hoover manipulated his Hollywood connections to spread propaganda through American
movies (Noakes 662; Wills 245). In addition, Carl Bernstein discovered that at the onset
of the Cold War the government, sometimes in cooperation with editors and journalists,
planted CIA agents throughout the American media, such as in The New York Times and

8

Reagan also vetoed the Civil Rights Restoration Act in 1988; however, Congress overrode his

veto.
9

Reagan’s idol was President Franklin Roosevelt. James Combs notes that Reagan blamed
President Lyndon Johnson and his Great Society, not FDR, for instituting an American welfare state.
However, Combs argues that Reagan often criticized Johnson for what were New Deal initiatives and
praised FDR for what were Johnson’s programs.
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the American Broadcasting Company (ABC) (Bernstein 66).10 According to Bernstein,
Henry Luce was among many powerful media figures “who lent their cooperation to the
Agency” (Bernstein 66). In addition to Luce’s publications, other popular magazines like
Reader’s Digest were heavily influenced by government propaganda. Reader’s Digest
often took cues from the CIA; many of its articles, for example, featured stories
celebrating various versions of individualism to contrast with beliefs about communism
(Sharp 13, 21). Abigail Cheever cites such works as David Riesman’s The Lonely Crowd
(1953), William Whyte’s The Organization Man (1956), and R.D. Laing’s The Divided
Self (1960) as examples from a deluge of studies undertaken to examine and seek out a
definable national identity that would contain the dissent among the American population
building throughout the postwar period.
Philip Gleason notes that scientists were the first to ploy the term “identity”
beginning in the postwar era (“Identifying Identity,” 910-11). Eschewing the phrase
“American character,” scientists such as Erik Erikson coined “identity” to explain how
America’s multi-ethnic, multi-racial population might be reconciled in a singular way. In
Childhood and Society (1950), Erikson’s work explores the psychological relationship
between the individual and society, using and popularizing the term “identity” to such an
extent that it quickly became the new buzz-word among scholars across disciplines.
Identity, Erikson explains, is difficult to define because it involves “a process ‘located’ in
the core of the individual and yet also in the core of his communal culture, a process
which establishes, in fact, the identity of those two identities” (qtd. in Gleason,
“Identifying Identity,” 914). Erikson’s efforts to reconfigure identity in an era when

10

Philip Roth declared that the postwar generation was “the most propagandized” generation in
American history (qtd. in Stanley 1).
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Americans were reimagining their own cultural, social, and political identity are not
coincidental. During World War II, Erikson had contributed to a US government study on
the effectiveness of propaganda, and his reexamination of identity began during the war
when a group of scholars were employed and encouraged by agencies of the United
States to study propaganda and embark on wide-ranging national character studies
(Gleason, “Identifying Identity,” 925). Erikson’s chapter “Reflections on American
Identity” from Childhood and Society posits that inconsistencies in the national narrative
have helped create identity crises in Americans since they are torn between “dynamic
polarities” such as “individualistic and standardized” (Erikson 286). However, Erikson
concludes that these polarities can be reconciled through America’s participatory
democracy because individuals could have a say in politics that affected them while
experiencing “fraternal congregation” of the political process (319). The idea of an
untouchable core identity reconcilable in the American democracy was important because
it maintained the uniqueness of each person, a concept of individualism that such
scientists emphatically touted as essential to American identity and, when seen in the
Cold War context, as evidence of the unnaturalness of communism and autocracy.
Abigail Cheever, author of Real Phonies: Cultures of Authenticity in Post World
War II America, traces this concern for American authenticity to the Emersonian and
Thoreauvian traditions that celebrate “a particularly American individuality that was
conceived in opposition to the expectations of a social world” (2). Furthermore, in
American ideology, according to Gregory Jay, “identity is personal, idiosyncratic,
something we do not share. Seeing oneself as a cultural identity tends to erode the feeling
of uniqueness so prized in American culture” (115). Cheever and Frederic Karl describe a
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backlash against this culture of conformity by many American literary writers of the
period. “Everything depended on keeping a public united in the Cold War,” Karl asserts,
and “the media organized [Americans] around stereotypes;” the “American sameness”
produced “counterfeit” selves that masked the real individual underneath (Karl 37).
Cheever and Karl explain that literature during the 1950s and 1960s exhibited a
fascination with “authentic” identities and derided what writers saw as fraudulence and
phoniness. Indeed, Robert Langbaum observes in The Mysteries of Identity: A Theme in
Modern Literature (1977) that by the 1970s the United States had become “an identity
society” in which individuals struggled to define themselves against the wave of
nationalist propaganda that swept the country throughout the Cold War (3). Thus, the
concerted effort to establish a “national identity” by the US government and the
American media produced a counteraction in America’s literary writers. In the 1950s and
60s, the US was in full identity crisis mode, reeling from a confluence of events and
national traumas: the Cold War, the Civil Rights Movement, the assassination of
President John F. Kennedy, and the Vietnam War. Kennedy’s assassination and the
growing Civil Rights Movement, highlighted by Martin Luther King’s 1963 “I Have a
Dream” speech, shattered any illusion of a stable nation that had successfully corralled
dissent.
Attempts to construct and direct a national identity, therefore, did not go smoothly
as the rush to define paradigms of American identity led to a reexamination of the nature
of the country itself. Diverse American writers—from Ralph Ellison and Norman Mailer,
to Adrienne Rich and Jack Kerouac—participated in this reexamination. Such writers
worked to explore America’s ongoing identity crisis, both challenging and reinforcing
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clichés of American individualism and exceptionalism while grappling with their
country’s new position as the West’s emergent political, economic, and martial leader.
Norman Mailer’s The Naked and the Dead (1948) and Joseph Heller’s Catch-22 (1963)
challenged the nationalistic representations of World War II that were common in
Hollywood films from the 1940s to the 1960s (e.g., Flying Tigers [1942], The Longest
Day [1962]). Several of Heller’s characters, for example, are not patriotic warriors
fighting for an idealistic American cause, but they are reluctant participants caught up in
a deadly conflict beyond their control. Jack Kerouac’s On the Road (1957) reached back
to the tropes of the American Western myth to criticize the banality of suburban America.
As much as the government and the media were obsessed with implementing a cohesive
national identity, writers such as Saul Bellow and James Baldwin and later the emerging
writers Philip Roth, John Updike, and Toni Morrison persistently produced works that
sought to recover a “discoverable authenticity” that was beyond the propaganda (Karl
29). Roth’s short stories such as “Goodbye, Columbus,” “Defender of the Faith,” and “Eli
the Fanatic” (1959) represent the dilemma for Jews torn between “authentic” Jewishness
and their American identity, a theme to which he returned in his American trilogy
beginning with American Pastoral (1997). Updike begins the Rabbit tetralogy, or Rabbit
Angstrom, with the publication of Rabbit, Run (1960). Covering thirty years (1959-1989)
of American history, the Rabbit tetralogy explores Harry “Rabbit” Angstrom’s lifelong
struggle to uncover his authentic self that is drowning beneath cultural and political noise.
Morrison’s writing career begins later (in 1970), but her early novels build on themes of
identity, leading to the commencement of her trilogy in 1987 with Beloved.
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Specifically, this dissertation examines American identity in John Updike’s
Rabbit Angstrom (1960-1990); Toni Morrison’s trilogy of novels Beloved (1987), Jazz
(1992), and Paradise (1998); and Philip Roth’s American trilogy comprising the novels
American Pastoral (1997), I Married a Communist (1998), and The Human Stain
(2000).11 First, these novelists seek to destroy narratives that attempt to codify exclusive
concepts of American identity. In addition, the novels identify varying brands of
American identity construed by competing interests and powers and explore the nexus
from which meanings of American identity emanate. Furthermore, they offer a thorough
examination and critique of American identity from different perspectives, such as, but
not limited to, Protestant, African American, and Jewish points of view. Ultimately,
although from different vantage points and through different fictional scenarios, Updike,
Morrison, and Roth attack the totalizing, mythic narratives that threaten America’s ideals
of equality, liberty, and democracy—and thus work to protect the integrity of America’s
identity as a democratic nation.
Through Rabbit Angstrom, for example, Updike dramatizes the core of
Protestantism, individuals alone with their allusive God. For Updike, the political
implications are very tangible, since individuals are left to their own conscience, and
collectively through democracy, they can set limitations on government or use
government to set practical but negotiable limits on individual freedoms and rights.
Second, a private relationship to this allusive God means, for Updike, that ultimate

11

Morrison and Roth have proclaimed that their sets of novels function as trilogies, and the
scholarship addressing these works consistently acknowledges them as such (e.g., see Tally, Justine.“The
Morrison Trilogy.” The Cambridge Introduction to Toni Morrison. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2007 and Schur, Richard. “Dream or Nightmare? Roth, Morrison, and America.” Philip Roth
Studies 1.1 [2005]: 19-36).
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“Truth”—“the thing behind everything” as Rabbit states, remains inaccessible, and
therefore individuals pursue truth on their own terms and according to their own
consciences (Rabbit, Run 241). Although for a believer in God like Rabbit, that God may
exist is a truth, and he may sense God intuitively; however, this truth is a private truth,
something individuals are free to recognize or not recognize at all. Moreover, Rabbit both
rebels against and accepts different national narratives, demonstrating both his
independent spirit and susceptibility to political influence, but intuitively and through the
help of other characters, Rabbit senses when his nation is out of balance with its ideals.
Throughout the tetralogy, the novels also expose the limits of Rabbit’s knowledge and
perspectives, and in Rabbit Redux, for instance, Skeeter’s history lessons show the need
for other narratives to check prevailing ideology.
In her trilogy, Toni Morrison extensively examines this need for pluralistic
narratives. For Morrison, memory, storytelling, and story gathering protect America from
being dominated by what she refers to as the “official story” constructed by powerful
white elites (Morrison, Race-ing Justice. En-gendering Power, x). Attacking what she
refers to as the spectacle of narrative, Morrison combats the official story with alternate
narratives. As exemplified by the character Pat Best in Paradise, Morrison dramatizes the
need for black women to write, record, and interpret history. By countering the “official
story,” blacks and women can decentralize the power held by those who attempt to
control the narratives that enforce exclusive conceptions of American identity, such as
those built on racist and sexist presumptions. For Morrison, it is not enough, though, to
attack racist and sexist narratives. First, these narratives must be undone through analyses
of how they function; her trilogy itself functions as a way to deconstruct and critique. But
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more importantly, history must be reimagined and rewritten through the experiences of
those who have been harmed by the nationalistic narratives that marginalize them.
Philip Roth echoes the importance of writing as a way to combat grand narratives.
In Roth’s American trilogy, Nathan Zuckerman, the trilogy’s primary narrator,
demonstrates the crucial role that the writer plays in American democracy. Although as a
child he longed to lose his “ethnic” identity, Zuckerman realizes the importance of the
skepticism he learned from his Jewish upbringing. Skepticism toward political narratives
is essential to keep America from extremism and from an American identity that is
exclusive and punitive for those that do not adhere to the given paradigms. For example,
without America’s plurality of perspectives, the ruling WASP establishment as
exemplified by the Grants in I Married a Communist could push the nation toward a
Nazi-like totalitarian state. Thus, the intellectual skepticism Zuckerman learned from his
Jewish mentors and upbringing is essential to his critical view of nationalistic narratives,
such as those that Rabbit Angstrom struggles to ward off.
Thus, these writers imagine American identity as democratic. Americans can
help maintain the nation’s ideal identity through their actions of self-discovery and
struggles against conformity like Rabbit Angstrom and Joe and Violet Trace or, like
Nathan Zuckerman and Pat Best, through the vigilance toward the grand narratives
dictated to them by powerfully interested individuals and groups. Therefore, to more
closely align America’s material identity with its ideal identity, the nation needs its
diverse members to participate and contribute in these various ways in order to resist
exclusive concepts and definitions of the nation’s identity.

18
As each of these writers indicates through these sets of novels, the postwar
identity crisis dredged up many of America’s subliminal divisions. Henry Luce’s “The
American Century” had overlooked America’s domestic problems, such as institutional
racism and sexism—the essay took for granted that the nation’s house was in order.
However, since many blacks, non-Anglo lower class and working class whites, Jews, and
women felt marginalized in American society, they did not share Luce’s enthusiasm for
America’s global aspirations nor did they trust attempts to homogenize American
identity. Or if they did share this enthusiasm, such as Updike’s and Roth’s characters
Rabbit Angstrom and Swede Levov, they became disillusioned by either the air of
conformity or the resulting social crises caused by the turmoil of the sixties (or both, as in
the case of Rabbit).
One feature of the postwar era was the rapid expansion of consumerism as a
homogenizing agent. The country’s trudge toward a consumer society left footprints from
the First World War as Woodrow Wilson laid out a foreign policy that linked
consumerism to statesmanship in order to “convert [the world] to the principles of
America,” principles that Wilson defined as primarily commercial (de Grazia 3).
However, the concept of the citizen-consumer, the idea that it was now every citizen’s
patriotic duty to spend and to purchase goods, the defining characteristic of their national
identity, gained the brunt of its force during the propaganda campaigns of the Second
World War. 12 Although the war ended, the propaganda of patriotic consumerism did not
as the United States’ government and complicit media championed mass consumption
against “the evils of communism” (Cohen 124). For example, the household products
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sold during the 1950s and 1960s were not always marketed for their essential usefulness,
but rather as a patriotic duty to help boost the American economy:
[The editors of] Life argued that “a health and decency standard for
everyone” required that every American family acquire not only a
“pleasant roof over its head” but all kinds of consumer goods to put in it,
ranging from a washing machine and a telephone to matching dishes and
silverware. As each family refurbished its hearth after a decade and a half
of depression and war, the expanded consumer demand would stoke the
fires of production, creating new jobs and, in turn, new markets. Mass
consumption in postwar America would not be a personal indulgence, but
rather a civic responsibility to provide “full employment and improved
living standards for the rest of the nation.” (Cohen 113)
Therefore, the relative usefulness of the new postwar products was
inconsequential to the seemingly more communal need to help build a robust economy.
Indeed, studies reveal that the actual increase of household gadgets on the market did
little to lessen the labor of housewives and domestic workers, but only changed the
manner in which tasks were done and created more tasks for them to perform.13
Furthermore, although the propaganda conveyed a spirit of community—every American
doing their part—in reality it also created an increased sense of competition among
neighbors that instilled the proverbial “keep up with the Joneses” mentality. More
cynically, though, such propaganda plays on that part of America’s psyche rooted in the
Protestant ethic. The housewife, for example, was not only patriotic for purchasing such
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gadgets, but by using them she contributed to and solidified her identity as part of the
American community. However, the pressure exerted on Americans to buy these
ancillary consumer products often fed into the enormous expansion of economic and
political power of corporate interests that took advantage by increasingly encouraging
consumers to go heavily into debt in order to finance more and more of the latest and
more expensive goods. Indeed, “Americans were told by economists and government
leaders that it was acceptable, even patriotic, to be in debt” (McDonald 109).
Consequently, American individualism, particularly in postwar America, was in part
being offered as an economic concept, the businessman unfettered by an intrusive
government.14 For example, in regard to patriotic consumerism, the development of the
United States into a consumer culture predated the World War II generation, but only in
the aftermath of the Second World War did a systematic and programmatic propaganda
campaign begin to link inextricably American identity to consumerism.
If to be an American simply means participating in the buying and selling of
products, it is an America that Updike’s Rabbit Angstrom and the women of Morrison’s
Paradise find soulless. Indeed, the first novel of Updike’s tetralogy, Rabbit, Run tells the
story of twenty-six-year-old Rabbit Angstrom, a former high school basketball star, and
his flight from his pregnant wife and two-year-old son. In an aborted flight sparked by his
recognition of a fraudulent consumer society, Rabbit deserts his family and embarks on a
spiritual quest to find his true self. In the novel, and throughout the tetralogy, Updike
reframes American individualism not as an economic construct but as an unfiltered,
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private, spiritual relationship with God—the core legacy of Protestantism.15 The
ramifications, for Updike, are significant because forced paradigms of national identity
that do not reflect the nation’s ideals destroy, or at the very least inhibit, the free
individual. As the tetralogy shows, the more Rabbit Angstrom conforms to these
paradigms, the less American he becomes. Rather than seeing consumerism linked to
Protestant spirituality, Updike frames it as Protestantism’s antithesis while Morrison sees
it as Protestantism’s material identity, or how it has worked in practice in the United
States, regardless of its ideal. In Beloved, Morrison gives a glimpse of how an Africanist
religious influence might have configured Christianity differently if not for the powerful
influence of the overarching white narrative. The trilogy dramatizes how slavery and
postwar institutional racism influenced blacks to model white society since blacks were
denied their American identity legally. Thus, the men of Paradise mimic how white
Protestantism can function as a patriarchal, economic, consumerist network.
In Rabbit Angstrom, the subject of my second chapter, for Rabbit to embody
Updike’s conception of American identity he must embody the spirit of the core of
America’s religious heritage, and the striking difference Updike illustrates between
Rabbit and the Episcopalian reverend, Jack Eccles, in Rabbit, Run epitomizes the
theological fissure in the American Protestant tradition, specifically between legalism and
antinomianism.16 As Larzer Ziff illustrates:
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[In] the Anglo-American Christian tradition, not to speak of other cultures
and other religions, exists a tension between legalism and antinomianism,
between the belief that religion, taking its impetus from revelation,
through reason achieves forms and laws which are essential to the aiding
of weak human nature and to the continuity of divine law upon earth; and
the belief that since man’s relation to God is super-rational, consisting as it
does of the Lord’s gift of grace to the individual believer, laws and rituals
are dead except insofar as they are directly informed by the Holy Spirit
acting through the individual believer. (Ziff 34)
Updike’s fascination with “middles” is oft-noted; as he has expressed, in the middle is
where “extremes clash, where ambiguity restlessly rules” (Updike, Interview, NY Times).
Although his use of “middle” is often interpreted as referring to the middle-class, it can
be interpreted as having a more abstract meaning—or as a middle in all things. And it is
in this middle space of American Protestantism’s theological conflict where Rabbit’s
angst arises as Rabbit embodies the conflict between Protestant legalism and Protestant
antinomianism. Stephen Webb notes that Updike has frequently confessed to “antinomian
tendencies,” and through Rabbit, Updike appears to endorse antinomianism over Eccles’s
legalism (584). However, Updike sees this tension between the two as not necessarily
resolvable but as a necessary part of American identity. In the novel, Updike pits
Lutheranism versus Episcopalianism and in doing so he traces American identity’s roots
to the Reformation and Martin Luther. In accordance with Updike, Sacvan Bercovitch,
reaches beyond the Puritans to Luther in locating the origins of Western individualism
that culminated into the American sense of self (Puritan Origins 11). Updike’s sense of
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individualism, then, is rooted in the spirit of the Reformation that removed the
intermediary between the individual and God. Played out politically, this idea is realized,
Updike declares, “in the American political experiment, which I take to be, at bottom, a
matter of trusting the citizens to know their own minds and best interests” (Updike,
Interview, NPR):
“To govern with the consent of the governed”: this spells the ideal. And
though the implementation will inevitably be approximate and debatable,
and though totalitarianism or technocratic government can obtain some
swift successes, in the end, only a democracy can enlist a people’s
energies on a sustained and renewable basis. To guarantee the individual
maximum freedom within a social frame of minimal laws ensures — if not
happiness — its hopeful pursuit. (Updike, Interview, NPR)
The remarks indicate that Updike shares with Emerson his optimism about America as an
ideal nation. However, Updike’s writing has a yes-but quality as has been often noted,
and so the clause “if not cogently” is key to understanding another difference with
Emerson. Whereas Emerson articulates a nation predestined by God and where, for
Emerson, America “wed the ideals of individualism” and “community,” Updike sees
America less pretentiously and as a nation that will always and necessarily possess the
tensions that Emerson sees as being resolved in his idea of America (Bercovitch, The
American Jeremiad 183). America is the place where the true Protestant-envisioned
human drama of God and man can play out unfettered. Rather than some utopia,
theocracy, or New Jerusalem, America must be a sinner’s paradise, a vanity fair, a
bastion of both puritanism and hedonism, for this is the price of individuality and the

24
pathway to grace. Although Updike’s conceptualization of American identity represents
an ideal, he recognizes that in practice the ideal is certain not to be fully realized at all
times and in the details of its implementation. For Updike, America is a special place,
but special because of its messiness, its fallibility, and the recognition that participatory
democracy is inherently anti-utopian, anti-fascist, and must be conducive to the
individualist spirit of the American character. That individualist spirit, self-governing and
resistant to totalitarianism, keeps America malleable and progressive by resisting the
arbitrary enforcement of a strict, limited, and exclusive national identity.
Born at the height of the Great Depression in 1932, Updike was too young to
serve in World War II and already college-bound at the start of the Korean conflict.
However, the difficulties of these times along with the national euphoria of victory in the
Second World War ingrained in Updike not disillusionment, but rather a sense that he
belonged to a privileged generation:
My generation, once called Silent, was in a considerable fraction of its
white majority, a fortunate one. . . . We acquired in hard times a habit of
work and came to adulthood when work paid off; we experienced the
patriotic cohesion of World War II without having to fight the war. We
were repressed enough to be pleased by the relaxation of the old sexual
morality, without suffering much of the surfeit, anomie, and venereal
disease of younger generations. We were simple and hopeful enough to
launch into idealistic careers and early marriages, and pragmatic enough to
adjust, with an American shrug, to the ebb of old certainties. Yet, though
spared many of the material deprivations and religious terrors that had
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dogged our parents, and awash in a disproportionate share of the world’s
resources, we continued prey to what Freud call “normal human
unhappiness.” (Updike, Early, xiv)
The “patriotic cohesion” Updike experienced, brought on by World War II,
spurred further attempts by the government and mass media to build a national consensus
and unite Americans under a common identity. It is not surprising then that Updike,
Morrison, and Roth have devoted a significant portion of their work to address the many
facets of this identity phenomenon. Updike, Morrison, and Roth, all children of the
Depression and the World War II era, have borne witness to and recorded much of
American history of the last sixty years. Therefore, the influence of the postwar period
features prominently in these works. Updike’s tetralogy begins close to postwar America
and stretches to the Reagan Era. Indeed, Rabbit at Rest (1990), the final novel of the
tetralogy, connects Reagan to the postwar era—he a mighty Cold War warrior—and
Rabbit shares with Reagan the nostalgia for pre-1960s America. In Rabbit at Rest, the
Reagan Era is the 1940s-1950s redux in terms of the country’s military power and
strength and in terms of how Reagan framed American identity.
My third chapter expands the discussion of American identity by examining Toni
Morrison’s unnamed trilogy produced from 1987 to 1998. Connected like Roth’s trilogy
by themes rather than a consistent cast of characters, Morrison’s trilogy covers primarily
the lives of African Americans from the 1850s to the mid-1970s. While Updike’s series is
temporally contiguous, Morrison’s trilogy aesthetically presents a fractured and
historically complex picture of American identity. Morrison’s techniques in each of these
novels reflect her resistance to grand narratives that Richard Schur argues point to “the
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banner of one signifier, such as singular ‘black’ or ‘African-American’ culture,” and, as I
will argue, American identity (32). Morrison’s trilogy illuminates African-Americans’
alienated position within American history and the sheer impracticality of sharing in the
predominant myths of American identity without risking cultural destruction. Setting the
opening novel, Beloved, in the heart of the nineteenth century, Morrison portrays slave
life in an era that gave birth to precursory components of American identity, such as
Emersonian individualism and expanding free market capitalism. Beloved attempts to
recover forgotten American history, and it also illuminates American identity in light of
black presence and suggests how American identity cannot be understood without
coming to terms with this history. Jazz traces African American movement into the City
as blacks explore individuality on their own terms while remaining constrained by the
racism of post-Reconstruction America. Here, Morrison utilizes and explores the
constraints of allegory in an effort to dramatize the failure of race as a signifier of
American identity. In concluding her trilogy with Paradise, Morrison seeks to uncover
the failure of the postwar American dream in an all-black town. While not assimilating
physically, the people of Ruby have mimicked whites’ version of American identity
through their accommodation of exploitative capitalism and didactic myths. Although the
novel ends in violence, the novel suggests that by reimagining myth constrictive notions
of identity can be overcome.
Although Morrison’s and Roth’s trilogies commence decades after Rabbit
Angstrom begins, they both focus heavily on the postwar period for its significance in
shaping American identity. Morrison’s trilogy reaches back to the nineteenth century, but
part of her project was to correct the postwar forgetting of African American history and,
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as I will show, to address the failures of the postwar American dream, which, for blacks,
was exemplified by financial security and racial equality. For example, Morrison
culminates her trilogy by setting the climactic novel Paradise (1998) primarily during the
postwar and Vietnam eras. Finally, the context of Morrison’s trilogy, I will argue,
demonstrates that the culture of the Reagan Era threatened the remembrance of blacks’
role in American history as well—a replay of the postwar forgetting. Since Morrison’s
trilogy sets out to uncover black Americans’ essential role in American identity (as in
Beloved [1987]), it laments how male WASPness, the white ruling elite of the United
States, overshadowed, subsumed, and disregarded blacks’ culture and African heritage.
For Morrison, the material identity of white Protestantism, how it actually works in
practice, must be vigorously confronted. The town’s sexism, racism, and consumerism in
fact result from such replication. Morrison, thus, hopes to recover black history and
culture in order to reimagine American identity under these terms. In addition, Morrison
wants to reconfigure the notion of American individualism. The trilogy posits that
individualism has been used as a euphemism for one person’s “right” to oppress another
and expresses a desire to break from the community. While Rabbit Angstrom’s perpetual
spiritual crisis has much to do with obtrusive communal and familial ties, in Jazz (1991),
Morrison’s individuals long for community and sense of belonging—the dangers of
selfish individualism lurk in the City where the sense of community has been either lost
or diminished amid the cityscape. The legacies of slavery and Jim Crow have induced a
desire for individual freedom, and like Rabbit, several of Morrison’s characters thirst for
it, but the desire for society returns, especially to the women in the novel. In Paradise,
Morrison hints at the ideal relationship between individuals and community: a non-
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coercive, unrestrictive, and cooperative relationship. Indeed, in the Convent, the
inhabitants come and go freely and are welcomed by Consolata, the Convent’s matriarch,
whereas in the patriarchal Ruby, the men attempt to control who belongs and who does
not, largely in terms of racial and economic interests.
Morrison’s concern with destruction by assimilation is shared by Philip Roth,
whose trilogy is the subject of my fourth chapter. Like Morrison’s series, Roth’s
American trilogy is connected by themes rather than characters other than its narrator
Nathan Zuckerman. Roth’s trilogy, similar to the Rabbit tetralogy, spans from circa 1945
to the Clinton era. Roth’s final two novels of the trilogy, I Married a Communist (1998)
and The Human Stain (2000), show the continuation of 1950s era nationalism and
persecution into the 1990s. As portrayed in Roth’s trilogy, the end of World War II marks
the crucial point in Jewish-American history. While liberal theorists hoped establishing
tenets of American identity would be inclusive and allow for a multicultural and multiethnic society, Roth portrays postwar American identity as subsuming and potentially
destructive of ethnic identity. Consequently, Jews and African Americans, Roth shows, at
times game the system in an attempt to thrive in postwar American society. However,
their participation in and acceptance involves a corrupt bargain in which they must
sacrifice some of their communities’ values and even surrender their ethnic and racial
identity, as Coleman Silk does in The Human Stain. In American Pastoral, Roth
demythologizes the idea of an American utopia. As Mark Maslan argues, the novel
shows that the rejection of certain identities is “merely the precondition for embodying a
national one” (381). But if the national identity is one that respects the ideal, this does not
force conformity upon the individual, but it forces the nation to respect its diversity. The
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sequel, I Married a Communist, examines the consequences of abandoning Jewish
identity. The young, naïve Nathan Zuckerman falls prey to propaganda of the postwar
period, ignoring his Jewish father’s and Jewish mentor’s counsel.
American Pastoral (1997) resembles aspects of the Rabbit tetralogy, especially
Rabbit Redux (1971), in revisiting the Vietnam War era. In this opening to his trilogy,
Roth seeks to destroy the myths of both WASP and Jewish Americans who believed that
the postwar era signified a paradisiacal America. In the series’ next installment, I
Married a Communist (1998), Roth recreates the era of HUAC and McCarthyism,
revealing their anti-Semitic and generally intolerant overtones. At first mesmerized by the
postwar atmosphere, the young Nathan Zuckerman (Roth’s primary narrator throughout
the trilogy), disavows his Jewish identity in favor of a seemingly new, pure postwar
American identity that is disconnected from the past. However, Zuckerman’s father and
mentor both convey the importance of maintaining and recognizing the Jewishness within
the American character. Although postwar propaganda attempted to unite disparate ethnic
and racial groups through its presentation of “American” ideals, the novel shows that
“American” was a euphemism for WASPness. Thus, the attempt to homogenize
American culture under WASP paradigms was a threat to Jewishness and, even worse,
resembled Nazism. In concluding his trilogy with The Human Stain (2000), Roth reveals
the continuation of the McCarthy era-style persecution, which in itself hearkened back to
Puritan America, through the novel’s representation of the ordeals of both President
Clinton and the novel’s protagonist Coleman Silk.
While Morrison’s and Roth’s trilogies expand the representation of American
identity outside of Updike’s parameters, each series offer critiques of forced and
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contrived national narratives that attempt to define how Americans imagine themselves
and their nation. Therefore, these series of novels do not just reflect the postwar period,
but they also use the postwar era as a way to understand the nation since and thereby
offer a complex panorama of American society in the second half of the twentieth
century. Most significant is the authors’ extensive investigation into the very question of
American identity, an elusive yet politically consequential concept that frames how
Americans understand each other and define their nation. Though their styles,
approaches, and perspectives remain distinct from each other, they share extraordinary
talents of social, cultural, and political perception. By grouping these authors together, we
can see their dialogical relationship, as they illustrate a diverse conception of American
identity consistent with the ideals of democracy and equality.
In the varying combinations, these three authors have been at different times
studied in pairs. George Searles’s 1985 The Fiction of Philip Roth and John Updike
discusses these authors as the writers to whom “future generations of literary critics and
social demographers will most profitably return when seeking fictions from which to
derive a felt sense of life in the troubled second half of the twentieth century” (7). In his
article “Dream or Nightmare? Roth, Morrison, and America,” Richard Schur points out
that Roth’s and Morrison’s trilogies examine the “consequences [that] follow from the
distinction between the ethnic/racial/religious identifier and the imagined community of
America” (20). In his article “Under the Skin of John Updike: Self-Consciousness and the
Racial Unconscious,” Jay Prosser calls for more extensive studies of Updike alongside
Toni Morrison. Finally, the novels that compose these series reveal their cultural and
artistic significance in American literature. The Rabbit tetralogy has garnered two
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Pulitzer Prizes and a National Book Award; Toni Morrison’s Beloved won the Pulitzer
Prize and was, arguably, largely responsible for her Nobel Prize in 1993; Philip Roth’s
American Pastoral won the 1998 Pulitzer Prize.
The completion of Updike’s tetralogy predates most of Morrison’s trilogy and all
of Roth’s, so Morrison’s and Roth’s works respond more to the Rabbit novels than vice
versa. Nevertheless, the novels are strikingly intertextual: a female Rabbit Angstrom pops
up in Morrison’s Paradise, Updike’s Jewish golfers in Rabbit at Rest lend a critical eye
to American propaganda which Rabbit is all too eager to believe, Swede Levov is in
many ways Rabbit’s Jewish counterpart, and both Roth and Morrison explicitly examine
a paradise lost in postwar America. In terms of identity, these authors have been studied
for what their texts reveal about gender, racial, ethnic, and religious identities. However,
my dissertation seeks to unite their series of novels as explicitly dedicated to revealing
American identity not as a singular, didactic concept but a collaborative—and, thus—
democratic idea.
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CHAPTER II
JOHN UPDIKE’S RABBIT TETRALOGY:
RABBIT AND AMERICA’S SHARED IDENTITY CRISIS
A war was going on, and political differences, however shrill, were submerged in our
common identity as young Americans doing our bit to defeat Hitler and Mussolini and
Hirohito.
-John Updike (Self-Consciousness123)
Rabbit Angstrom in Context
The career of John Updike began similarly to those of his peers as the thennascent author gained early recognition for his vignettes of 1950s America in various
stories appearing in The New Yorker, sixteen of which were collected and published in
The Same Door (1959). In 1960, Updike published his second novel Rabbit, Run,
initiating what would become over the next thirty years his signature work, the Rabbit
tetralogy, now collectively referred to as Rabbit Angstrom. Rabbit Angstrom covers some
thirty years of American history, embodying the national spirit of the four decades
(1950s-1980s) spanning most of Harry “Rabbit” Angstrom’s adult life and ending in
1989 with Rabbit at Rest. Despite the series’ preoccupation with America in the late
twentieth century, Updike criticism, especially in regard to the Rabbit novels, has
centered on his aesthetic achievements, use of mythology, and religious philosophy. As
D. Quentin Miller points out, critics tend to treat the novels of Rabbit Angstrom
separately, “as if there are no unifying themes connecting them” (6). Although Marshall
Boswell’s The Rabbit Tetralogy: Mastered Irony in Motion (2001) and Peter J. Bailey’s
Rabbit (Un) Redeemed (2006) are among the first major works and remain among the
few to treat the series as a whole, Boswell and Bailey follow in the path of critics such as
Donald Greiner by characterizing Rabbit’s quest as a rendering of Updike’s religious
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faith and theology. Noting Updike’s reading of Søren Kierkegaard in the years just before
the publication of Rabbit, Run, Boswell discusses the novel (and the entire tetralogy) in
terms of Rabbit’s faith in his inner life with a “Kierkegaardian ethical center” (9).
Although theological readings of the novels of Rabbit Angstrom offer insight into
Updike’s intricate understanding of the interplay among Christian philosophy, faith, and
art, they tend to do so without juxtaposing the tetralogy’s relationship to American
identity portrayed in Rabbit, Run, and which he continued to explore throughout the
tetralogy. Indeed, in the opening novel, Updike frames Rabbit’s rejection of 1950s
consumerism and conformity politically as much as spiritually, and together the novels
exemplify Updike’s portrait of Rabbit and America’s shared identity crisis.
As Updike once declared, Rabbit’s being “has this political dimension” (Updike,
“Why Rabbit Had to Go,” 7). My dissertation, thus, builds on such critical works on
Updike as Dilvo Ristoff’s Updike’s America: The Presence of American History in John
Updike’s Rabbit Trilogy (1983) and John Updike’s Rabbit at Rest: Appropriating History
(1998), Miller’s John Updike and the Cold War (2001), and Jay Prosser’s “Updike, Race,
and the Postcolonial Project” (2006). These works lay a foundation for studying the
tetralogy’s political overtones that have been often overlooked in Updike criticism.
Although these works serve as important touchstones for steering criticism toward
recognizing Updike’s interest in documenting American history and the mindset of his
times, they do not fully investigate the extent to which Updike tries to unravel American
identity. In the 1983 work, for example, Ristoff calls our attention only to the usage of
history in his treatment of the then-trilogy. Additionally, Miller’s and Prosser’s works
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examine an array of Updike’s fiction rather than novels that are obviously tied together,
such as Rabbit Angstrom.
My work offers a concentrated treatment of Rabbit Angstrom not only as a
document of thirty years of American history, but more specifically as a “mega-novel”
that explores the nature of American identity. 17 Although Updike’s other works may
portray characters shaped by the historical context of the given time period, Updike most
fully explores the nature of American identity through Rabbit Angstrom. Updike clarifies
the uniqueness of the Rabbit novels:
Insofar as a writer can take an external view of his own work, my
impression is that the character of Harry ‘Rabbit’ Angstrom was for me a
way in—a ticket to the America all around me. . . . Each [novel] was
composed at the end of the decade and published at the beginning of the
next one; they became a kind of running report on the state of my hero and
his nation [emphasis mine], and their ideal reader became a fellowAmerican who had read and remembered the previous novels of Rabbit
Angstrom. (Updike, Rabbit Angstrom, vii)
Rabbit Angstrom is for Updike and his readers a way to understand how each decade has
affected Rabbit and their country alike. Therefore, Rabbit personifies the condition of his
country, and his problems reflect the nation’s. The two intertwined, as evidenced by
Rabbit’s dressing up as Uncle Sam at a Fourth of July parade in Rabbit at Rest, Rabbit
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and America share the identity crisis brought on by the social and political changes they
endure.18
The Rabbit novels seek to account for this identity crisis, especially among the socalled Silent Majority who enjoyed privileges and material comforts not yet experienced
in the nation’s history. The series’ initial text Rabbit, Run (1960) presents this national
identity crisis more subtly than do the other novels, having mystical and spiritual
overtones that are largely balanced by more direct political and cultural references in the
more earthy and later installments. Nevertheless, the central question Updike poses in
Rabbit, Run is how can the quintessential American, or at least the one who epitomizes
the traditional, propagandized, and hegemonic icon of American identity, (white, male,
and Protestant) be unhappy in America at the height of its power? The soul-searching
novel finds Rabbit Angstrom at a loss as he bounces among women, religions, jobs, and
homes. Despite its material excess and formidable military might, the country teeters on
extinction as it plays a nuclear version of chicken against the Soviet Union. For Rabbit,
though, these larger political problems filter down to his life through coerced conformity
and soulless consumerism. For Updike, Rabbit, at least in the opening novel, has
remained (or desires to remain) more purely American in spirit than his country, resisting
institutions and newfangled postwar culture that confine his individuality through coerced
religious and cultural conformity.
In Rabbit Redux (1971) Rabbit’s problems are more tangible than they are in
Rabbit, Run: a cheating wife, building tension between father and son, a deteriorating
town, and a nation bogged-down in a war it will not soon win. Updike’s reaction to the
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sixties was bewilderment at the privileged classes who seemed to revel in their nation’s
foreign and domestic cataclysms:19
One source of my grievance against the peace movement was that I hadn’t
voted for any of its figures—not for Abbie Hoffman or Father Daniel
Berrigan. . . . The protest, from my perspective, was in large part a
snobbish dismissal by the Eastern establishment; Cambridge professors
and Manhattan lawyers and their guitar-strumming children thought they
could run the country and the world better than this lugubrious bohunk
from Texas [Updike voted for Lyndon Johnson]. These privileged
members of a privileged nation believed that their enviable position could
be maintained without anything visibly ugly happening in the world. They
were full of aesthetic disdain for their own defenders, the business-suited
hirelings drearily pondering geopolitics and its bloody necessities down in
Washington. (Updike, Self-Consciousness, 124-125)
Yet Updike’s support for the Vietnam War was tepid at best, and he even expressed
displeasure that the New York Times had classified his position as “unequivocally for” the
war: “How could anyone not be at least equivocal about an action so costly, so cruel in its
details, so indecisive in its results?” (Updike, Self-Consciousness, 117). Indeed, Updike’s
support for American involvement was highly conditional, and he criticized the American
government’s handling of the war: “These butterfingered fat cats in their three-hundreddollar suits had dropped us all into a mess of blood and shame and embarrassment” (SelfConsciousness 134). He also criticized “doves” whom he believed were ignoring the
carnage and persecution the South Vietnamese were facing at the hands of communists
19
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and would face in the event of a unilateral American withdrawal: “I visualized tortured
and executed [villagers] by the Viet Cong [that wanted] to show us [sic] peasants that the
only possible social order was theirs” (Self-Consciousness 133). In his response to a
questionnaire about Vietnam, Updike wrote: “I do not believe that Ho Chi Minh and the
Viet Cong have a moral edge over us. . . . It is absurd to suggest that a village in the grip
of guerillas has freely chosen. . . . If their will is Communism, we should pick up our
chips and leave. Until such a will is expressed [through elections], I do not see how we
can abdicate our position in South Vietnam” (Self-Consciousness117). Admittedly
exasperated by his country’s divisiveness over the war, Updike left for England in 1969
where he began writing Rabbit Redux (1971). The lively sequel to Rabbit, Run displays
Rabbit’s notion of American identity unhinged, under fire, and yet at the same time
refreshingly undergoing revision thanks to Skeeter, a black Vietnam vet turned militant,
who awakens Rabbit to an alternate version of their country’s history, debunking for him
many of his precious American myths.
Redux can mean to restore, and the end of the novel suggests that Rabbit’s
marriage and his country will be restored. After the mayhem of Redux comes the
“happiest novel of the four,” Rabbit is Rich (1981), where we find that both Rabbit’s
marriage and his country have apparently healed in the ten years since the end of Redux
(Updike, Rabbit Angstrom, xv). But the novel’s title and its author’s characterization
belie an underlying cynicism while its hero and country are both “[r]unning out of gas”
(Rabbit is Rich 1). Both the country’s and Rabbit’s illusory prosperity stem from a touch
of luck and borrowed resources. Rabbit’s reward for reconciling with Janice is to be
handed a Toyota dealership from the father-in-law who took Rabbit on as a salesman, and
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“when the time was ripe had the kindness to die” (Rich 2). The novel is set in 1979, and
the US runs on the mercy of Big Oil and Japan’s dependable automobiles; broken-down
American cars are what Rabbit and other dealerships unload to unsuspecting poorer and
younger customers. As Stacey Olster observes, “the America Harry Angstrom is meant to
mirror is in steady decline” (46). President Carter’s symbolic gesture of pardoning draft
evaders epitomizes the feeble attempt to close the chapter on the Vietnam-era strife and
reconcile the country’s divisions. Rabbit sympathizes with Carter but sees him as weak,
especially in the wake of the Iran hostage crisis. On the surface, the turmoil of the sixties
and of Rabbit’s marriage have seemed to pass, but just as the 70s are known as the Tom
Wolfe-coined “Me” decade, Rabbit, too, turns more selfish and disconnects from his son
whom he increasingly belittles. Rabbit lusts after Webb Murkett’s nubile wife and begins
an affair with Thelma Harrison the wife of his longtime rival from high school.20 Images
of Rabbit as a miser carrying around and obsessing over his gold coins persist throughout
the text. In the world of Rabbit is Rich the sixties were just an isolated tremor, America
repositioning itself rather than experiencing any political or economic revolution. As
Rabbit’s employee Charlie Stavros tells him, “[t]he little man is acting like the oil
companies now. I’ll get mine, and screw you” (5).
In Rabbit at Rest (1990), Rabbit’s thirty-two-year-old son Nelson represents what
Rabbit’s America has bequeathed to the next generation. Like Nelson, 1989 America is
coked out, heavily in debt, and through shifty economics is bilking people out of money.
For Rabbit, though, the Reagan era is like “anesthetic” while Reagan himself “floated
above the facts” while “running up the national debt” but at least, in Rabbit’s mind, he
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was tough on communists, a “dream man” under whom “the world became a better
place” (54-55). While in Rich Rabbit identifies with the greed and selfishness that has
consumed his country, in Rest he prefers the “goofy” optimism of Reagan and the
commercial-like feel of his and Bush’s presidencies, a kind of fraud that he once despised
(54). Although he senses the financial voodoo of Reaganomics, Rabbit appreciates
Reagan’s Cold War saber-rattling as a sign of America’s return to greatness and leans on
the trope of strength as a defining element of American identity. Rabbit asks at one point,
“If there’s no Cold War, what’s the point of being an American?” (402). In associating
American-ness with the Cold War, Rabbit turns nostalgically to the past, believing
retrospectively that the Cold War had brought out the best in the country and exemplified
a time when America and he were at their peak. In his and his country’s declining health,
Rabbit clings to an imaginary version of both himself and his nation. Rabbit and America
are always better in retrospect.
Rabbit, Run and America’s Protestant Legacies
Written partly in response to Jack Kerouac’s On the Road (1957), Updike’s
second novel and the first installment of the Rabbit tetralogy took on an instantly iconic
work that had repackaged familiar tropes of American identity in 1950s hipster garb. 21
As Mikhail Bakhtin theorizes, road narratives have ideological implications, and On the
Road reinforces certain American myths endemic to the nature of the nation’s identity
(The Dialogic Imagination 244). On the Road, for example, follows in the tradition of
American novels having characters “light out for the territory,” searching for an Edenic
21
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paradise.22 In his foreword to Rabbit Angstrom, Updike writes that with Rabbit, Run he
wanted to break free from this trope. The characters of Melville and Twain, Updike
observes, exist on the fringes of American society and their experiences take place
spatially outside of it or on its edge. Although Rabbit is similar in spirit to such freedom
seekers, Updike’s realism posits him in the middle of everyday American life.
Additionally, Rabbit, Run reacts to Kerouac’s and other Beat Writers’ celebration of the
“perpetual NOW” and the mysterious “IT” (Weinreich 77). Indeed, the perpetual NOW
becomes a source of irony for Updike as he writes in the present tense about a young man
who clings to his storied past as a high school basketball star, suggesting that Kerouac’s
version of American identity rests in adolescent notions of freedom that, for Updike,
inevitably involve the abdication of social responsibility. But Updike refuses to conclude
that Rabbit Angstrom should simply grow up and go back to his alcoholic, immature
wife. Instead, as much as a carefree life on the road rankled Updike, so did the trappings
of 1950s American domesticity, which he was quick to link to America’s expanding
culture of consumerism. Had Updike read Kerouac’s novel (see footnote 22) he might
have found Sal Paradise’s settling into domesticity equally problematic. Rabbit possesses
what Sal seeks, but Rabbit begins to see postwar American domesticity as built upon a
fraud of consumerism and conformity. Consequently, as a MagiPeel salesman who
markets the product to housewives, Rabbit perceives his marriage and career as an
extension of that fraud.
Reflecting on his writing, Updike observes, “My novels are all about the search
for useful work. So many people these days have to sell things they don’t believe in and
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have jobs that defy describing” (qtd. in Greiner 51). Updike traces his sense of work ethic
through his deeply parochial upbringing. Speaking of his Pennsylvania roots, Updike
recalls that
The cautious spirit of Ben Franklin’s maxims still lived in the air. A penny
saved is a penny earned; willful waste is woeful want; a fool and his
money are soon parted; my grandfather quoted these often, as inherited
wisdom passed on. My father’s bitter economic experience supplied some
darker maxims. Another day, another dollar. Dog eat dog. You don’t get
something for nothing. I had been reared in the static, defensive world of
the Depression, to which the World War added a coloring embattlement
and patriotic pride. . . . I was an American Protestant. (Updike, Self
Consciousness 135)
As an “American [emphasis mine] Protestant,” Updike declares, he was “the beneficiary
of a number of revolts, Luther’s, which dumped the Pope; Cromwell’s, which dumped
the monarchy; and Sam Adams’s, which dumped the British” (135). Updike alludes to
Protestantism as a fundamental part of his American-ness and says that his work ethic
emanates from that combination. As Gail McDonald notes, in Protestantism “one’s work
becomes itself a sign of God’s blessing” (67). Work and its products signify spirituality,
but Updike shows that an American society immersed in consumerism loses spiritual
value as material possessions become evidence of one’s American identity. George
Searles argues that Updike takes part in “a long tradition of Protestant self-criticism” that
“does not attack Christianity itself, but the distortion and violation of its tenets” (20).
Stephen Webb also points to Updike as an important theological writer whose fiction
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documents “the eclipse of mainline Protestantism as a force for social change and a
carrier of cultural standards” (588). However, Searles and other Updike critics who focus
on Updike’s critique of Protestantism do so primarily as an analysis of Updike’s critique
of religion without regard to how the author links Protestantism and national identity. For
if Rabbit’s situation exemplifies the American predicament, then, for Updike, the
evaporation of substantive Protestant values leads to a loss of Rabbit’s and America’s
core identities. Thus, Updike explores American identities through the lens of its
religious legacies.
According to Gail McDonald, Max Weber demonstrates that “the acquisition of
possessions for their own sake, beyond a reasonable level of comfort was not the goal” of
the Protestant ethic (68), while Gregory Jay also notes that consumer identity “considers
cultural practices strictly as commodities” (115). In Rabbit, Run, Updike carefully
distinguishes consumerism from the Protestant work ethic. As a MagiPeel Peeler
salesman, Rabbit appears to sell a useful product rather than a product of indulgence. The
name of the product, however, ironically suggests that its usefulness is illusory; the only
“magic” of the peeler is the “fraud,” Rabbit thinks, that he helps to perpetuate by selling a
product whose functions remain opaque (Run 10). Additionally, Rabbit recognizes that
the true purpose of selling such fraudulent products is to support the “base of our
economy” (11).
Updike illustrates the subtlety of corporate America’s appropriation of the
Protestant ethic in the opening pages of the novel when Rabbit comes home and begins to
watch the Mickey Mouse Club on television. Rabbit “expects to learn something helpful
from [Jimmie the Mouseketeer] in his own line of work, which is demonstrating a kitchen
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gadget in five-and-dime stores around Brewer” (Rabbit, Run 10). Playing his
“Mouseguitar,” Jimmie sings “Proverbs, proverbs, they’re so true . . . proverbs tell us
what to do; proverbs help us all to bee—better—Mouse-ke-teers” (10). Although
Jimmie’s proverb begins with the Socratic advice “Know Thyself,” Jimmie incorrectly
defines this dictum as “be what you are” and then piously tells the audience that “God
wants some of us to become scientists, some of us to become artists, some of us to
become firemen and doctors and trapeze artists” (10). The narrator tells us that Rabbit
and Janice are Christians and that “God’s name makes them feel guilty.” Explaining that
“We must work,” Jimmie concludes his sermon by pinching his mouth and winking (10).
Jimmie the Mouseketeer has replaced the minister in the American pulpit, and instead of
working to enhance their relationship with God, Updike intimates, Americans work to
become good consumers as part of the congregation of Walt Disney. Rabbit, though,
picks up on Jimmie’s wink and tries to imitate him. Feeling akin to Jimmie—“he respects
him”—Rabbit appreciates that with his wink Jimmie acknowledges that they are both part
of the same sham: Jimmie of Walt Disney and Rabbit of the MagiPeel Peeler Company
(10). “We’re all in it together,” Rabbit thinks, “Fraud makes the world go round” (10).
Additionally, Jimmie’s list of roles that God wants us to fulfill are not just social roles,
but also are specific occupations that serve the community. Jimmie emphasizes work as a
desire of God, but his ironic wink implies that in reality Jimmie uses God’s name as a
tool of propaganda and as a mask for the desires of the consumer state. Jimmie’s
propaganda further demonstrates the subtlety of television’s role in playing to deeply
rooted paradigms of American identity and refashioning them for the consumer age. As a
popular character on a national television program, Jimmie invokes God, presuming that
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America is a religious nation. Certainly, the program plays to its demographic for
commercial purposes, but by so casually working God into the script, the program also
reinforces the idea that God is inextricable from American society in contrast to the
godlessness of the nation’s Cold War enemies. Although Cold War propaganda was
fashioned to promote an inclusive brand of American identity, it often resulted in subtle
repackaging of traditional American stereotypes. For example, although Jimmie does not
announce his God’s denomination, the subtext points to his Protestant Christian
incarnation as evidenced by Jimmie’s emphasis on God’s insistence that everyone must
work. Additionally, because of communism’s association with atheism, the presentation
of the United States as a God-believing nation remained important to maintaining a
central core of the nation’s identity despite increasing undercurrents of secularity. Updike
was concerned with American religious shallowness in the postwar period,23 and Rabbit,
Run echoes sentiments expressed in Will Herberg’s Protestant, Catholic, Jew (1955) in
which Herberg argues that the eponymous brands of religion in the US “were but varietal
expressions of a more substantial and fundamental reality, namely, the American Way of
Life,” and “Herberg saw them as at root expressing a thinly disguised American
patriotism or even boosterism” (J. Wilson 57). Indeed, in Rabbit, Run tenets and language
of American Protestantism are slyly appropriated by commercial interests to induce
conformity, groupthink, and surrender of idiosyncratic identity, all necessary for rampant
consumerism.
From Jimmie’s “lesson,” Marshall Boswell concludes that Rabbit “learns that his
social identity as a MagiPeel demonstrator is a mask that serves to conceal his inward,
existential identity,” but that in recognizing this inauthenticity, Rabbit becomes aware of
23
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his “authentic self” (33). Abigail Cheever argues that the label of being a fraud and the
epithet “phony” were appellations that became “omnipresent during the postwar period”
as did concerns that “[t]oo close a symbiosis between the individual and the various
social contexts with which he or she negotiated” existed (2). In addition to phoniness,
Cheever continues, postwar society was also concerned with the authenticity of the self:
“Authenticity in the postwar period is imagined as that which separates the individual
from the social world, as what might be uniquely one’s own than a consequence of social
influence,” meaning that culture and society masked the “true” individual beneath (3).
Indeed, a flood of sociological and psychological studies poured into the marketplace to
“diagnose a specific postwar malaise” representing “a modern cultural moment” that had
become obsessed with “struggle for mastery between the individual and her conditions,
and one that the individual is inevitably losing” (Cheever 6-7). Although Rabbit does not
use phony (a term popularized famously by J.D. Salinger through Rabbit’s literary
contemporary Holden Caulfield) while watching the Mickey Mouse Club, Rabbit senses
the he has become a fraud like Jimmie, “a grown man who wears circular big ears” (10).24
Indeed, before Rabbit comes home to Janice, he watches (and later interrupts) some kids
playing basketball and admires the fact that the boys are “doing this for themselves, not a
show for some adult in a double-breasted cocoa suit” (1). The boys are authentic because
they are not putting on a performance like Rabbit and Jimmie who are dressed in their
costumes and playing to their audience in order to sell a product. Rabbit’s identity crisis
arises because he is torn between the practical function of his phony—i.e., socially
influenced—identity and his authentic core that society forces him to cover up with his
24
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business suit. For example, after leaving Janice, Rabbit drives out of town and spots an
Amish couple and thinks “of the good life these people lead, of the way they keep clear
of all this phony business, this twentieth-century vitamin racket” (27). Later, he thinks of
his father-in-law, Fred Springer—a car salesman, as an “old phony” who adopts his
Episcopalian faith as a means for social climbing (87).
Updike reinforces his concern for the commodification of faith in a scene that
foreshadows the death of Rabbit’s baby daughter and equates Reverend Eccles’s
solutions with shallow Christian legalism.25 When Reverend Eccles phones Rabbit to tell
him that Janice is having the baby, Rabbit leaves his lover, Ruth, to be with his wife
when she gives birth. After the baby, Becky, is born, Rabbit joins Janice in her hospital
room. During his second visit, Rabbit and Janice watch a game show during which
elderly women tell about their tragedies and earn money “according to how much
applause there is;” however, “by the time the M.C. gets done delivering the commercials
and kidding them about their grandchildren and their girlish hairdos there isn’t much
room for tragedy left” (Run 186). The show “makes for a kind of peace” as Rabbit and
Janice hold hands, their marriage on the verge of what turns out to be a brief
reconciliation (186). For the second time, television shows up at a crucial point in the
novel. The hospital television scene marks Rabbit’s return to the marriage, whereas
watching The Mickey Mouse Club had marked his desertion. The women’s trivializing
their lives for money is another example of the decline of spirituality, another
perpetuation of the fraud, and signifies that Rabbit’s return to Janice is also insincere. He
has returned to Janice, not out of love, but out of guilt and obligation. He feels that his
25
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desertion and adultery would lead to either Janice’s or Becky’s death, meted out by
divine justice. He also tells Ruth that he is returning to Janice only until the baby is born.
But instead, Rabbit soon forgets about Ruth. His mother asks, “And what’s going to
happen to this poor girl you lived with in Brewer?” (195). Rabbit nonchalantly replies,
“Her? Oh, she can take care of herself. She didn’t expect anything,” though he
immediately “tastes the lie in it” (195). Back with Janice, Rabbit begins to settle into his
old life, mends his relationship with his in-laws and, at the suggestion of Eccles, attends
church. Having accepted a job from his father-in-law, Rabbit once again dons his mask,
dresses in “his new pale-gray suit to sell cars in,” and thinks:
the job at the lot is easy enough, if it isn’t any work for you to bend the
truth. You see the clunkers come in with 80,000 miles on them and the
pistons so loose the oil just pours through and they get a washing and the
speedometer tweaked back and you hear yourself saying this represents a
real bargain. He’ll ask for forgiveness. (201)
Though he returns to church, Rabbit appreciates only its superficialities and its
aesthetic appearance: he in his suit and loving “the ones dressed for church” while hating
“all the people on the street in dirty everyday clothes, advertising their belief that the
world arches over a pit, that death is final, that the wandering thread of his feeling leads
nowhere” (201). Gone is Rabbit the mystic for the time being while he adopts the
superficial religious views permeating his social circle: Act sinfully, God punishes,
repent and God rewards, or in other words, immediate and obvious revelation of God’s
will directly correlates to Rabbit’s actions. Having rejoined Janice, Rabbit “considers
himself happy, lucky, blessed, forgiven, and wants to give thanks” (201). The
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shallowness of Rabbit’s “rebirth” reveals itself as Rabbit kneels to pray, but his eye
wanders to Eccles’s attractive wife. After church, Rabbit soon mistakes Eccles’s wife’s
mundane pleasantness as a sexual overture and, to her shock, tells her that though she’s
“a doll,” he’s “got this wife now” (208). Having “rejected” Eccles’s wife, he returns
home “jazzed up” and ready to have sex with Janice, who is exhausted, sore, and
stitched-up from childbirth (209). Feeling that she owes him for his good deed—i.e.,
returning home without having asked her for anything—Rabbit believes he should be
rewarded sexually despite his wife’s condition. Janice, though, refuses him, and Rabbit
storms out, leaving her for a second time. Upset and drunk, Janice accidentally drowns
Becky in the bathtub. The narrative slyly suggests that God does indeed punish Rabbit by
letting Becky drown: “He [Rabbit] rolls back his sleeve and reaches down and pulls the
plug; the water swings and the drain gasps. He watches the line of water slide slowly and
evenly down the wall of the tub, and then with a crazed vertical cry the last of it sucked
away. He thinks how easy it was, yet in all His strength God did nothing. Just that little
rubber stopper to lift” (237). God’s unwillingness to intervene seems to suggest a
moralizing tone. But such a reading trivializes Rabbit’s tragedy, reducing human fate to a
Pavlovian reward-and-punishment relationship with God and, in effect, making God akin
to the M.C. on TV, a game show host who doles out winnings to those who suffer
without cause or who do good deeds and renders wrath upon evil doers.
The novel’s trap for the reader, so to speak, lies in the apparent options that it
lays out. If the reader believes that God punishes Rabbit for leaving Janice, then the
reader must also accept Rabbit’s fraudulence, conformity, social climbing, superficial
religiosity, and sleazy salesmanship as virtues to be rewarded. More broadly, the novel

49
also criticizes a prevailing cultural view that America’s postwar prosperity was God’s
reward for religiosity and protection of individual freedom. Such a view of events in the
“myth-history of the nation” make America’s “God-given role to lead the world” and its
postwar abundance “seem preordained” (Sharp 166). As Jay notes, the “[h]istories of the
United States regularly narrate American selfhood in terms of European tyranny versus
American freedom,” and in the cases of World War II and the Cold War, Germany and
the USSR and its Eastern bloc satellites were the latest reincarnations of such tyranny
(115). In indicting consumer America as soulless, Updike challenges the mythos that
portrays America as reaping the benefits of God’s blessings. Such a transparent God,
whose will humans easily discern from fortune and misfortune, feast and famine, is a
fraudulent God who does not derive from America’s Protestant roots. Marshall Boswell
relates the following: “Having caught wind that Updike is a self-proclaimed Christian,
priests and other fellow believers have gone to his work expecting confirmation of their
positivistic, God-ordered moral vision, only to encounter a dialectical anti-theology that
borders on existential atheism” (67). Updike rejects such an orderly moral world where
God so clearly punishes the wicked and rewards the righteous, a view that Reverend
Eccles’s legalism accommodates.
Thus, one of the key figures in the novel is Reverend Jack Eccles, the Springer’s
Episcopalian minister. Boswell characterizes the contrast that Updike draws between
Rabbit and Eccles:
Eccles is a man without faith, a believer in human solutions and
conventional ethics. His name not only evokes Ecclesiasticus, the author
of the eponymously titled Old Testament book of stoic, earthbound
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wisdom, but also hints at Updike’s ironic strategy: Rabbit’s outwardly
animalistic and sensuous demeanor conceals an intensely spiritual man,
while the minister’s ecclesiastical surface conceals an almost pagan
unbeliever. Whereas Rabbit is the Knight of Faith, Eccles is a pastoral
shepherd. (Boswell 58)
More succinctly, though, Updike draws a contrast between the theologies of two
denominations: Episcopalianism and Lutheranism. While Rabbit is a spiritual man of
faith, Eccles is an earthly man of actions, and for Updike in this contrast lies a crucial
aspect of America’s identity crisis. For Rabbit to embody the true American spirit, he
must embody the spirit of the core of America’s religious heritage, and the striking
difference Updike illustrates between the two characters epitomizes the theological
fissure in the American Protestant tradition, specifically between legalism and
antinomianism.26
The novel’s criticism of Eccles’s Episcopalianism echoes a tradition of Protestant
criticism of Anglicanism and Catholicism: that they are more cosmetic than spiritual.27
Again, Rabbit thinks of his father-in-law’s Episcopalianism as a cover for his phoniness,
and the narrative points out that the Springers rarely attend church. Additionally, the
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Springers mainly enlist Eccles in order to quell the gossip about Rabbit and Janice’s
marriage. Attending Eccles’s church, Rabbit feels uncomfortable:
The affected voice, nasal-pious, in which he intones prayers affects Rabbit
disagreeably; there is something disagreeable about the whole Episcopal
service, with its strenuous ups and downs, its canned petitions, its cursory
little chants. He has trouble with the kneeling pad; the small of his back
aches; he hooks his elbows over the back of the pew in front of him to
keep from falling backward. He misses the familiar Lutheran liturgy,
scratched into his heart like a weathered inscription. In this service he
blunders absurdly, balked by what seem willful dislocations of worship.
He feels too much is made of collecting the money. He scarcely listens to
the sermon at all. (Run 202)
Discussing his Lutheran sensibility during the 1960s, Updike states: “Faith alone,
faith without any false support of works, justified the Lutheran believer and distinguished
him from the Catholic and Calvinist believer. In all varieties of Christian faith resides a
certain contempt for the world and for attempts to locate salvation and perfection here”
(Self-Consciousness 136). Because of its reliance on faith alone as the means for
receiving God’s grace, Lutheranism shares with Updike “antinomian tendencies” (Webb
584). In a letter to a friend, Martin Luther writes, “Be a sinner and sin boldly, but believe
and rejoice in Christ more strongly, who triumphed over sin, death, and the world; as
long as we live here, we must sin;” however, Luther rejected the idea that adherence to
his doctrine of faith gives license to sin freely (Luther, Letter). In rejecting certain sects
of antinomians whom he claimed misunderstood his teachings, Luther did so on the
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grounds that such antinomians claimed that faith alone permitted or excused immoral
conduct. For Luther, persons sincere in their faith and who are guided by the Holy Spirit
would not intentionally act immorally, consciously not submit to God’s laws, or not seek
forgiveness for sins.28 Sin comes about naturally as part of humanity’s depravity, but this
does not excuse willful and unconscionable sinful acts. Through Rabbit, Updike
illustrates Luther’s delicate balancing act between Lutheranism’s antinomian tendency
and adherence to moral law. Rabbit sins, but not maliciously; he sins in the spirit of
Luther’s order to “sin boldly” or to sin as an expression of faith, a paradox indeed, but
nevertheless consistent with Luther’s theology. Rabbit’s sins manifest from his angst, his
spiritual longing, the tension between flesh and soul, all of which Rabbit seeks to satisfy.
Thus, he sins from his very sincerity that befuddles the Episcopalian Eccles. Indeed,
Eccles accuses Rabbit of being “monstrously selfish” and “a coward” who “doesn’t care
about right or wrong” (Run 115).
As with most other characters in the novel, Eccles condemns Rabbit for violating
the sacrament of marriage yet fails to appreciate the depth of Rabbit’s spiritual crisis.
Eccles misdiagnoses the root of Rabbit and Janice’s marital troubles and assumes that
Rabbit shares his own superficial qualities, telling him, “It’s the strange thing about you
mystics, how often your little ecstasies wear a skirt” (111). Ruth, though, becomes “a
skirt” for Rabbit only when he gives in momentarily to social pressures and returns to
Janice as a result of Eccles’s meddling; only then does he dismiss her as everyone else
does. Otherwise, Updike portrays Ruth, not simply as the whore that other characters see
her as, but as Rabbit’s spiritual wife as opposed to Janice, his legal one. When Ruth asks
Rabbit sarcastically if he thinks they’re married, he replies sincerely, “Yes; let’s be,” just
28
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before consummating their relationship (68). After they learn of Becky’s death, Eccles
and his atheist wife, Lucy, argue over Eccles’s role in reuniting Rabbit and Janice, which
precipitated the baby’s drowning. When Lucy asks, “Why were you so anxious to get
them back together?” Eccles replies, “Marriage is a sacrament,” but “half-expects her to
laugh” (229). Lucy, though, responds by asking, “Even a bad marriage?” to which Eccles
answers, “Yes” (229). Eccles demonstrates his concern not for the spirit of Rabbit and
Janice’s marriage, but rather the letter of it, highlighting a key difference between
Episcopalianism and other Protestant denominations such as the emphasis placed on the
sacraments as a conduit for receiving God’s grace. Eccles also presumes to know God’s
plan for Rabbit and sees his duty as acting as God’s agent to do his will. Additionally,
Eccles thinks that Becky’s death has solidified Rabbit and Janice’s marriage: “this
tragedy, terrible as it is, has at least united you and Janice in a sacred way” (241).
However, Rabbit remains wary of the sacrament. Even after Becky’s death, the Springers
offer Rabbit forgiveness, and his marriage is seemingly healed in the midst of the
tragedy. Rabbit then asks Eccles if being a good husband is enough. Eccles, though,
misunderstands and replies “You mean to earn forgiveness? I’m sure it is, carried out
through a lifetime” (241). Therefore, Eccles believes that Rabbit’s respect of the
sacrament will earn him forgiveness. However, Rabbit asks instead not for forgiveness,
but if marriage is enough for “[t]he thing behind everything” (241) or grace, which for
Updike is “our nonmaterial side that seeks out what is good” (qtd. in Trachtenburg 8).
Eccles, though, claims not to believe in “the thing” or the “it” as Rabbit does and
implores him to believe that his marriage is sacred. Rabbit “clings to this belief, though it
seems to bear no relation to the colors and sounds of the big sorrowing house, the dabs
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and arcs or late sunshine in the little jingle of plants on the glass table, or the almost
wordless supper he and Janice share in her bedroom” (Run 241).
Through the Angstrom’s family minister, the Lutheran Fritz Kruppenbach,
Updike rebukes Eccles’s Episcopalian theology. Kruppenbach appears as a twentiethcentury Luther (he insists in his German accent that Eccles lock himself up to pray).29
Indeed, through Kruppenbach, Updike explicitly invokes America’s Protestant heritage
that stemmed in part from Luther’s revolt against the Pope. Nevertheless, Kruppenbach
reprimands Eccles for meddling and for placing acts above faith Eccles, thus, reads as a
caricature of a meddling Episcopalian attempting to cure sinners of their sins before the
Second Coming, and Updike uses Kruppenbach to set him straight. The dispute between
Eccles and Kruppenbach serves as a microcosm for the longstanding religious grappling
over America’s identity. As Eccles seeks out Kruppenbach in order to help with Rabbit
and Janice’s marriage, Kruppenbach chastises the younger clergyman:
[D]o you think this is your job, to meddle in these people’s lives? I know
what they teach you at seminary now: this psychology and that. But I
don’t agree with it. You think now your job is to be an unpaid doctor, to
run around and plug up the holes and make everything smooth. I don’t
think that. I don’t think that’s your job. (Run 146)
Continuing his diatribe, Kruppenbach declares:
There is no reason or measure in what we must do … If Gott [sic] wants to
end misery He’ll declare the Kingdom now. . . . How big do you think
29
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critics have overlooked Luther’s influence in his works (Plath 94). Since Barth can be seen as a twentiethcentury Luther, Kruppenbach might be best described as an embodiment of the two. And it seems here that
Kruppenbach and Eccles replay some of the debates of Luther’s and Barth’s reformations.
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your little friends look among the billions that God sees? In Bombay now
they die in the streets every minute. . . . There is your role: to make
yourself an exemplar of faith. There is where comfort comes from: faith,
not what little finagling a body can do here and there, stirring the bucket.
In running back and forth you run from the duty given you by God, to
make your faith powerful, so when the call comes you can go out and tell
them, ‘Yes, he is dead, but you will see him again in Heaven.’. . . It’s all
in the Book—a thief with faith is worth all the Pharisees. (146-147) 30
That Kruppenbach so forcefully denounces Eccles’s efforts, and in effect his theology, is
a testament to Updike’s agreement with Kruppenbach’s thought. So too is Eccles’s
reaction. Although angered by Kruppenbach, Eccles reacts with a flood of self-doubt, and
his previous confident façade begins to crack: “His [Eccles’s] depression is so deep that
he tries to gouge it deeper by telling himself He’s right, he’s right as he sits behind the
pearl-gray steering wheel. He bows his head so his forehead touches an arc of its perfect
plastic circle, but he can’t cry; he’s parched. His shame and failure hang downward in
him heavy but fruitless” (147).
Remarking on his Lutheran upbringing, Updike states that the “world is fallen,”
agreeing with Kruppenbach that human misery is endemic to existence (Self30

Kruppenbach’s speech to Eccles is similar in content to that of Martin Luther’s letter to a friend
that advises:
If you are a preacher of mercy, do not preach an imaginary but the true mercy. If the mercy is
true, you must therefore bear the true, not an imaginary sin. God does not save those who are
only imaginary sinners. Be a sinner, and let your sins be strong, but let your trust in Christ be
stronger, and rejoice in Christ who is the victor over sin, death, and the world. We will commit
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Peter (2. Peter 3:13) are looking forward to a new heaven and a new earth where justice will
reign. It suffices that through God's glory we have recognized the Lamb who takes away the
sin of the world. No sin can separate us from Him, even if we were to kill or commit adultery
thousands of times each day. Do you think such an exalted Lamb paid merely a small price
with a meager sacrifice for our sins? Pray hard for you are quite a sinner. (Luther, Letter)
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Consciousness 137). The novel, therefore, admonishes utopian thinking, whether it be
from postmillennialists or from the political and cultural ideologies of Updike’s era that
threatened or had threatened to overtake American society. In the thirties, utopian
thinking was behind Hitler’s fascism as part of his demented plan to build a perfect
Germany; in the forties and fifties it was communism’s31 and consumerism’s competing
propaganda that at least shared promises of ending economic misery in addition to the
strain of postmillennialism to which I have previously alluded. Utopian thinking also
forms one part of another great schism in American Protestantism. Certainly many early
American Protestants arrived believing that America offered the promise of a New Israel,
and fantasies of a Christian utopia were abundant; such visions are described countless
times in histories of American religion. But the visions are not uniform, nor are they
coherent, and they are often at odds. Updike’s skepticism places him in line with early
American critics of a Christian utopia who rejected the Puritans’ vision of a paradisiacal
Christian theocracy, just as Updike, I have argued, rejected mid-century attempts to
correlate America’s postwar “success” with evidence of providence. In reaching to the
roots of Protestantism, Updike reflects Luther’s own rejection of a New Jerusalem
initiated by Christian sects. Luther denounced such endeavors as “impatient efforts” and
arrogant attempts to force God’s hand or to pretend to know God’s timetable for the
Second Coming (qtd. in Oberman 64). Updike traces the American Protestant lineage
from Luther to Cromwell to Sam Adams. In identifying Luther as the fountainhead of
Protestantism, Updike implies that the spirit of American Protestant identity is more in
31
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line with Luther than, say, the Puritans, who, in their enthusiasm at the prospect of
forging a Christian utopia, had become radicalized from European Calvinists and other
more “conscientious” Puritans (Bercovitch, The American Jeremiad, 40). 32
As Marshall Boswell warns, “Updike is no theologian” but an artist, and his use
of theology is “libertine”; therefore, it would be a mistake to read Rabbit, Run as simply a
call to Lutheranism (24). After all, Kruppenbach may be Luther, but Rabbit certainly is
not. Instead, as an elder, conservative Pennsylvania-German, Kruppenbach symbolizes
Luther’s Old World orthodoxy while Rabbit is its Americanized progeny. In essence,
America as an idea is what Luther hath wrought by igniting the individualist spirit and
laying the basis for a more personal and private relationship with God. In their fervency
to establish a rigidly enforced Christian community, the Puritans had not only gone
against Luther’s rebuke of millennialism (and Calvin’s as well) but also that very strain
of individuality through which Luther’s teachings really took hold.33 In accusing Eccles
of trying to play psychologist and cop, Kruppenbach reprimands him for representing the
kind of Christian community where the church becomes authoritarian and an agency of
social control. For Kruppenbach, the church is a place to express and join in faith only
and so the church’s role in the community is a place of voluntary worship rather than an
intrusive institution. Eccles represents the social forces that demand Rabbit act in
accordance with the rules of the community. Pressuring Rabbit to return to Janice, Eccles
attempts to squelch Rabbit’s doubts about his humanist moralizing by telling him that
32

Bercovitch cites Roger Williams and his letters to John Cotton as examples of resistance to the
more radical American Puritans.
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Indeed, early Americans increasingly reacted against rigid visions of the Christian community,
especially those that entirely threatened to subsume all secular life. Second, the flocking of the masses to
Luther away from the Catholic Church is a phenomenon often attributed less to the specifics of Luther’s
theology than to its general implications for each individual.
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man’s relationship to God “was all settled centuries ago, in the heresies of the early
Church” (115). However, Rabbit senses Eccles’s disingenuousness: “It hits Rabbit
depressingly that [Eccles] really wants to be told. Underneath all this I-know-more-aboutit-than-you heresies-of-the-early-Church business he really wants to be told about it,
wants to be told that it is there, that he’s not lying to all those people every Sunday”
(115).
Rabbit instinctively rejects that his intuitive faith could be so easily dismissed on
Eccles’s human terms.34 Eccles’s later confrontation with Kruppenbach and his
subsequent self-doubt confirm Rabbit’s instincts. Rabbit explains to Eccles that he
doesn’t “know about all this theology, but I’ll tell you I do feel, I guess, that somewhere
behind all this . . . there’s something that wants me to find it” (110). To Rabbit, God
“seems obvious” (79) and despite Ruth’s “mocking and “Eccles’s blinking,” God’s
existence appears “plain, standing here, that if there is this floor there is a ceiling, that the
true space in which we live is upward space” (99). Upon first meeting Rabbit, Eccles
attempts to gauge Rabbit’s sense of morality, and when he sees that Rabbit is
unremorseful about leaving Janice, Eccles is surprised when Rabbit answers “without
hesitation” that he believes in God (92). Rabbit’s confident pronouncement startles him
because of the seeming disconnection between Rabbit’s lack of moral responsibility and
yet his sincere belief. For Rabbit, feeling God has nothing to do with one’s morality; God
is there no matter what, for Luther writes “No sin can separate us from Him even if we
were to kill or commit adultery thousands of times each day” (Luther, Letter). Eccles
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remains both mystified and fascinated by Rabbit’s sense of God and the mysterious “it”
or “thing” for which Rabbit professes to be searching:
“Harry,” he asks, sweetly yet boldly, “why have you left her? You’re
obviously deeply involved with her.”
“I told ja. There was this thing that wasn’t there.”
“What thing? Have you ever seen it? Are you sure it exists?” (114)
Exasperated with Rabbit’s inability to articulate “the thing,” Eccles demands, “What is it?
What is it? Is it hard or soft? Harry. Is it blue? Is it red? Does it have polka dots?” (115).
Eccles is unable to understand that his demand to have the “it” named or described
undermines the notion of faith, of believing in what cannot be seen or articulated.
Additionally, Eccles’s desperateness comes partly from his realization that Rabbit does
not need him or any other intermediary in order to know or feel God. By emphasizing his
feelings, Rabbit not only resists Eccles’s oppressive dogma, but also exemplifies the
uniqueness of the American religious experience.
Harold Bloom argues that the “God of the American Religion is an experiential
God, so radically within our being as to become a virtual identity with what is most
authentic (oldest and best) in the self” (259). Bloom dubs the peculiarity of the American
religion as a form of Gnosticism or an intuitive, private knowledge of God. Citing
William James’s “Emersonianism,” Bloom observes that the “crucial elements that mark
the American difference” in religion are “solitude, individuality, and the pragmatism of
feelings, acts, and experiences . . . Awareness, centered on the self, is faith for an
American” and “that our partly hidden national religion teaches us a purely inner
freedom” (25-26). Although Bloom points to the 1801 religious gathering at Cane Ridge
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as a seminal moment in the development of America’s religious idiosyncrasies,35 the trail
leads further to the Reformation and its aftershocks. For instance, Bercovitch, similar to
Updike, reaches further back to Luther in locating the origins of Western individualism
that culminated in the American sense of self (Bercovitch, Puritan Origins 11). Bloom
also notes that Williams James “permanently marked the American sense of religion” in
describing it as “wholly experiential”: (quoting James) “Religion, therefore, as I now ask
you arbitrarily to take it, shall mean for us the feelings, acts, and experiences of
individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation
to whatever they may consider the divine” (qtd. in Bloom 25). In his speech
Emersonianism, predating Bloom’s work by seven years, Updike calls Emerson “the
prophet of the new American religion” and observes that Emerson and Barth share
similar concerns over the loss of faith in modern Christianity (Updike, Emersonianism,
7). Rabbit is the inheritor of that particular kind of belief that has run thick through the
American Protestant bloodline and embodies those crucial American elements. He partly
“exhibits Emerson’s positive view of the universe” and “even believes that the universe is
somehow created for him” (De Bellis 158). Furthermore, Rabbit also exhibits the
Emersonian thought that it always seemed to him that, “Life was ahead of theology, and
the people knew more than the preachers taught” (Emerson, “Contemplations,” 137).
Another uniquely American feature is what Eccles refers to when he calls Rabbit
“monstrously selfish;” theologian Philip J. Lee, from whom Bloom borrows the idea of
the Gnostic Protestant, calls this the exalting of the self over the community, where
“society is sacrificed in the individualism of American spiritual life” (Run 115) (Bloom
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27). For Bloom, the problem resides in the Gnostic belief—which began, like
Christianity, he argues, as a Jewish heresy—that retained “the spark” of the “uncreated,
of God” and leads to the elevation of self over community (27). Updike, too, is aware of
the conundrum he has created. As much as Rabbit feels God or searches for the “it,”
Updike infuses Rabbit with enough selfishness to make readers recoil in disgust from his
actions. Arrogant and full of himself—“I’m lovable,” he tells Ruth—Rabbit audaciously
boasts that he is a saint (Run 124). Remarking on the havoc he wreaks by leaving Janice,
he declares, “If you have the guts to be yourself . . . other people’ll pay your price” (Run
129). Donald Greiner notes that Updike recognized the unsolvable problem in Rabbit,
Run: “Updike explains: ‘There is no reconciliation between the inner, intimate appetites
and the external consolations of life . . . there is no way to reconcile these individual
wants and the very real need of any society to set strict limits and to confine its
members’” (Greiner, John Updike’s Novels, 50).
As Ruth tells Rabbit after he leaves Janice and comes to stay with her, “Say. You
really think you have it made,” and later, after he takes a part-time gardening job from the
elderly, fawning Mrs. Smith, “look at all you’ve got. You’ve got Eccles to play golf with
every week and to keep your wife from doing anything to you. You’ve got your flowers,
and you’ve got Mrs. Smith in love with you. You’ve got me” (Run 124). Rabbit’s best of
both worlds existence, though, is destined to collapse, not out of direct punishment for his
sins, but because tragedy and suffering are also endemic to existence. As Greiner
observes, Updike does not make the mistake of assuming that Thomas Jefferson’s
insistence that the “pursuit of happiness” promises its fulfillment (Greiner, “Updike,”
150). Instead, in Rabbit, Run Updike takes Jefferson’s idea of pursuit literally. Rabbit’s
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run, his pursuit of happiness, appears perpetual, as Greiner also notes, “Like America,
Updike’s characters seek recurring confirmation of their innocence” (150). Indeed, at
Becky’s funeral Rabbit horrifies Janice and the rest of the gallery by insisting that they
recognize his innocence in Becky’s death:
“Don’t look at me,” he says. “I didn’t kill her.” This comes out of his
mouth clearly, in tune with the simplicity he feels now in everything.
Heads talking softly snap around at a voice so sudden and cruel. They
misunderstand. He just wants this straight. He explains to the heads, “You
all keep acting as if I did it. I wasn’t anywhere near. She’s the one.” He
turns to her [Janice], and her face, slack as if slapped, seems hopelessly
removed from him. “Hey it’s O.K.,” he tells her. “You didn’t mean to.”
He tries to take her hand but she snatches it back like from a trap and
looks toward her parents, who step toward her. His face burns. His
embarrassment is savage. Forgiveness was in his heart and now it’s hate.
He hates his wife’s face. She doesn’t see. She had a chance to join him in
truth, and she turned away. He sees that among the heads even his
mother’s horrified, blank with shock, a wall against him; she asks what
have they done to him then she does it too. A suffocating sense of injustice
blinds him. He turns and runs. (Run 253)
Just as Rabbit horrifies the gallery with what it sees as his monstrous selfishness and his
cowardly refusal to accept responsibility, Janice horrifies Rabbit by refusing “to join him
in truth,” or to recognize the paradoxical nature of their shared human predicament: They
are guilty only of being human, but they are both innocent because of their inherent
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destiny to suffer (253). Rabbit, though, lacks the ability to adequately articulate any of
this to those who stand around him, so his outburst only further disgusts the onlookers.
Since he cannot make them understand, Rabbit runs, disconnecting himself from the
communal show of grief. He is equally dismayed that the community believes it can
share in his personal torment and that the ritual of the funeral can somehow rectify
Becky’s death: Eccles and the other mourners are “false,” all of them “except his dead
daughter” and his own private grief (Run 251). Rabbit stays to true to himself, rejecting
another one of Eccles’s sacraments.
Rabbit runs, but as Greiner notes, Updike’s sympathy may go with him but his
approval does not, or perhaps more succinctly, Rabbit has no other choice but to face his
society. Updike states that in preparing for the sequel, Rabbit Redux, he imagined that
Rabbit “would have run around the block, returned to Mt. Judge and Janice, faced what
music there was, and be now an all too-settled working man” (Updike, Rabbit Angstrom,
xiii). For characters on the fringes of society like Dean Moriarty who continue on the
road, their spirit for the perpetual physical quest eludes the reality for most Americans
that Updike wants to explore. This is why Updike’s novel inverts the typical road
narrative to which Kerouac’s novel adheres. Kerouac’s novel, at least in regard to the
chronotope, is typical of the road narratives that unfold:36 characters meet in chance
encounters, they have adventures. Rabbit’s road is his alone, he meets no one of
significance, and he circles back to Mt. Judge. His American reality is that irresolvable
tension between individual freedom and the demands of society. More pointedly, though,
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Updike has chosen to pinpoint Rabbit’s predicament as a true American whose country
seems to be losing its identity.
Rabbit Redux: Rabbit’s Tangled Garden
Rabbit Redux (1971) takes place in 1969, ten years after the events of Rabbit,
Run. In this sequel to Rabbit, Run (1960), we learn that Rabbit and Janice reconciled not
long after their daughter’s funeral, and for ten years have been living a typical blue collar
existence. Janice, though, turns the tables on Rabbit by having an affair with her coworker, Charlie Stavros, and moves in with him, leaving Rabbit with their thirteen-year
old son Nelson. Once the nonconformist, Rabbit is a passionate supporter of the Vietnam
War and all things (white) American. Nevertheless, in Janice’s absence, he takes in an
eighteen-year-old hippie, Jill, and a black Vietnam veteran-turned-radical, Skeeter.
Intolerant of having a white girl living with a black man, Rabbit’s white neighbors set fire
to his house, killing Jill, while Skeeter narrowly escapes. In the aftermath, Rabbit and
Janice move toward another reconciliation while Rabbit reconsiders his rabid patriotism.
Updike claims that he had not thought of writing a sequel to Rabbit, Run until
1970. As the author explains, he turned to writing Rabbit Redux in order to fulfill an
obligation to his publisher, Alfred K. Knopf, after failing to produce a work about James
Buchanan, a fellow Pennsylvanian and the ignominious President who was either
unfortunate enough to be president on the eve of the Civil War or whose gross
incompetency hastened the nation’s worst outbreak of internal violence in its history.37
Updike saw in Buchanan a sympathetic figure, a president whose practicality has been
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overlooked, a president who was torn apart by the raging extremists on both sides of the
war. Nevertheless, the historical context of Rabbit Redux makes clear that Updike had
exasperated presidents and national strife on his mind when he commenced writing
Redux two years after the events of the novel take place. As late as 1968, Updike was
defending “poor” Lyndon Johnson “and his pitiful and ineffective war machine” to “a
world of rabid anti-establishments militants,” a group that included Philip Roth (SelfConsciousness 132). In defending Johnson and Vietnam, Updike remarks, he realized that
he was not only defending America but also himself, he and America rolled into one
(132). Updike asserts that by 1967 the “orderly civil-rights strategies” had morphed into a
Yippiesh carnival of mischievous voodoo and street theatre, and finally, a
nightmare of anarchy, of window-smashing and cop-bopping and drugtripping and shouting down. The shouting down part of it, the totalitarian
intolerance and savagery epitomized by the Weathermen, but to some
extent adopted by student radicals everywhere, amazed me. Authority to
these young people was Amerika, a blood-stained bugaboo to be crushed
at any cost. (133)
Updike, though, insists he was a liberal, that he had never bought into the Republican
“hatred of governmental activism,” and that, as a member of a blue-collar family, it was
ingrained in him that the Democratic Party was the party of the poor and working class.
Further, Vietnam, Updike claims, was “a liberal cause,” an “intervention against a
Communist bully” begun by Truman and intensified by Eisenhower, Kennedy, and
ultimately Johnson (130). (Updike quotes the address by Carl Oglesby at a 1965
Washington, D.C. rally that identified Truman as a “mainstream liberal,” Eisenhower as a
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“moderate liberal, and Kennedy as a “flaming liberal” who all supported and escalated
action in Vietnam [qtd. in Updike, Self-Consciousness, 130]).38 Updike’s feeling that in
defending the US he was defending himself is a defensiveness that Rabbit shares in
Redux. Arguing about Vietnam with Janice’s lover Charlie Stavros, Rabbit feels “frantic,
the thoughts of the treachery and ingratitude befouling the flag, befouling him” (Redux
39).
However, Rabbit’s views on Vietnam derive not from Updike’s liberalism, but,
as Stavros puts it, from Rabbit’s imperialist racism (Redux 40). Liberal defenders of
Kennedy’s and Johnson’s Vietnam policies saw American intervention in the war as the
US standing up against communist aggression, a mission often articulated as
humanitarian. Indeed, Updike cites atrocities committed by the Viet Cong and North
Vietnam prior to the US’s large scale invasion and the lack of free elections in both North
and South Vietnam as reasons for his position. Rabbit’s defense of the war, however,
rests mainly on the imperialism and racism that Stavros points out. The distinction
underlies the frustration Updike must have felt seeing his “liberal” position being
conflated with the likes of Barry Goldwater (to whom Updike refers as a “warmonger”
[Updike, Self-Consciousness 124]) and other conservative and silent majority Americans.
Janice refers to Rabbit disparagingly as “silent majority” and an “Ugly American” (Redux
40, 33). Rabbit echoes some of Updike’s sentiments: that war is sometimes necessary and
that imperialism and atrocities committed by communist nations and armies were being
ignored. Quoting W.H. Auden, a supporter of the Vietnam War, Updike highlights
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Auden’s belief that many protesters were against the war not for humanitarian reasons:
“They believe,” Auden writes, “rightly or wrongly, it would be better if the communists
won” (qtd. in Updike, Self-Consciousness 120).39 The split among liberals over Vietnam
catalyzed the emergence of the New Left from the Old, and Updike’s alignment with the
latter is clearly evident. By 1968, Updike, though, recommended in the pages of the New
Yorker that Johnson resign, and wrote that if his successor could not correct mistakes and
improve the situation in Vietnam then the US should withdraw. The following year,
exasperated with the war and the civil unrest within the US, Updike left for England.
As his suggestions in the New Yorker indicate and as he explains in SelfConsciousness, Updike was willing to reexamine his position on Vietnam and his sense
of loyalty to the United States and support of its policies. On one hand, Updike states, his
generation experienced the relatively uncontroversial wars of World War II and Korea,
both led by liberal, Democratic Presidents, and the latter was generally fought on the
same principles used to justify Vietnam. Additionally, his German-Lutheran upbringing
had made him averse to revolution and inclined to accept the will of democratically
elected leaders, leading to his “delusional filial attachment to Lyndon Baines Johnson”
(Self-Consciousness 139). Finally, his 1964 trip to the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc
nations filled him with a “hardened antipathy to Communism” (145).40 However, in
rethinking his beliefs, Updike reflects that perhaps “the System” had let his family down
in the crash that set off the Depression, costing his grandfather his money and his father
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Updike points out that the New York Times erroneously declared him to be the only major
American writer supportive of American action in Vietnam. Updike notes not only W. H. Auden but also
Marianne Moore and James Michener. Updike dismisses as cavalier Norman Mailer’s response that
“maybe we need a war. It may be the last of the tonics” (qtd. in Updike, Self-Consciousness 120).
40
In an exchange between Updike and Arthur Miller about meeting the Soviets, Miller quipped,
“Jesus, don’t they make you glad you’re an American?” (Self-Consciousness 146).
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his job. Second, Vietnam had pulled Americans into a fight with one another, making “it
impossible to ignore politics, to cultivate serenely my garden of private life and printed
artifact” (134). He adds that the Vietnam protests had brought together blacks, gays, and
women in a fight for civil rights and that “with Woodstock, Barbarella, and The Joy of
Sex and the choral nudity of Hair, there was a consciously retrieved Edenic innocence, a
Blakeian triumph of the youthful human animal” (154). Updike’s conflicted self serves as
a microcosm for the divided nation during the Vietnam era, which Rabbit Redux
dramatizes.
Although Rabbit spouts some of Updike’s own arguments in defense of the
Vietnam War, Updike infuses Rabbit with a strain of racism in an attempt to typify white
Middle America’s views on the war and the Civil Rights movement. Through Rabbit
Redux, Updike acknowledges that the lines between Old Left liberalism and Goldwater
conservatism had indeed become so blurred that he was frightened at the prospect of
finding himself tacitly in agreement with conservatives about Vietnam: “Was I a
conservative? I didn’t think so,” Updike asks rhetorically in regard to his position, unsure
of the line between conservatism and liberalism (134). Although Updike declared
Vietnam to be a liberal war, Rabbit characterizes Stavros’s anti-war stance as a liberal
view: “We’ve stopped [dropping bombs]; we’ve stopped like all you liberals were
marching for and what did it get us?” (Redux 39). Stavros comes off as better informed
and more knowledgeable than Rabbit, who exclaims at one point during their argument
that “I don’t think about politics. . . . That’s one of my Goddam precious American rights,
not to think about politics” (38). Indeed, in the later novels Stavros becomes someone
that Rabbit looks to for advice and insight on American society. Early in Redux, Updike

69
paints Rabbit as a man full of racism and, given Updike’s own views on the war,
curiously he seems intent on linking Rabbit’s racism to his views on Vietnam. In the
opening pages of the novel, Rabbit thinks the bus he’s riding home on “has too many
Negroes” and that they are like “seeds of some tropical plant” that are “taking over the
garden. His garden. Rabbit knows it’s his garden and that’s why he’s put a flag decal on
the back of the Falcon even though Janice says it’s corny and fascist” (10-11). The flag
decal serves as a source of tension between Rabbit and Stavros that ignites their argument
over Vietnam. When Janice tells Stavros that she was not the one who put the decal on
the car, Rabbit interjects:
“What’s wrong with it” he asks them both. “It’s our flag, isn’t it?”
“It’s somebody’s flag,” Stavros says, not liking this trend and softly
bouncing his fingertips together under his sheltered bad eyes.
“But not yours, huh?”
“Harry gets fanatical about this,” Janice warns.
“I don’t get fanatical, I just get a little upset about people who come over
here to make a fat buck . . .”
“I was born here,” Stavros quickly says, “So was my father.”
“. . . and then knock the fucking flag,” Rabbit continues, “like it’s some
piece of toilet paper.”
“A flag is a flag. It’s just a piece of cloth.”
“It’s more than just a piece of cloth to me.” (37-38)
By placing the flag on his car, Rabbit symbolically plants the flag in his garden, which he
sees as being threatened not only by blacks but by “ethnic” Americans (Stavros is
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ethnically Greek, prompting Rabbit’s insinuation that he’s an immigrant). The narrator,
though, pokes fun at Rabbit’s thoughts. Rabbit thinks that blacks are “[c]ertainly dumber”
than whites but then thinks that “being smart hasn’t amounted to so much, the atom bomb
and the one-piece aluminum beer can. And you can’t say Bill Cosby’s stupid,” prompting
the narrator’s tongue-in-cheek remark that Rabbit’s “educated tolerant thoughts” lead to
“a certain fear” of blacks being “so noisy” (11). Rabbit’s thoughts then immediately shift
from blacks to privileged Northeastern white kids who smash up their well-to-do parents’
homes in Connecticut, partying while “their parents are away in the Bahamas” (11).
Rabbit thinks, “More and more the country is getting like that. As if it just grew here
instead of people laying down their lives to build it” (11). Here Updike foreshadows
Skeeter, the militant black, and Jill, the New England rich kid-turned-strung-out-hippie,
who personify those who are ruining Rabbit’s garden.
Why, then, does the novel portray the hero of his novel, a character who shares
the author’s support for US involvement in Vietnam, as a “typical good-hearted
imperialist racist” (40)? As discussed earlier, Updike’s run-in with Roth and arguments
with his wife over Vietnam forced him to reconsider his personal allegiance to the United
States and its leaders. Later, Updike writes, “As for my patriotic duty to my country, I
feel, as I age, less anxious about that” (Self-Consciousness 170). In Rabbit, Run, Updike
points to the private self, for better or for worse, as embodying the American spirit and
dismisses as equally damaging society’s attempts to control Rabbit or make him conform;
for Rabbit’s transgressions are the cost of individual freedom. The conformity and
corporate propaganda prevalent in the 1950s, I have argued, affected Updike enough to
inspire the creation of Rabbit, an American man striving to hold onto his individuality.
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However, the civil unrest of the 1960s had the opposite effect on Updike in
characterizing Rabbit. Rabbit’s innate rebelliousness in Run springs from his heritage of
rebellions; his Protestant heritage is crucial to his resistance to social norms. Yet, as I
have noted, Updike states that his German-Lutheran roots made him averse to social and
political revolution—the protesting spirit in his Protestantism having dissipated in the
wake of the Vietnam protests. Similarly, Luther admonished political revolutionaries
while he himself had launched a revolution. What Updike had feared is what Luther had
feared: a complete breakdown in necessary institutions and state apparatuses that prevent
utter social chaos. For Updike, lack of respect for democratically elected officials and the
democratic process threatened to unravel the nation’s binding, and the most radical
elements of the 1960s political dissidents offered no better alternative to American
democracy. In both Run and Redux, Updike presents the image of the garden. In Run, the
garden serves as the place where Rabbit finds meaningful work. Working temporarily for
Mrs. Smith in her garden, Rabbit
loves folding the hoed ridge of crumbs of soil over the seeds. Sealed they
cease to be his. The simplicity. Getting rid of something by giving it to
itself. God Himself folded into the tiny adamant structure, Self-destined to
a succession of explosions, the great slow gathering out of water and air
and silicon: this is felt without words in the turn of the round hoe-handle
in his palms. (Run 117)
Read in contrast to his other job as a salesman, the passage conveys a meaning simple
enough: Rabbit in Run has lacked his private garden in which he has a spiritual
connection to the fruits of his labor. Updike shares in the mythos that the American
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dream rests on the cultivation of the private sphere, hence his lament that Vietnam did not
allow him “to cultivate serenely [his] garden of private life and printed artifact” (SelfConsciousness 134). In Redux, however, Rabbit’s garden has gone public: the entire
physical and noetic space that is America. In the ten years between the events of Run and
Redux, Rabbit has conformed to the standards of Eisenhower America, and more
significantly, he has had to settle into the type of soulless work that helped spur his
escapades of the previous novel. In the opening of Redux, Rabbit and his father, who is
also his coworker, are described as men beaten down by their monotonous profession:
A man and his son, Earl Angstrom and Harry, are among the printers
released from work. The father is near retirement, a thin man with no
excess left to him, his face washed empty by grievances and caved in
above the protruding slippage of bad false teeth. The son is five inches
taller and fatter; his prime is soft, somehow pale and sour. The small nose
and slightly lifted upper lip that once made the nickname Rabbit fit now
seem, along with the thick waist and cautious stoop bred into him by a
decade of the Linotyper’s trade, clues to weakness, a weakness verging on
anonymity. (Redux 3)
That Rabbit and his father are “released” from work suggests a prison-like
regimen or at the very least a form of societal servitude that has driven out their
(especially Rabbit’s) vivacity. Indeed, Janice tells Rabbit that she appreciates he has
worked “in that dirty place” for her and that there have been “a lot of days . . . when I was
sorry you came back that time. You were a beautiful brainless guy and I’ve had to watch
that guy die day by day” (Redux 57, 63). Rabbit’s frustrations are further increased by his
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own failure to tend properly the private garden of his marriage and home. In the years
since Becky’s death, Rabbit and Janice’s marriage has been lacking sexually; Janice
exclaims to Stavros, her lover, that Rabbit “refused to have another child” as a result of
Becky’s death (41). Rabbit confesses to her that “ever since that happened to Becky, I
haven’t been that much for sex” (59). Having been more or less coerced into his
mundane life, Rabbit feels that those around him have betrayed him. In addition to the
discovery of Janice’s infidelity, he runs into Eccles who now has eschewed the ministry
in favor of the counterculture. In reference to his behavior in Run, Rabbit tells Stavros,
“Everybody now is like the way I used to be” (156). Indeed, Janice is now the adulterer,
trying to find herself, and those around him are, to borrow from Timothy Leary, turning
on, tuning in, and dropping out as he once wished to do. In lieu of his private garden,
Rabbit transfers his life’s frustrations into his energetic patriotism and imaginatively
claims America as his own. As a blue-collar worker, Rabbit identifies with the pioneers
who had to lay “down their lives to build” the nation (11). In their ignorance of history,
Rabbit and other Silent Majority characters, though, deny that black and “ethnic”
Americans are part of the same legacy of hardworking citizens: blacks want a free ride,
Jews cheat, and darker Europeans are disloyal opportunists. Rabbit thinks that white men
“have to get on with the job, making America great” and declares that “You can’t turn on
television now without some blackface spitting at you. Everybody from Nixon on down
is sitting up nights trying to figure out how to make ‘em all rich without putting ‘em to
the trouble of doing any work . . . the Negroes plus the rich kids, who want to pull it all
down” (41). He rationalizes that Janice is a victim of Stavros’s Greek slickness and social
climbing: he reminds Janice that she is “the boss’s daughter” while laying out Stavros’s

74
motivations for sleeping with her (62). “All these Greeks and Polacks or whatever are on
the make,” he adds (55). Unable to come to terms with his own failures as a husband and
earner, Rabbit finds blacks and others whom he deems to be tearing down the country to
be scapegoats for his own inadequacies.
Thus, Updike illustrates the underlying reasons for the Silent Majority’s
nationalism as distinguished from his own and Old Left liberals’. Rabbit, as
representative of the Silent Majority attributes the country’s economic woes to the
“freebies” supposedly handed out to and demanded by blacks, a feeling intensified by the
Civil Rights movement. Second, the racist assumptions that blacks and other
marginalized groups either do not want to work or have gamed the system excludes them
from the American mythos of a nation built solely by and for hardworking Christian
pioneers. By denying blacks and other groups their American identity, Rabbit frames the
attacks on US foreign and domestic policy as orchestrated by those disloyal to the United
States. Indeed, Fred Springer, Rabbit’s father-in-law, exhibits Cold War paranoia,
claiming that “Jewish Communists” had conspired with Joseph Kennedy as “honest
businessmen who’d put this country on the map were losing their shirts” (71). Springer’s
political theories implicate Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson as presidents who
wanted to “turn the economy upside down” and start wars in order “to get the coloreds
up” (70). Springer’s hatred for Roosevelt (he says FDR had “maggots in the brain” [70])
typifies radical Republican disgust for Roosevelt’s New Deal during the Depression and
the view that World War II was a way to “bail Democrats out of their crazy economics”
(70). Rabbit’s father shows the same distrust of Republicans that Springer does for
Democrats, claiming that Johnson “did a lot for the little man” while the “Republicans

75
don’t do a thing” for them (9). Rabbit, though, does not go as far as believing Mr.
Springer’s and his father’s partisanship; instead, he replies to Springer that “I think . . .
about America, it’s still the only place” (71). Additionally, rather than affiliate with a
particular party, Rabbit supports whoever is president and saw World War II as a
benevolent endeavor, a war that was “fought across oceans so he could spin out his days
in happiness” (19). Rabbit conflates obeisance to American policymakers as evidence of
faith in the American ideal and conflates the government and its actions with the
imaginary actions of an abstract, heavenly force. Looking over his father, Rabbit
observes that he “stands whittled by the great American glare, squinting in the manna of
blessings that come down from the government, shuffling from side to side in nervous
happiness that his day’s work is done, that beer is inside him, that Armstrong is above
him, that the US is the crown and stupefaction of human history” (10). Later, he
dreamily muses that “America is beyond power, it acts as in a dream, as a face of God.
Wherever America is, there is freedom, and wherever America is not, madness rules with
chains, and darkness strangles millions. Beneath her patient bombers, paradise is
possible” (41).
Rabbit’s conflation of America with God is consistent with the kind of
nationalism that Will Herberg had called “civic religion” in the 1950s and sociologist
Robert Bellah coined as “civil religion” in 1967. 41 John Wilson observes that both
Herberg and Bellah recognize that in the postwar era allegiance to America had taken on
religious qualities that were superseding traditional religious ties (Wilson 60-61). Indeed,
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Although Bellah wrote that America’s civil religion can be used for good, he also warned and
acknowledged that it is “being used today [referring to Vietnam] for petty interests and ugly passions” (7).
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instead of the mysterious “It”—the “thing” behind all things—Rabbit’s search has led to
finding God as America. Benedict Anderson argues that “nationalist imagining . . .
suggests a strong affinity with religious imaginings” (10). Eisenhower had declared that
America must be a religious nation, and in his inaugural address Kennedy asked God for
his blessing to do his work here on Earth. Although presidents invoking God is not
unique, when seen in the particular contexts of the end of World War II and the Cold
War, these statements resonate with political implications. Furthermore, coming from
such popular presidents, these kinds of statements had propagandistic effects on the
American psyche. Since communists were seen as atheists and therefore “godless,”
America’s opposition to communism purports a religious endeavor, America not only on
the side of freedom, but on the side of God. The more internally dangerous effect of this
view is that any political dissidents who opposed America’s involvement in Vietnam
could be lumped with communists, and, therefore, seen as domestic enemies (such lists
were in fact kept by the FBI and those on the list were obsessively investigated by
Nixon). Indeed, Rabbit calls Stavros, a critic of the war, a commie. Additionally,
Anderson defines a nation as an “imagined political community” where in “the minds of
each live the image of their communion” (6).
Rabbit thinks that he and America share the same beliefs and goals, and those
beliefs and goals are imagined as monolithic, common to those within the nation. In
defending US involvement in Vietnam to Stavros, Rabbit repeatedly uses we in
describing American action in Vietnam. Thus, Rabbit also conflates the individual with
the nation as if the nation acts in the interest of each individual citizen and with each
person’s consent. Rabbit’s assumption that the government’s actions reflect the nation’s
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unanimous will suggests Fredric Jameson’s notion of “situational consciousness” or what
Houmi Bhaba calls national allegory “where the telling of an individual story and the
individual experience cannot but ultimately involve the whole laborious telling of the
collective self” (Jameson 86). Inevitably, as Edward Said famously notes, a nation comes
to define itself against its imagined creation of other nations and cultures (Bhaba 4).
Instead of a nation being a whole, it is quilted together not only from what is shared in
the collective memory but what its citizens collectively think that the nation shares in
common and what they believe distinguishes them from others.
Updike’s criticism of American society in Rabbit, Run, I argue, is a
counternarrative that opposes the notion of America’s emergence as a world power as
ordained by God. In Redux, this counternarrative becomes strikingly more pointed. As
opposed to the Rabbit of Run, who is interested only in his private self, the Rabbit of
Redux exemplifies the private consciousness that, as Hannah Arendt states, “assumes
public significance” and flows into a “hybrid realm” (33). For Updike, if America is
supposed to be a place that protects cultivation of the private realm, then Rabbit and the
Silent Majority fail to uphold this basic American premise since they assume that their
private beliefs are the paradigm for the nation—their private interests are enforced
publicly and politically to deny other groups their own private gardens. For example,
after Jill and Skeeter move into Rabbit’s home, two of Rabbit’s neighbors, Mahlon
Showalter and Eddie Brumbach, confront him about Skeeter’s presence. Showalter tells
Rabbit that “It wasn’t my idea to get after you, I said to [Brumbach], The man has rights
of privacy” (Redux 251). However, Showalter adds that the real reason that he and
Brumbach have confronted Rabbit is that “It’s the girl and the black together” and
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explains that “Any colored family, with a husband in the house” has his permission to
move into the neighborhood (to which Rabbit replies ironically, “It’s nice to meet a
liberal”) (251-252). After Rabbit ignores Brumbach’s threat, the neighbors burn Rabbit’s
house to the ground, killing Jill. The burning of Rabbit’s house comes from a real-life
incident that Updike recalls from his hometown in Shillington, PA, when whites
(presumably) set fire to the house of an interracial couple in the 1950s. In relating this
incident, Updike expounds on the racism that pervaded his seemingly innocuous
hometown:
A single Negro family, the Johnsons, attended Shillington High, and were
admired for their singing (the girl) and athletic skill (the boys). When one
Johnson boy, however, took a white bride, his house somehow burned
down. There seems to be, in this Southeast corner of Pennsylvania,
including Philadelphia, a certain Southern illusion of a mutually enjoyed
apartheid—though in doctrine Penn and the Quakers were radically
egalitarian, and in Frederick Douglass’s autobiography the thrilling escape
into freedom takes the form of a short train ride from Baltimore to
Philadelphia. . . . When I worked as a copyboy for the Reading Eagle, I
was shocked to hear an editor bawl out one of the photographers for
bringing back from the city playgrounds too many shots containing
“them.” It was my belief, as of 1950, that the United States’ black tenth
had contributed more than their proportionate share to what is distinctive
and universally eloquent in American culture, and I believed that realizing
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full equality for blacks was our foremost domestic priority. (Updike, SelfConsciousness, 66-67)
Influenced by his days as a copyboy, Updike intersperses the news from around the
country into the narrative of Rabbit Redux. Rabbit’s confrontation with Showalter and
Brumbach is prefaced by running news media reports on national and local events. As
Rabbit comes home from his job as a linotypist, he overhears reports on the television,
such as the Civil Rights Commission charging “that the Nixon Administration has made
quote a major retreat unquote pertaining to school integration in the southern states”
(Redux 195). Additionally, the report adds that “In Fayette Mississippi three white
Klansmen were arrested for the attempted bombing of the supermarket owned by newly
elected black mayor of Fayette, Charles Evers, brother of the slain civil rights leader”
(Redux 195). Rabbit blames hippies and blacks for violence, but the news reports
document many whites’ fiery resistance to civil rights and black mobility. Furthermore,
as evidenced by attacks against Evers, such whites attempt to continue to deny blacks
participation in the democratic process. Moreover, Showalter tries to deny blacks their
private gardens by dictating the conditions by which they can gain access to the
neighborhood. Brumbach is more intolerant than Showalter, telling Rabbit that “This is a
decent white neighborhood” and “that’s why we live here instead of across the river in
Brewer where they’re letting them ‘em run wild” (250). Feebly tempering his racism,
Brumbach explains that he “fought beside the colored in Vietnam” and had no problem
with them since they all “knew the rules” (250-251). Although Brumbach does not state
the exact rules, Showalter’s immediate admission that it is Jill and Skeeter together that
bothers Brumbach and Showalter indicates that even in Vietnam Brumbach expected

80
blacks not to violate racial taboos. Additionally, Skeeter echoes Updike’s assertion that
Southern-type apartheid exists in southeastern Pennsylvania. When Rabbit advises that
Skeeter should turn himself in because “This isn’t the South,” Skeeter replies that “the
South is everywhere. We are fifty miles from the Mason-Dixon line where we sit, but
way up in Detroit they are shooting nigger boys like catfish in a barrel. The news is, the
cotton is in. Lynching season is on” (180-181).
Although Rabbit and the Silent Majority accede to the obligation to forget or not
learn swaths of American history, Skeeter and, to a lesser extent, Jill serve as voices that
demand that America reevaluate its self-serving mythos. Rabbit, with a comic crudeness,
already senses the racism that underlies the Silent Majority’s American narrative,
although he is reluctant to fully acknowledge it. Watching a “Carol Burnett Show” skit
about the Lone Ranger and Tonto, Rabbit realizes he
knows nothing about Tonto. The Lone Ranger is a white man, so law and
order will work to his benefit, but what about Tonto? A Judas to his race,
the more disinterested and heroic figure of virtue. When did he get his
payoff? Why was he loyal to the masked stranger? In the days of the war
one never asked. Tonto was simply “on the side of the right.” It seemed a
correct dream then, red and white together, red loving white as naturally as
stripes in the flag. Where has “the side of the right” gone? (20)
Unlike in Rabbit, Run, in Redux, Rabbit is conscious of his Americanness and senses the
“low flame of loyalty lit with his birth” (41). In Run, Rabbit knows that he has lost some
essence of his individuality, and his quest to reclaim it is what makes him essentially
American. At the opening of Redux, though, Rabbit is a beaten man and his delusion is
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that in his conformity and rabid nationalism he becomes more American than ever. In
reality, Rabbit himself has built nothing, did not serve in World War II, Korea, or
Vietnam and is dependent on his father-in-law and father for steady employment. In
certain moments, Rabbit acknowledges his faults. In addition to the dullness of his job,
his position at the Verity Press is in danger of being eliminated. He tells his mother,
“Let’s face it. As a human being I’m about C minus. As a husband I’m about zilch. When
Verity folds I’ll fold with it and have to go on welfare” (84). This confession comes
shortly after the discovery of Janice’s infidelity, and from here Rabbit’s world begins to
turn upside down as he accepts his black co-worker Buchanan’s invitation to join him at a
lounge on the edge of Brewer. That Janice’s infidelity sparks Rabbit’s reevaluation of
himself and his country is not surprising, since it was the social forces from Run that
eventually coerced him to return to the marriage and settle into a typical blue collar life.
Rabbit’s father had compared Rabbit to “human garbage” and a “bum” for deserting his
family while Eccles had promised Rabbit earthly salvation if he respected the sacrament
of marriage (Rabbit Run 142). Rabbit settled for this postwar version of the American
Dream, but Janice’s affair begins to erode the pretensions he has used to justify his life to
himself. The Angstroms have fared well enough, having moved to the suburb of Penn
Villas and into their own house, although they still live paycheck to paycheck. Though
critics often describe Rabbit as passive in the novel, defending America and the war
reinvigorate him, as Updike indicates that the sexual energy lacking in his marriage
Rabbit reinvests into his passionate arguments about Vietnam. For example, Stavros
decides to confront Rabbit over his affair with Janice and to find out about Jill and
Skeeter. Instead, Rabbit wants “to argue about Vietnam, but Stavros keeps to the less
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passionate subject” (Redux 155). But Janice’s affair forces Rabbit to acknowledge his
inadequacies, and in turn leads to his reevaluation of his beliefs. Buchanan’s invitation
“hums in his ears. Something in what Buchanan said. He was lying down to die, had been
lying down for years . . . he has somehow seen everything too often” (89). Rabbit readies
himself for the “exotic,” as he had thought of blacks, and the tenor of Buchanan’s
invitation hints at adventure: “‘Come to Jimbo’s Lounge around nine, ten, see what
develops. Maybe nothin’. Maybe sumpthin’” (88). Ignoring his inclination to avoid
blacks, Rabbit heads to the lounge where “all the people are black” (98). Rabbit senses a
fear that “travels up and down his skin” and “hangs like a balloon waiting for a dart”
(98). The remainder of the novel details a reeducation for Rabbit, and since racism
underlies his presumptions, Updike brings him face to face with what the Silent Majority
fears most: the black radical revolutionary. Consequently, Skeeter becomes Rabbit’s real
teacher, and his version of history is what Rabbit must reckon with.
Updike’s characterization of Skeeter has remained controversial since he comes
close to the tropes of the black Christ-figure and what has become more popularly known
in the last decade as the “magical Negro” character.42 Both tropes involve a black
character who suffers or sacrifices himself for the sake of the flawed white protagonist
which leads to the latter’s ultimate redemption. The black Christ-figure correlates more
rigorously to the Christian tradition of Christ’s sufferings while the magical Negro is a
secular figure whose redemptive power comes from a general spirituality or some other
phenomena. As Peter Bailey argues, however, Updike plays with the idea of the Christ42

The origin of this term is obscure. Rita Kempley, writer for The Black Commentator, writes that
the term has been popular in cinema circles since the1950s. In her article, “Stephen King’s Super-Duper
Magical Negroes,” the novelist Nnedi Okorafor-Mbachu reports that she first heard it from fellow writer
Steve Barnes in 2001(Kempley). Journalist Christopher John Farley discussed the concept in a 2000 article
lambasting the Robert Redford film The Legend of Bagger Vance for employing the trope (Kempley).

83
figure in Skeeter and offers a nuanced character who both “represents the best of the
1960s in his defiant questioning of all socioreligious principles and structures” and yet
“constitutes simultaneously Updike’s” skepticism of the “age’s attempt to supplant faith
with psychohistory, politics, and drugs” (99). Second, Updike prudently holds off on any
full-scale redemption for Rabbit—he does not relinquish entirely his stance on Vietnam,
nor is his racism expunged. In fact, racial prejudice remains interwoven into Rabbit’s
character for the remainder of the tetralogy. Furthermore, Skeeter does not sacrifice
himself; in fact, he saves himself from the fire and leaves Jill to burn to death, an act that
Rabbit considers cowardly. Skeeter makes himself out to be a Christ-figure, but Updike
has other ideas about the nature of his character. Skeeter is the monstrosity that American
racism has produced: he is both sufferer and punisher, good and evil, Jesus and Satan.
Skeeter first impresses Rabbit as “evil” (Redux 181), “poison,” and “murder” (185). But
Skeeter’s service in Vietnam softens Rabbit’s attitude toward him as a result of Rabbit’s
delusional guilt that he should have served in the war (“he likes anybody who fought in
Vietnam where he himself should have been fighting” [253]). Where America has failed
Skeeter and blacks in general, Updike indicates, is not because of an inherently rotten
capitalist system, but rather corrupt governance of that system; further, America has
consistently failed to live up to its ideals and the Protestant values on which it was
founded. Updike and Rabbit, though, fear that hippies and revolutionaries wanted to
“throw the baby out with the bath” (213).
Having seen the ugliness of communism in his trip to the Soviet Union and read
of atrocities by Vietnamese communists, Updike was wary of the affinity for Marxism
within the counterculture (indeed, Marx’s works are among Skeeter’s books).
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Nevertheless, the novel clearly shows that racism has produced a polar extreme and
invited alternative political ideas to fester among those disenchanted with the System.
Skeeter’s criticism of America gets directly to the heart of its Christian roots, a direct
affront to Rabbit’s Protestant sensibilities. In the lounge, Skeeter exclaims, “The reason
they so mean, they have so much religion, right? That big white God tells ‘em, Screw that
black chick, and they really wangs away ‘cause God’s right there slappin’ away at their
butterball asses. Cracker spelled backwards is fucker, right?” (100). Much to the
consternation of Babe, the black lounge singer, and Buchanan, Skeeter continues to mock
Rabbit and his “white” religion. Offering a cigarette, he says “Waste is a sin, right?”
(102). After Rabbit declines, Skeeter concludes, “They’re going to live forever, right? . . .
God’s on their side right? God’s white, right? He doesn’t want no more Charlies up there
to cut into his cake, he has it just fine the way it is, him and all those black angels out in
the cotton” (102). Later, he tells Rabbit, “I got news for you. Your God’s a pansy. Your
white God’s queerer than the Queen of Spades. He sucks off the Holy Ghost and makes
his son watch. Hey. Chuck. Another thing. Ain’t no Jesus. He was a faggot crook, right?
They bribed the Romans to get his carcass out of the tomb ‘cause it smelled so bad,
right?” (183). Skeeter’s interjections and insults foreshadow his later history lessons as
he hints at the Biblical and theological justifications Protestant Christians used to defend
slavery and racism, and using their positions not only to exploit black labor but also to
rape black women. Thus, Skeeter poisons for Rabbit the purity of his American mythos
and demeans his God and religion as nothing more than a racially constructed deity and
ideology designed to politically and economically dominate the country. In contrast to
Peter Bailey’s view of Skeeter, Marshall Boswell argues that the reader should take
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seriously Skeeter’s claim that he is Jesus. Boswell specifically notes as evidence
Updike’s comment that “Skeeter, the angry black, might be Jesus. . . . And if that’s so,
then people ought to be very nice to him” (qtd. in Boswell 110).
However, Updike’s last remark suggests more of a reply to critics who shared
Rabbit’s first impression that Skeeter was indeed evil and poison and to critics who
referred to Skeeter as an anti-Christ. Updike appears to be asking critics to reconsider
their harsh views as, indeed, a closer reading reveals Skeeter to be a sympathetic
character, scarred not only by racism but by his service in the Vietnam War (Rabbit asks
Skeeter how he avoided getting hurt in Vietnam to which Skeeter replies, “I was hurt”
[Rabbit Redux 230]). Skeeter’s proclamation that he is Christ suggests, instead of a fact,
an irony the author wants the reader to acknowledge; otherwise, Updike risks careless
heavy handedness in driving home the trope. America’s history of irreverence for
religious ethics and morality has forced Skeeter to lose faith in everything. For Skeeter,
the country’s entrenched racism is irrevocably intertwined into the Christianity in which
he was raised: “They had been wicked, when he was a child, to teach him God was a
white man” (230). Redux continues Updike’s criticism of mid twentieth-century
American religiosity from Rabbit, Run, and Skeeter and Jill represent those who have
turned elsewhere for spiritual fulfillment through drugs and, for Skeeter, a new selfcentered religion. Skeeter’s influence on Rabbit’s thirteen-year-old son Nelson and Jill
while Rabbit has been at work becomes apparent. Skeeter has Jill tell Rabbit that they are
going to have nightly discussions. Jill “nervously” and while “blushing” tells Rabbit that
“Skeeter and Nelson and I were talking about it today after school and agreed” that “a
structured discussion might be helpful and educational” (198).
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Using Jill to persuade Rabbit to participate, Skeeter sets his goal to get Rabbit, a
white man, to listen. Jill explains to Rabbit that “the reason Skeeter annoys and frightens
you is you don’t know a thing about his history, I don’t mean his personal history so
much as the history of his race, how he got to where he is. Things like riots and welfare
have jumped into the newspapers out of nowhere for you” and adds that they will now
discuss “Afro-American history” (200). Rabbit unknowingly takes the bait and asks,
“why do so few American Negroes want to give up their cadillacs and, excuse the
expression, colored televisions and go back to Africa?” (200). Updike writes ominously
that in answer to his question, “Skeeter begins,” the self-fashioned black Jesus having
waited precisely for this rhetorical opening (200). At first, Rabbit asserts his authority in
the house. Barging in from work, he announces that he is sick of the word “black” and
orders Jill to get the “darker of your boyfriends” out of the house (196). Skeeter, relishing
the opportunity to educate Rabbit, is glad to see Rabbit act stereotypically; he says that he
loves when Rabbit “gets like this. He is the Man” (196). Seizing the moment, Skeeter
inverts the power dynamic within the household as Rabbit becomes a passive listener and
eventually a disciple to Skeeter’s religion. In role playing, Skeeter becomes the house
master and Rabbit and Jill the black male and female slave, respectively. Additionally,
Rabbit takes notice of the racists around him, from his white neighbors to his own father.
But Rabbit’s belief is short lived. After his conversion, Rabbit begins to sense a danger in
Skeeter’s influence; as a wild cry for normalcy, he calls Peggy Fosnacht (a substitute for
Janice in her absence) and arranges a date. In defamiliarizing America for Rabbit, Skeeter
forces him to acknowledge the realities of history; instead of seeing America dreamily,
Rabbit must deal with the concreteness of its sins. Skeeter succeeds in getting Rabbit to
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acknowledge these sins, but the two—angry black and angry white—seem lost as what to
do about it. Rabbit wants to retreat back into domesticity, but he cannot bear to admit that
he wants Janice back or to lose face to Stavros by asking him to end the affair. For
Skeeter, he can imagine only destruction, and this path Rabbit refuses to follow. At this
crux, both men act irresponsibly. Having retreated from Skeeter’s precipice, Rabbit, by
calling Peggy Fosnacht, decides to cast off Jill along with Skeeter. Rabbit suggests that
Jill call her mother and have her mother come and get her. He ignores that Skeeter gets
Jill re-hooked on drugs, and against Nelson’s pleas to stay home, he goes to Peggy’s,
leaving a drug-entranced Jill alone with Skeeter. And Updike pulls back from allowing
Skeeter to be redemptive. Rabbit later confesses to Skeeter that he does believe that
Skeeter is the “Christ of the new Dark Age” (241). Although Skeeter enlightens Rabbit
on American history, he can see only chaos as the answer.
Skeeter’s taste for violence becomes apparent when he first arrives at Rabbit’s
house. Although he protests that he is about love, the thought of violence excites him. He
goads Rabbit into punching him and is thrilled when he sees clashes between protesters
and police on the television. At one point, the news reports that civil rights leader Robert
Williams has returned to the country. Skeeter gleefully points out to Rabbit that
Williams, who influenced militant strains of the Civil Rights Movement, has come back
to “fry your ass” (196). That Skeeter enjoys violence points back to Rabbit’s own affinity
for it. As I noted earlier, Stavros observed that “burning up gook babies” thrilled Rabbit
as much as the war’s politics (40). And, indeed, in discussing Vietnam, Rabbit and
Skeeter appreciate the war for its blood and death. Rabbit asks Skeeter, “Is our being in
Vietnam wrong?” Skeeter replies, “Wrong? Man, how can it be wrong when that’s the
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way it is? These poor Benighted States just being themselves, right? . . . Nam the spot
where our heavenly essence is pustulatin’. Man don’t like Vietnam, he don’t like
America” (229-230). Though Rabbit enthusiastically agrees, he fails to see the distinction
between Skeeter’s “support” for the war and his own. For Skeeter, Vietnam “is the local
hole. It is where the world is redoing itself. . . . It is where God is pushing through. He’s
coming, Chuck, and Babychuck, and Ladychuck, let Him in. Pull down, shoot to kill. The
sun is burning through. The moon is turning red. The moon is a baby’s head bright red
between his momma’s legs” (228). While Rabbit believes the war is necessary, America
on the side of the right, Skeeter celebrates the war because it confirms his view of what
America has always been—a place of racism and imperialism. The longer the US
commits itself to Vietnam, the more chaos the war will create at home. Skeeter’s stories
of Vietnam horrify Nelson, but both Rabbit and Jill tell him that they must listen to
Skeeter, Rabbit concluding, “We all got to deal with it somehow” (227). But none of
them know how to handle it. Skeeter becomes “wild,” so much so that Rabbit tells him
that he is getting “carried away” with their readings and conversations (243). Jill’s drug
addiction worsens, and Rabbit turns to Peggy Fosnacht. With the three of them, emblems
of three factions of America, unable to “deal with it,” Rabbit’s house, a synecdoche of the
country, goes up in flames. As large as Skeeter looms over this middle-section of the
novel, he slinks away at the end of his section, hiding in Rabbit’s car and then has to beg
Rabbit for money and a ride out of town. Quickly, Rabbit’s prejudice and racism return
as he fears that Skeeter might stick a gun or a knife in his back. Alluding to Jesus’
betrayal, Rabbit hands Skeeter thirty dollars to help him get out of town and wonders if a
“Judas kiss” would be appropriate (292). Here Updike juxtaposes two biblical figures
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with Skeeter: Skeeter is both Judas, the betrayer, who receives the money for handing
over Christ (Luke 22:3-6 and John 13:27 both explain that Satan entered Judas), and
Jesus, whom Rabbit wonders if he should betray by turning him in. Rabbit’s thirty dollars
helps the two men escape responsibility for Jill’s death; Boswell calls Jill the “white
race’s crucified martyr” (124). Critics have oft noted Rabbit and Skeeter’s callous
reactions to her death. Jill’s mother calls Rabbit a monster, and Skeeter tells Rabbit to
explain to Nelson that her death was no big deal since “there’s a ton of cunt in the world”
(Redux 292). Rabbit and Skeeter also argue over which one of them should feel guilty.
When Rabbit asks, “How could you let her die?” Skeeter replies, “Man, you want to talk
guilt, we got to go back hundreds of years” (291). Rabbit argues, “I wasn’t there. But you
were there last night.” Skeeter, though, rationalizes that he “was severely disadvantaged”
(291).
Rabbit wants Skeeter to take responsibility for his present actions while Skeeter
demands that Rabbit take responsibility for the past. Since both refuse to acknowledge
their own guilt, they both eschew blame for the tragedy. Skeeter’s defense, though, has
plausibility, as it was in fact white men who burned the house down, and Skeeter’s fear of
being lynched is a real fear based in history that Rabbit does not understand. Updike
mitigates Skeeter’s guilt, but does not absolve him of it, and thus resists excusing the
violence and agents of chaos in the radical black movement as a reaction to historical
injustice. Whatever Skeeter’s affinity for violence, though, the novel indicates that it
stems from white racism. Additionally, white characters complain about black crime, but
the most violent and deadly act in the novel is committed by white suburbanites, an act
for which police immediately suspect Skeeter. Nevertheless, one man is stuck in
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America’s past and the other stubbornly in its present, and together they cannot imagine
its future. Skeeter, we learn in the subsequent novel, dies in a shootout with police
sometime before the events of Rabbit is Rich, so his eventual demise has little narrative
significance. Upon receiving the notification from an anonymous sender, Rabbit muses
that that “part of him subject to Skeeter’s spell had shriveled and been overlaid . . . with
him dead Rabbit feels safer” (Rabbit is Rich 27). The results of Rabbit’s encounter with
Skeeter and Jill are not entirely ambivalent, but neither is there wholesale change in his
views.
The uneasy resolution the novel offers is a proper tending of and attention to
one’s private garden while respecting others’ rights to do the same. Rabbit’s sister Mim
tells him, “Why don’t you tend your own garden instead of hopping around nibbling at
other people’s?” (321). Read as a larger comment on America, Mim’s question cuts to the
heart of America’s own internal strife while the nation attempts to “nibble” at the
problems around the world. Mim tells Rabbit that his domestic strife is because he
“didn’t tend it at all,” and the advice appears equally applicable to the nation as a whole
(321). Indeed, many of the novel’s characters seek their gardens, a stable and loving
family life, while also searching for a sense of themselves as individuals. Although
Rabbit meets Jill, the rich-girl-turned-burned-out-hippie, through the lounge, Rabbit does
not take her hippie philosophy and politics too seriously. Her utterances come off as
contrived, more of a parroting of other’s words than conveying a real understanding of
what she believes. As Marshall Boswell notes, “it is her wealth, rather than any specific
moral conviction, that inspires her to become a hippie” (98). Skeeter characterizes Jill as
enacting her white guilt: “We’re [blacks] the blood to wash her sins away, right? Clean.
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Shit, that burns me. There’s no dirt made that cunt won’t swallow. With a smile on her
face, right. Because she’s clean” (105). Skeeter’s hostility toward Jill stems from his
recognition that she is in part motivated by white guilt and that her willingness to let him
use her is an attempt to absolve herself of that guilt, as if the sins of history could so
easily be washed away. Furthermore, like Rabbit, Skeeter does not take seriously the
hippies’ political stances: they mock “all laws” except for the “laws of bribery and
protection” (241). Additionally, Rabbit sees these privileged northeastern white young
people as more about sticking it to their parents, feeling guilty about being rich, and using
the counterculture as a way to play at life—as he tells Jill. “Put another record on,”
Rabbit orders, and then says that she’s just another rich kid “throwing rocks at cops
protecting your daddy’s loot” (145). He continues, “You’ve had it handed to you, sweet
baby, that’s why it’s so dead” (145-146). Having inherited a Porsche from her late father,
Jill fails to maintain it and provokes an outburst from Rabbit. “You dumb mutt,” he
declares, It’s just the waste” (235). Because she has had it handed to her, Jill fails to see
the value in what other people have had to work to obtain and maintain. Thus, for her it is
easy to destroy (or shit on as she says) what has been provided for her. In addition to
being fraught with white guilt, Jill comes off as a naïve young girl who is more
influenced by her father’s death than anything else. She is passed from man to man, with
each successive man becoming for her a father figure, whom she lets manipulate her. She
first refers to Buchanan as her daddy and later both Skeeter and Rabbit use and dominate
her. She tells Rabbit that “I feel you’re a funny big teddy bear my Daddy has given me”
(186). But Jill’s search for her father is not a dismissal of her character. Instead, she longs
for what some other characters in the novel long for—fulfillment through a stable and
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loving family. Although wealthy, Jill characterizes life with her mother and stepfather as
cold and materialistic; she believes her mother was adulterous before her father died.
Additionally, she claims that all she wanted from her first boyfriend was his “mundane
love,” but instead he hooked her on drugs (149). Soon after meeting Rabbit, she moves in
and quickly assumes traditional wifely duties as she cooks and takes care of Nelson.
Similar to Jill, Janice parrots the latest sixties’ jargon, full of pop-psychology and
self-improvement slogans. She also relies heavily on Stavros for her opinions and his
advice. Janice’s newfound liberalism easily crumbles when she discovers that a black
man is living in her house. After accusing Rabbit of racism, she uses a racial slur in
demanding that Rabbit kick him out of the home. Nevertheless, Updike “largely
applauds” (and so does Rabbit eventually) Janice for her adultery, for turning the tables
on Rabbit and refusing to live a living death as her verbally abusive and sexless husband
has (Boswell 91). Janice’s adultery does not result from a desire to escape domesticity
per se, but rather to escape the lifeless garden that she and Rabbit now have. Janice, in
fact, still longs for a loving marriage and family—she hopes to have it with an unwilling
or incapable Stavros if not Rabbit—and blames Rabbit for his treatment of her, for
making her feel worthless. An assertion of her value, Janice’s adultery, like Rabbit’s in
Run, is her means to reclaim her individuality, and as Rabbit himself thinks, a way for her
to bloom. Janice sins boldly and “earns her freedom by sinning” (Boswell 91).
Additionally, Janice’s adultery is an attempt to shock Rabbit out of his doldrums, for she
wants him to reclaim her from Stavros, and as she tells Rabbit, to fight for her. Stavros
confirms nothing less to Rabbit, advising him that Janice wants “what every normal chick
wants. To be Helen of Troy” (Redux 155). After their reconciliation, Rabbit, too,
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recognizes this, as he harbors no ill-will toward Janice for her affair throughout the
remainder of the tetralogy. In fact, he tells her that her affair made her a better person and
more appealing to him.
Although the novel conveys that America must get its house in order, Rabbit and
Janice’s uneasy reunion portends that America’s divisive problems will not be easily, if
ever, resolved. As usual in Updike’s fiction and especially in Rabbit Angstrom,
resolutions are often incomplete and lack fulfillment. Rabbit admits to Mim that Skeeter
taught him “that this country isn’t perfect,” although even this is mitigated as he “realizes
that he doesn’t believe it, any more than he believes at heart that he will die” (Redux
311). Rabbit also counters his father’s diatribe against war protesters, saying, “Pop, all
they’re saying is that they want the killing to stop” (304). Both of these remarks, he
senses, go against his deep-rooted beliefs, and later he maintains his support for the war.
However, his enthusiasm for the war has waned. Lying in bed with Janice and
exasperated over all that transpired, he asks her, “Do you think Vietnam will ever end?”
(351). Rabbit’s Vietnam position and the impulsive return of his racism (the fear that
Skeeter would stab him) exemplify just how deeply nationalism and racism are
interwoven into the fabric of American consciousness. Indeed, even Janice, who had
called out Rabbit for his racism and regurgitates 1960s political correctness, recoils at the
notion of Skeeter in the Angstrom home: “you’ve taken that darkie into the house along
with that hippie,” she chastises (189). The novel’s uneasy resolution does not overshadow
the novel’s critique of the nationalism and racism embedded in Rabbit and much of white
America, rather it suggests that the turmoil of the 1960s was a cathartic time in American
history, a time when much of America’s underlying fountain of problems and divisions
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over the identity of the nation came to a head. Again, the word redux means restored,
rejuvenated, and marks a resurgence, and in Updike’s rendering Rabbit’s resurgence
results from a process of catharsis. Since Rabbit represents working-class white America,
his restoration symbolizes the redemption of his class through the social and political
catharsis brought on by the Civil Rights movement and the Vietnam War. This
resurgence, however, constitutes a potential reconfiguration of Rabbit’s and his class’s
values that, having been unsettled, are now more attuned to problems of racism,
government propaganda, and the benefits of sexual freedom and equality. As Richard
Kearney argues, catharsis serves as a form of cultural therapy. Working through cultural
myths, catharsis is used to remedy social and cultural unrest by acknowledging the
destabilizing elements in society, but it is also used to reestablish social order and
equilibrium. The cathartic myth resulted from a lack of practical solutions to the ancient
society’s problems, which have carried over into a more complex world of politics,
racism, and economics. Updike becomes the literary shaman of the modern world, using
the cathartic myth to suggest the hope of a regenerative America. The cathartic myth does
not necessarily provide an answer to these conundrums but serves as a symbolic response
at the cathartic level of imaginary plots, characters, and representations. What cannot be
solved historically, in other words, can be resolved fictionally in terms of structural
balance. Updike works through this mythic method as Jill is sacrificed as “the cost of the
social fabric”—she is “Iphigenia” sacrificed so the “crew can go on”—and in Jill’s case,
the country (Boswell 124). For example, Jill is burned to death in the fire that destroys
Rabbit’s home. Her tragic death marks the climax of the novel, but also allows for the
restoration of Rabbit and his estranged wife, Janice’s, marriage. From a mythic
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perspective, Jill’s death is a necessary sacrifice, the cathartic mechanism through which
renewal is possible.
Some fifteen years after Redux, Updike published an essay, “At War with My
Skin,” that was later edited and turned into the second chapter of his memoir SelfConsciousness. The last chapter of the memoir is written in the form of a letter to two of
Updike’s grandchildren both of whom are of mixed Northern European stock and “the
pure black of West Africa” (Self-Consciousness 171). Jay Prosser notes that Updike
addresses “in his memoir the other his fiction has forgotten” (590). In addition Prosser
asserts that in the 1980s critics turned from Updike to Toni Morrison who, if read
alongside Updike, “much more consciously” returns to “America’s history, in which skin
forms a crucial surface” (Prosser 590). Prosser concludes that Updike and Morrison, if
read “to cross the mirrored relation of each other” might “also dramatize the racial
encounter repressed in America’s history” (590).43 Rabbit Redux, I argue, foregrounds
Updike’s aforementioned text that shows how intricately skin is laced into identity, how
much individuals attempt to escape the trappings of their own skin, and the legacy of skin
that his grandchildren must deal with as the children of a white mother and black father.
Indeed, Updike sees American history as writing and inscribing the skins of its
characters. Denying that racism is a factor in the condition of 1960s blacks, Rabbit tells
Skeeter to “forget your skin” (196). Skeeter counters that he’ll “forget it when you forget
it, right?” (196). For certain, Rabbit cannot ignore Skeeter’s skin; he looks upon it and
sees that “His [Skeeter’s] skinny chest, naked, is stunning in its articulation: every muscle
sharp in its attachment to the bone. Rabbit has never seen such a chest except on a
crucifix,” but Jill also describes Skeeter’s skin as “scaly” from being so “bitter”
43

See Chapter III on Toni Morrison.
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(243,186). Again, Updike juxtaposes Jesus and Satan onto Skeeter, but also Skeeter’s
skin is formed from America’s history. His skin resembles Christ’s because his body, taut
and muscular, has carried the burdens of his race while its serpent-like scales are
produced from his bitterness. Chiseled and textured by racism, Skeeter’s skin reminds
Rabbit that his whiteness is not pure. Skeeter tells Rabbit, “We fascinate you white man.
We are in your dreams. . . . We are all the good satisfied nature you put down in
yourselves when you took that greedy mucky turn” (204).
In citing her motivation for writing her trilogy, Toni Morrison explains that she
was redressing America’s “national amnesia” regarding slavery and black history
(Morrison, Conversations 257). Also, Morrison recognizes that the betrayal of blacks in
the 1870s by the policies that ended Reconstruction was in fact a double indemnity.
Indeed, the travesties of Reconstruction fuel the narratives of Jazz and Paradise as much
as slavery does Beloved. In Redux, Skeeter cites 1876 as the “76 that hurt” and notes that
“the South got slavery back at half the price, it got control of Congress by counting the
black votes that couldn’t be cast, the North got the cotton money it needed for capital,
everybody got the fun shitting on the black man and then holding their noses” (Redux
202). Skeeter’s powerful retelling of history serves as Updike’s attempt to force America
to recognize not only the original sin of slavery, but also the continuation of its sins even
after slavery’s abolition. Skeeter, in his over-the-top presentation, in his dynamic JesusSatan dichotomy, is called on to shock America out of its historical ignorance—and
amnesia. Far from being absent from Updike’s fiction, the consequences of skin as it
relates to American identity are what Rabbit Redux relentlessly addresses.
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Rabbit is Rich: “Running Out of Gas” or Second Wind?
Rabbit is Rich is Updike’s most decorated novel, winner of the literary triple
crown, the 1981 Pulitzer Prize, the National Book Award, and the National Book Critics
Circle Award. A few years after the novel’s publication, Donald Greiner noted the critical
accolades, and Marshall Boswell, assessing the entire tetralogy, claims that in Rich
Updike has never written better. The novel is, in fact, rich—rich in style and significantly
longer than its predecessors. The humor is robust, so much so that it has been called both
a comic novel and an “American romance” (qtd. in Greiner, Novels 88). The novel
combines the spiritual angst of Run with the social commentary of Redux, effortlessly
blending the themes of both. While funnier than either Run or Redux and less tragic—no
young girl’s death underpins the novel, instead a birth—a tone of despair pervades its
pages, the humor often dark and mocking of its protagonist: Rabbit is the big, dumb lug
living off his wife’s inheritance and the deaths of others. At age forty-six, Rabbit still
loves America, but he’s lost his fanaticism and is not as ready to jump to its defense, his
political attitude more que sera sera than love it or leave it, a fatalism that has come to
haunt him in this novel.
Shading the novel’s dark undertones is Rabbit’s near total surrender to the
trappings of American society. In Run, his recognition that America’s consumerism is
fraudulent ignites his longing to escape. In Redux, Rabbit’s bitterness and anger come
from knowing he was coerced into returning to Janice and taking a monotonous job as a
linotypist, and thus he uses his patriotism in part as a cover for his own failures. But in
Rich, Rabbit truly enjoys the material comforts that consumerism provides. And he
enjoys his membership to the Flying Eagle Country Club and his wealthy, suburban
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friends. Indeed, he has a reverence for Consumer Reports, and his material goods and
gold are sacred. Not surprisingly then, Nelson’s wrecking of his father’s Corona and later
a convertible irreverently become for Rabbit distorted “tragedies” that darkly, and
comically, mirror the human deaths of the previous novels—tragedies for Rabbit now
involve his cars rather than people. By undermining the relative, superficial happiness of
the novel’s protagonist, Updike challenges the reader to notice Rabbit’s instinctual sense
that he and his nation are living on borrowed time and the greed and material wealth
cannot fulfill the hole left by spiritual desolation. Continuing the paradox of Redux,
Rabbit is Rich shows that the more Rabbit becomes immersed in American society and
culture the less American he becomes. Rabbit, though, semi-consciously recognizes this
conundrum, and so he clumsily investigates the young girl he believes is his illegitimate
daughter by Ruth in attempt to find the proof of the trace of his authentic self, the product
of his initial search for grace.
In rich, forty-six year old Rabbit Angstrom’s rearview mirror, the 1960s fade into
the foggy horizon. The turmoil of that decade has settled enough for Rabbit to feel safe
and comfortable in 1979 while his fortunes have turned around. “Rabbit is rich,” the
narrator tells the reader, but qualifies this wealth (1). Rabbit is rich only in comparison to
his working class roots and within the context of the blue-collar town of Brewer, PA
(Updike, Rabbit Angstrom, xv). Hence, Updike presents an ironic title as Rabbit’s wealth,
like America’s, is not quite as advertised. He and America are “running out of gas,” and
“the great American ride is ending” (1). Gas lines, fuel shortages, “truckers who can’t get
diesel shooting at their own trucks,” dollars “going rotten,” and Rabbit feeling death
closing in on him at age 46 (1). Rabbit’s hope at the end of Redux that America will

99
endure has proven correct for the moment, though the sky is figuratively falling as
Skylab—the space station America was supposed to restore and refurbish—is about to
crash through Earth’s atmosphere. The dead are stacking up: Rabbit’s parents, his fatherin-law Fred Springer—the ardent Republican who “burst” when “Nixon left him nothing
to say”—his former teachers, customers, “local celebrities like himself,” and even John
Wayne (2-3). Although Rabbit senses that America is, like him, on the decline, he intends
to cushion the fall with America’s goodies, its material comforts, before it all comes
crashing down. In spite of the Sixties’ creed (espoused by Jill in Redux) of ego-less love
(Boswell 95), Charlie Stavros believes people are more selfish than ever, that
corporations have seized even more control; Exxon, Big Oil, OPEC, President Carter
have all manufactured the energy crisis to consolidate further wealth and power. Updike,
in fact, says that the energy crisis gave him the fulcrum from which to swing the themes
of Rabbit is Rich. If the government and big business learned anything from the Sixties,
the novel indicates, it was that they needed a firmer grip on the controls. And Rabbit is
just fine with that. Regarding the energy crisis, Rabbit tells Stavros, “I don’t blame the oil
companies. . . . It’s too big for them too. Mother Earth is drying up, is all” (5). Stavros
replies, “Shit champ, you never blame anybody. . . . Skylab could fall on your head right
now and you’d go down saying the government had done its best” (5). Indeed, the effects
of the counterculture have faded. Rabbit has more or less forgotten Jill’s warnings against
materialism, and Skeeter, who Rabbit felt had seen him “anew, as with X-Rays,” is now
dead (27). He thinks of Skeeter as a “madman,” and now Rabbit sits safe and “snug in his
sealed and well-assembled” Japanese car (27). His racial prejudice remains, albeit lacking
the venom portrayed in Redux. News reports confirm the fading of the Sixties; Rabbit
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reads the article about Skeeter’s death. Running a commune in Philadelphia called
Messiah Now Freedom Family, Skeeter dies in a shootout with police (the details of
which are not clear), and an officer offers that “We don’t come up against as many of
these crazies as we used to” (26). Perhaps the only significant lingering effect the Sixties
have had on Rabbit is his marriage. Janice has maintained the confidence and selfassurance she claimed as a result of her affair, and Rabbit’s respect and attraction to her
has never been stronger (though Updike characteristically qualifies and limits the extent).
Janice’s mother refers to them as lovebirds, and their sex life, once dormant, is at least
alive, even if it is more or less forced, such as Rabbit having to imagine himself in a
pornographic film. Rabbit confesses that the “decade past has taught her more than it has
taught him” (124).
Further undermining his apparent happiness, Rabbit’s sense of inevitable doom is
colored by the doldrums of the Seventies and America’s apparently declining strength:
“Going down with all her lights blazing, the great ship America,” Rabbit muses (272).
During a dinner with his family and Stavros, Rabbit initiates a discussion about President
Carter’s infamous “malaise” speech (though, he in fact never says the word). Even the
once-liberal Stavros says, “I thought it was pathetic. The man was right. I’m suffering
from a crisis. In him” (86). Nelson’s friend Melanie adds that she “thought it was sad . . .
the way he said people for the first time think things are going to get worse instead of
better” (86). Although Carter’s speech to the nation is received negatively by both the
characters and many in the American public, the President’s warnings about America’s
sickness exemplify Rabbit’s own malaise:
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In a nation that was proud of hard work, strong families, close-knit
communities, and our faith in God, too many of us now tend to worship
self-indulgence and consumption. Human identity is no longer defined by
what one does, but by what one owns. But we’ve discovered that owning
things and consuming things does not satisfy our longing for meaning.
We've learned that piling up material goods cannot fill the emptiness of
lives which have no confidence or purpose. . . . We are at a turning point
in our history. There are two paths to choose. One is a path I’ve warned
about tonight, the path that leads to fragmentation and self-interest. Down
that road lies a mistaken idea of freedom, the right to grasp for ourselves
some advantage over others. (Carter).
Carter’s attack on consumerism relies on romanticizing America’s past, and the Christian
Carter points toward America’s transference of spiritual values to material ones as a
major reason for America’s decline. Carter uses the broader adjective human, but clearly
the context implies that he is referring to American identity. Although Rabbit is at first
surprised at Carter’s perceived pessimism, the sense of fatalism continues to creep up on
him. The knowledge that his material comforts and present wealth can’t keep him from
death begins to seep in as Nelson returns home from college and starts to crowd him. He
responds to the discussion on Chappaquiddick that he “never understood what was so bad
about” it; [Ted Kennedy] “‘tried to get her out.’ Water, flames, the tongues of God: a
man is helpless” (92). Later he learns that Peggy Fosnacht is dying of breast cancer: “My
God,” he thinks, “Breast he had sucked. Poor old Peggy. Flicked away by God’s
fingernail. Life is too big for us, in the end” (417). The reminders are everywhere. While
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America appears to be dying all around him, Rabbit seemingly takes comfort in his
wealth rather than spirituality. Hearing the rain, Rabbit thinks it’s “the last proof to him
that God exists” (111). Rabbit refuses to go to church because he thinks the minister is “a
fag,” but Melanie tells him that the minister’s radical sermon “was about how the rich
have to go through a camel’s eye” (139). Although she bungles the verse, Melanie hints
at what Rabbit intrinsically feels but hopes to avoid. In a feeble attempt to outpace death,
he has taken to jogging, a routine he sticks to only when Nelson returns. Janice expresses
concern that at his age he might be overdoing it, but Rabbit replies,
“It’s now or never,” he tells her, the blood of fantasy rushing through his
brain. “There’s people out to get me. I can lie down now. Or fight.”
“Who’s out to get you?”
“You should know. You hatched him.” (127)
Knowing that he will have to die to make space for his son, Rabbit is repulsed by
Nelson and resents having to share his home and the Toyota dealership. Nelson has come
to mean death for Rabbit; he wonders why the “the poor little shnook” has to stand so
close to him as he hears “the boy’s worried breath” (141). In a gratuitous scene, Rabbit
and Janice have sex on top of Krugerrands he has bought, as if he can somehow generate
more wealth in contrast to the son he has spawned who is now “out to get” him. Rabbit’s
selfishness exemplifies Stavros’s assessment that the “little man” is out only for himself;
he resists Nelson’s pleas to join him in running the Toyota dealership despite Nelson’s
legitimate hereditary rights to his maternal grandfather’s business. Rabbit’s hesitancy in
letting Nelson learn the business arises from a desire to keep Nelson from crowding him
and to keep him from encroaching on what has been his territory. Since taking over after
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his father-in-law’s death, he has been “king of the lot” and “the man up front” (3). The
work itself he holds little interest in: the “cars sell themselves, is his philosophy” (3).
Really, though, Mrs. Springer still holds the lot, and Rabbit resents the prospect of being
a placeholder for his son, who he knows will eventually inherit the business.
Monstrously, Rabbit gleefully watches his son flail and fail; after seeing Nelson wreck a
convertible he hoped to sell at the lot, Rabbit feels “awkward blobs of joy bobbing in
[his] chest. Oh what a feeling” –the last phrase a take on the popular Toyota slogan (152).
“Within a week,” Updike writes, “it has become a story he tells on himself” at the
country club: “I had this terrible impulse to laugh, but the kid was in there crying” (128).
Although Rabbit admits he pitied Nelson and that his son ended up being right about
selling the convertibles for a profit, Rabbit wants to keep him at arm’s length and tries to
undermine Nelson’s plan to leave college and share in the family business, which is
Springer rather than Angstrom. Updike comments about Rabbit in Rich that Rabbit
hopes to “reap advantage from American decline” while he can (Rabbit Angstrom xv). As
the price of his gold tops out, Rabbit takes Webb Murkett’s advice and goes to convert
his gold to silver. Worried about speculating on the price, Rabbit fears that the resolution
of the Iran hostage crisis will burst the silver market. Rabbit tries to maintain his position
and wealth at the expense of others including his own son. For example, Rabbit dismisses
Janice’s light concern that buying Krugerrands will support apartheid in South Africa:
“they’re making jobs for the blacks, mining the stuff” (Rich 194). Certainly, Updike has
not infused Rabbit with a new trait; naturalistically and spiritually, Updike sees
selfishness as intrinsic to people in general (he rejects Jill’s idea of ego-less love in
Redux, [Boswell 95]).
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In Updike, in fact, a certain degree of selfishness is necessary for the pursuit of
happiness, as in Janice’s need to put her needs in front of Nelson’s in Redux. But Rabbit’s
selfishness in Rich differs from his selfishness in Run. In Rich, Rabbit’s material lust and
territorialism are not sins resulting from a search for grace; he does not sin boldly in these
regards. In Run, the reader may empathize or sympathize with Rabbit over his
predicament; in Rich such reactions are not likely. Nelson thinks that Rabbit “doesn’t like
to look bad anymore, that was one thing about him in the old days that you could admire,
that he didn’t care that much how he looked from the outside, what the neighbors
thought. . . . [H]e could say Fuck You to people now and then. That spark is gone,
leaving a big dead man on Nelson’s chest” (284). Rabbit’s selfishness tinges with greed
as he hoards not only his gold but also his position at the lot. It also overtakes,
temporarily, any paternal desire to see his son become better than himself; Janice calls
him “an unnatural father” (63). In Run, Rabbit’s run is toward grace, in search of the
“thing behind everything”; in Rich, his run is away from grace—at least at first—as he
has traded in the spiritual for the material (Run 241). In addition to his fascination with
money, sex for Rabbit, which was once for him a spiritual undertaking with Ruth in Run
and Jill in Redux, has been replaced with mere lust, juxtaposed with his love for money.
Spreading his Krugerrands on the bed, Rabbit “feels amid the pure strangeness of the
gold his prick firming up and stretching the fabric of his Jockey shorts” and while
“examining the coin, stroking its subtle relief . . . He hasn’t had a hard-on just blossom in
his pants since he can’t remember when” (194-195).44

44

Critics have pointed out that this scene is reminiscent of a scene in Frank Norris’s McTeague, a
novel about greed.
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Donald Greiner notes that Updike takes the reader deeper into Rabbit’s head than
he had done in the previous novels (Novels 91). And through this window into Rabbit’s
psyche Updike hints that Rabbit suspects his unsettled inner-self. Rabbit senses that he
has lost something in exchange for material wealth. One of his first recognitions of this
loss comes when he acknowledges that his interest in sex has waned: “Somewhere early
in the Carter administration his interest, that had been pretty faithful, began to wobble
and by now there is a real crisis of confidence. He blames it on money, on having enough
at last, which has made him satisfied all over; also the money itself, relaxed in the bank
gets smaller in real value all the time” (Rich 43). Updike ties Rabbit’s loss of confidence
to a president who is unable to recapture Americans’ confidence in their country—
Rabbit’s malaise mirrors his nation’s. In the midst of this discontent, “Rabbit senses a
need for a quest,” and Rich presents Rabbit several opportunities (Greiner, Novels 91).
One possibility for an enticing quest rests in Rabbit’s lust for Webb Murkett’s twentynine-year-old wife, Cindy. Rabbit finds in her the tantalizing nymph that he’s happy to
pursue, but his pursuit is mere fantasy, and Rabbit knows it. His lust for her reaches a
peak when he rummages through their bedroom and finds pictures the couple had taken
of each other having sex. Recalling the proliferation of pornography in the 1970s, Updike
has Rabbit fantasize about himself in a pornographic film with Webb and Cindy in a
ménage a trois while his old rival Ronnie Harrison is relegated to manning the camera.
Noted for breaching sexual taboos, Updike’s writing in Rich mimics the explicit and
graphic scenes of pornography, intimating the rise of the sex industry. Out jogging,
Rabbit muses on the rise of casual sex and pornography: “. . . it was part of the culture,
taken for granted, fuck-and-suck-movies they call them, right out in the open, you take
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your date, Adult Films New Each Friday in the old Baghdad on upper Weiser where in
Rabbit’s day they used to go see Ronald Reagan being co-pilot against the Japs” (204).
Although fantasies of Cindy awaken in Rabbit a hint of sexual mystery, they have all the
substance of a pornographic film. Rabbit’s infatuation with Cindy is comical and cannot
be taken seriously and thus lacks the spiritual yearning of Rabbit’s sexual escapade with
Ruth. As Marshall Boswell argues, Rabbit’s lust for Cindy rests on the economic status of
her and her husband (147). As much as he wants to sleep with Cindy, he wants to be
Webb Murkett, the wealthiest, most influential member of their clique. In the Caribbean
with friends, Rabbit has a golden opportunity to fulfill his fantasy as he and his circle of
friends from the Flying Eagle swap spouses. But Updike denies Rabbit the grail of his
quest. Instead of Cindy, Thelma Harrison takes Rabbit’s hand and leads him to the
bungalow where she confesses that she insisted that she have him on the first night.
Knowing that Rabbit is attracted to Cindy, she promises that the women have agreed that
he can have Cindy the following evening. Nelson, however, spoils Rabbit’s chance at
Cindy, running out on his pregnant bride, Pru, and cutting the Angstrom’s excursion to
the Caribbean short. Updike contrasts Rabbit’s lustful fanciful quest for Cindy with his
actual sexual encounter with Thelma Harrison. With Cindy, Rabbit’s consummation
would have been merely the fulfillment of his lust.
Rabbit’s sexual encounter with Thelma Harrison, though, reinvigorates him. What
at first seems to Rabbit an unfortunate detour in his quest for Cindy is actually the right
path that Rabbit needs to take. Matthew Wilson sees this encounter as another negative,
unfulfilling sexual experience (5-6) while Paula Buck argues that this sexual encounter is
a positive experience that frees Rabbit “to perform a conscious act of altruism” (163).
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Marshall Boswell also recognizes the significance of this encounter, calling Thelma
“another of Updike’s life-givers” (Boswell 182). Read as a counter to Rabbit’s adolescent
obsession with Cindy, Rabbit’s sexual foray with Thelma restores spiritual meaning to
sex. Additionally, Updike’s sexual descriptions in Rich point to the rise of pornography
in American culture and links it to the overall deadening meaning of sex, the latter of
which he first points to in Redux (“You have no juice, baby. You’re all sucked out and
you’re just eighteen,” he tells Jill [Redux 146]). Again, Updike pushes the boundaries of
sexual description as Rabbit and Thelma engage in explicit acts that allude to the
pornographic fantasies Rabbit has had about Cindy. However, the sexual acts that Rabbit
and Thelma perform emerge not from lust or simple gratification, but spontaneously,
from Thelma’s secret love for Rabbit. The discovery that Thelma is to be his paramour
for the evening rather than Cindy disappoints Rabbit at first as he hopes that he can “get
through this” and that “maybe all she wants to do is talk.” However, Thelma “breaks
upon him like the clatter of an earthquake” and after performing oral sex on him declares
that “I’ve wanted to do that for so long” (374, 376). Thelma confesses to Rabbit that she
adores him and after he sees that her love is sincere, Rabbit becomes more enthusiastic.
“He didn’t expect” to be so “stirred” by her (373), and he thinks of her giving him oral
sex as “Beautiful” (375). To show him how much she loves him, Thelma asks Rabbit to
engage in sex acts with her that he has never experienced and later Rabbit reciprocates
the offer. At first, Rabbit is concerned that he will not be able to maintain an erection, but
her declaration of love increases his sexual stamina. Having anal sex with Thelma, Rabbit
finds “no sensation: a void, a pure black box, a casket of perfect nothingness. He is in that
void” (378). Although Matthew Wilson interprets this “nothingness” as an empty feeling,
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it is the nothingness and void that Rabbit has been pushing up against that makes him feel
alive. Afterward he tells Thelma, “Thank you. That I won’t forget” (378). Fascinated by
Thelma’s affection for him, Rabbit asks her, “what is it about me that turns you on?”
(378). Thelma replies:
Oh darling. Everything, Your height and the way you move, as if you’re
still a skinny twenty-five. The way you never sit down anywhere without
making sure there’s a way out. Your little provisional smile, like a little
boy at some party where the bullies might get him the next minute . . .
You believe in people. . . . You’re so grateful to be anywhere. . . . You’re
so glad to be alive. . . . I love you so much for it. (379)
Rabbit then thinks of the
void, inside her. He can’t take his mind from what he has discovered, that
nothingness seen by his single eye. In the shadows, while humid blue
moonlight and the rustle of palms seep through the louvers by the bed, he
trusts himself to her as if speaking in prayer, talks to her about himself as
he has talked to none other: about Nelson and the grudge he bears the kid
and the grudge the boy bears him, and about his daughter, the daughter he
thinks he has, and grown and ignorant of him. He dares to confide to
Thelma, because she has let him fuck her up the ass in proof of love, his
sense of miracle at being himself, himself instead of somebody else, and
his old inkling, now fading in the energy crunch, that there was something
that wanted him to find it, that he was here on earth on a kind of
assignment. (378)
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Finally, their sexual encounter culminates in a particularly graphic scene in which Rabbit
and Thelma take turns urinating on one another. Although these sex acts have the specter
of a pornographic film, Updike has couched these acts in deep emotion, acts so unique to
the two of them that they only heighten the intimacy. Updike artfully determines that the
line between pornography and eroticism is not the in physical aspects alone but in the
motivations behind them. With Cindy, the sex would have been spiritually meaningless;
with Thelma they are acts of love. Far from “a negative revelation,” as Wilson puts it (M.
Wilson 14), Rabbit and Thelma’s sex makes him “more in love with the world again”
(Rich 390). Additionally, Wilson argues that Rabbit’s encounter with Thelma has no
“reconnection to his past” (M. Wilson 14). However, he unloads about his past to
Thelma, telling her about his dead daughter and the one he thinks is alive. Feeling in love
with the world again, Rabbit quickly decides to confront Ruth about his suspicion that the
young girl who came into the lot is in fact their daughter, conceived during the events of
Rabbit, Run some twenty years earlier.
Virtually absent in Rabbit Redux, Ruth returns in Rabbit is Rich, as does the
storyline that she may have been carrying Rabbit’s baby at the end of Rabbit, Run.
Another quest option that distracts him from his materialism occurs early in the novel
when a young couple comes into Springer Motors. Rabbit immediately senses something
familiar in the girl as “he feels an unwitting swimming of her spirit toward his” (Rich 11).
He wants to ask her, “is your mother’s name Ruth?” but hesitates “lest he frighten her,
and destroy for himself the vibration of excitement, of possibility untested” (18). Despite
his seeming comfort, Rabbit “needs the chase,” Greiner writes, and the possibility of a
“daughter in exchange for a dead one would be a blessing from immortality” (Greiner,
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Novels 91). In addition to needing the chase and to replacing his dead daughter for a live
one, Rabbit also longs for his former, rebellious self, that “beautiful, brainless guy”—as
Janice described him (Redux 63). The girl, as the product of his quest for grace, signifies
the possibility of reaching out once more to his true self. Indeed, he makes a “mistake
that married people make” by assuming that he and Janice are one and entrusting to her
“this ghost of his alone,” telling her about the possibility of his illegitimate daughter
(Rich 64). Janice refuses to discuss it, saying, “It’s a disgusting idea” (64). Janice, now
comfortable, senses Rabbit’s curiosity about this girl as a threat to their stability. Rabbit,
though, can’t let it alone and makes the first of his two excursions to rural Galilee where
Ruth lives. As he meanders in overgrowth searching for her house, Rabbit thinks he
“does not know if he loved her or not, but with her he had known love, had experienced
that cloudy inflation of self which makes us infants again and tips each moment with a
plain excited purpose, as these wands of grass about his knees are tipped with packets of
their own fine seeds” (100). Rather than the inflation of markets where money loses
value, a problem during the Carter years, the inflation of self Rabbit experienced during
Run he hopes to relive or at the least revisit. Although during his first trip to Galilee
Rabbit runs off, fearing he will be spotted, after his night with Thelma Rabbit is more
determined. As he crosses onto what he suspects is Ruth’s property, his instinct is to run.
However, “as with dying, there is a moment that must be pushed through, a slice of time
more transparent than plate glass; it is in front of him and he takes the step, drawing heart
from that loving void Thelma had confided to him” (396). As in Run, Ruth sees through
to Rabbit’s innate egotism. Within moments of their reunion, she declares, “I’d forgotten
what a pushy obnoxious bastard you are. Stuck on yourself from cradle to grave” (400).
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She remarks that he’s “dressed up like a pansy” in his suit and sheepskin hat (400). She
cuts to the core and tells him that he is now “the kind of person you used to hate” and that
he now belongs “with those phonies” in suburban Penn Park (401). But Rabbit has come
on a sincere mission, and although she tears up at the sight of Rabbit as a “regular Brewer
sharpie,” the ever-perceptible Ruth senses that before her is the Rabbit she once knew
(401). “She loves him,” we are told, and their banter is playful at first—he on the offense,
she on defense (400). Although Ruth denies that the girl, Annabelle, is Rabbit’s daughter,
Rabbit picks up on cues that suggest otherwise: the hints that the daughter is hers alone
and not her late husband’s. He departs without Ruth’s confession, but in his confrontation
Rabbit at least has attempted to recapture some essence of himself; symbolically he pops
a Life Saver into his mouth as he leaves.
Along with Rabbit’s inner conflict, his outer conflict with his son Nelson
dominates another layer of the novel. Rabbit’s conflict with his son suggests Rabbit’s
entropic view of American society: it is in decline, breaking down, and the next
generation is losing something of the old in the transfer. Certainly, Nelson’s
characterization buttresses such an observation. As Stavros and Thelma point out, Nelson
is in many ways much like his father. Nelson, Stavros observes, is not built for the car
business and neither is Rabbit, who relies heavily on Stavros and is quite glad that the
Toyotas seem to sell themselves. Thelma observes that Nelson’s hang-gliding in
Colorado sounds like Rabbit, hinting at Rabbit’s love of pushing up against death. Like
Rabbit, Nelson is irresponsible; he, too, will run out on his pregnant wife. But, as Donald
Greiner notes, Nelson lacks Rabbit’s “joyous pursuit” of grace (94). Nelson is indeed a
“sourpussed little punk,” a scowling, angry young man who has none of Rabbit’s
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“loveable” traits (Rich 79). Customers at the lot are turned off by him, and he does not
possess Rabbit’s zest for life. Most of all, though, Nelson lacks belief: “I don’t believe
any of that stuff,” he declares. “You don’t?” Rabbit replies, “hurt” (177). In further reply
to Nelson’s professed atheism, Rabbit says that without a little religion, “you’ll sink”
(178). Marshall Boswell argues that Nelson’s plotline is a rewrite of Rabbit, Run, and it
seems that this is, indeed, the case (213). But Nelson is Rabbit without the faith in
himself or without the sense of quest to find “the thing behind everything” (Run 241). If
Run laments the decline in America’s faith with Rabbit as a lone, flawed saint marching
on, Rich further highlights this decline as Nelson is not spiritually willing to carry on the
quest of the father. With Nelson, God is dead. Rabbit tells him, “Look, Nelson. Maybe I
haven’t done everything right in my life. I know I haven’t. but I haven’t committed the
greatest sin. I haven’t laid down and died” (Rich 341). Unable to relate, Nelson replies
“Who says that’s the greatest sin?” (344). Also disturbing to Rabbit is Nelson’s refusal to
take the opportunity that Rabbit did not have. Despite the Pill, the legalization of
abortion, and more liberal attitudes, Nelson is still getting crunched by social forces as
they pressure him to marry the pregnant Pru. Recognizing that Nelson is about to repeat
his own life, Rabbit tries to give Nelson options other than marriage. For the first time in
the novel, Rabbit expresses a sincere desire to see his son have a better life than he.
Rabbit explains to Nelson that
There’s something that doesn’t feel right to me in this new development.
The girl gets knocked up, O.K., it takes two to tango, you have some
responsibility there, nobody can deny it. But then as I understand it she
flat out refuses to get the abortion, when one of the good things that’s
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come along in twenty years along with a lot that’s not so good is you can
go have an abortion right out in the open, in a hospital, safe, and clean as
having your appendix out. (184)
Nelson replies that Pru refused the abortion because “it wasn’t natural;” Rabbit counters
that because she refused the abortion “it’s sort of her funeral, isn’t it. . . . I mean where do
you come in? Nelson Angstrom. I mean, what do you want?” (185). As he says this, he
drives an underpass that reminds him of a “crypt, of death” and declares to his son that he
does not “have to lead” his [Rabbit’s] life (185). Lacking Rabbit’s sense of grace, Nelson
cannot relate to Rabbit’s attempt to help him escape the trap. Instead, Nelson interprets
Rabbit’s offer as hostile, a way to deny him a place at Springer Motors. Rabbit’s empathy
for his son in this passage clearly overshadows the selfish motivations for wanting his son
away in other places in the text. He wants Nelson to be his own man, to embody the spirit
of American individualism in a way that he never fully did. Essentially, Rabbit alludes to
the struggles he faces throughout the tetralogy. Rabbit’s desire is to “go it alone, from sea
to shining sea,” but the web of interdependency is proving too much to escape (422).
John Wayne—the definitive postwar cultural icon of male American rugged
individualism—as Rabbit muses both at the beginning and end of the novel is, after all,
dead. He wants to say “Fuck the Japs,” but earlier he acknowledges how much his
family—and, thus, America—depends on the Japanese for jobs and products (422). In the
background, again, is Carter’s speech that delineates America’s predicament:
It is the idea which founded our nation and has guided our development as
a people. Confidence in the future has supported everything else: public
institutions and private enterprise, our own families, and the very
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Constitution of the United States. Confidence has defined our course and
has served as a link between generations. We've always believed in
something called progress. We've always had a faith that the days of our
children would be better than our own. (Carter)
Despite the media’s criticism of Carter’s speech for its apparent pessimism,
Carter outlined six points that he believed would restore American confidence. The
President invoked a semblance of the go-at-it-alone sentiment by announcing that
America would decrease its dependency on foreign countries for energy. The President
also invoked America’s past: just as America won World War II, America would win the
energy war. Indeed, the coda of Carter’s speech was intended to announce how America
would return to what it once was. Additionally, the President appeals to both America’s
sense of roguish pride and the need for citizens to participate in government (he laments
the low numbers of voter turnout). Carter’s forward-looking policies and appeals to
American pride fail to resonate. Rabbit thinks Carter “is smart as a whip and prays a great
deal but his gift seems to be the old Eisenhower one of keeping much from happening,
just a little daily seepage” (Rich 113). Rabbit sees Carter’s ineptitude hitting a low point
with the hostage crisis: “Khomeini and Carter are both trapped by a pack of kids who
need a shave and don’t know shit, they talk about old men sending young men off to war,
if you could get the idiotic kids out of the world it might settle down to be a sensible
place” (321). John Wayne’s nation is now a country brought to its knees by “a pack of
kids” (243). Even Stavros laments America’s lack of vigor: “This country is sad,
everybody can push us around” (243). When Rabbit replies, “You were the guy who
wanted to get out of Vietnam,” Stavros remarks, “That was sad too” (243). Resenting
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Nelson and his generation, Rabbit pleads to Ma Springer and Janice not to let Nelson in
at the Toyota dealership: “Take over young America. Eat me up. But one thing at a time”
(109).
Consistent with the previous two novels, the ending of Rabbit is Rich is
ambiguous, and even more so than the previous two, hints toward an additional sequel.
With the birth of a granddaughter and the new daughter-in-law, the two dead girls from
Rabbit’s past are replaced. Although the younger, female additions to his family suggest
renewal, the last lines of the novel present the birth of his granddaughter ambivalently:
Oblong cocooned little visitor, the baby shows her profile blindly in the
shuddering flashes of color jerking from the Sony, the tiny stitchless seam
of the closed eyelid aslant, lips bubbled forward beneath the whorled nose
as if in delicate disdain, she knows she’s good. You can feel in the curve
of the cranium she’s feminine, that shows from the first day. Through all
this she has pushed to be here, in his lap, his hands, a real presence hardly
weighing anything but alive. Fortune’s hostage, heart’s desire, a
granddaughter. His. Another nail in his coffin. His. (423)
If in Rabbit’s eyes Nelson and his generation are pushing America toward failure, then
hope lies in the promise of even future generations. However, all Rabbit can be sure of is
that this granddaughter is alive, though she will be “hostage” to some unknown fortune
that Nelson will leave her, just as Nelson has been left with the legacies of Rabbit’s
generation. However, as these novels proceed, and as the reader would be aware, irony
belies the nostalgia for Rabbit’s America. In Rabbit’s rearview mirror, the myth of the
American ideal glows, blurring the nation’s future. The conflict that has underpinned
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Rabbit’s struggles in this novel has been a conflict over Rabbit’s materialism and his
inner faith in himself—it is the crisis that Carter poses in his speech. America needs faith
in itself, Carter implores, rather than a blind lust for material goods. Toward the end of
Self-Consciousness, Updike touches precisely on this conflict: “. . . when we try in good
faith to believe in materialism, in the exclusive reality of the physical, we are asking
ourselves to step aside, we are disavowing the very realm of emotion, and conscience, of
memory and intention, and sensation” (264). If the novel is indeed the happiest of the
four novels, the optimism lies in Rabbit’s own recognition, however faint and however
clumsily manifest, that his individuality, his self, lies beneath the layers of culture that
overlay him.
Rabbit at Rest: Rabbit and Reagan, Dream Men
In Rabbit at Rest (1990), the fifty-six year old Rabbit Angstrom is semi-retired,
lives half the time in Florida and the other half in Pennsylvania, suffers from heart
problems, and finds out that his son Nelson, married to Pru with two children, is a drug
addict. To make matters worse, Nelson has been embezzling money from the Toyota
dealership to pay for his drug habit and experimental medication, he claims, for his
AIDS-plagued friend, Lyle. Rabbit and Janice force Nelson into rehab but must figure out
a way to repay Toyota the $200,000 that Nelson stole. After a heart attack, Rabbit
recuperates while Janice begins a new career in real estate. In the midst of the turmoil,
Rabbit and Pru sleep together, prompting Rabbit to flee to Florida to avoid the family’s
reaction. While in Florida, he dies from a heart attack he suffered while playing
basketball, bringing the tetralogy to a close.
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Rabbit Angstrom “is the New World’s man, armored against eventualities in little
but his selfhood,” Updike tells us in his introduction to Rabbit at Rest (Updike, Rabbit
Angstrom, xix). Perhaps this is what makes Updike’s Rabbit tetralogy so defiantly
American, that it so meticulously records a character’s resistance to the dissolution of the
self amid an ever expanding ocean of social, cultural, and political tides. Peter Bailey
refers to Rabbit Angstrom as “a fifteen-hundred page elegy to American individualism”
(15) and indeed the last eighty pages of Rest—as Rabbit marches stoically to his death—
catalogue mostly nostalgically the sights, sounds, and events of his life as a kind of
homage to the American past. But Rest is more than just a lamentation on the end of
American individualism as embodied by Rabbit Angstrom. If anything, Rest resists
celebration of individualism but instead further probes the tension between individual
freedom and the need for stable families and communities. As the tetralogy has played
out, Rabbit’s life exemplifies mostly conformity rather than individuality. Though the
novels build toward episodes of Rabbit’s consequential transgressions, Rabbit, except in
Run, spends most of these pages as someone more than willing to play it safe as a
company man and willing to believe that the government “had done its best,” as Stavros
mocked, in looking out for him and his country (Rich 5). Significantly, Rabbit at Rest
returns more forcefully to the issues of race and ethnicity that are largely relegated to the
tangential in Rabbit is Rich in favor of a more focused look into Rabbit’s inner thoughts
and his conflict with Nelson. As Rabbit has had to split more of his time between
Pennsylvania and Florida and as younger generations have begun to take over more of
American culture, Rabbit is forced to deal more and more with an America he has
heretofore been mostly unfamiliar with: his Jewish golfing buddies, working women, a
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gay employee, and the world of drugs Nelson brings into the family. Culminating in
Rabbit’s preference to die alone rather than feel “the squeeze” of his family, Rabbit at
Rest dramatizes Rabbit’s last quest to maintain a semblance of his individuality in a
culture that is smothering him beneath its weight (405). However, Updike is not
necessarily championing Rabbit’s quest in this final installment. This is not a cheering of
Rabbit’s “go-at-it-alone” strategy. Rather, in Rest, Rabbit’s death makes room for a new
kind of America. Although the novel betrays a nostalgia and reverence for Rabbit’s era,
Rabbit’s death at a relatively young age (56) hints that the novel also welcomes the
inevitable change that the country undergoes and acknowledges that America may yet
resurge through its plurality.
The figure of President Ronald Reagan looms over the novel, the muse of
Rabbit’s nostalgia and reverence for his country. The novel takes place from December
1988 to September 1989. Reagan is no longer in office, and Rabbit is not impressed with
his successor, George H.W. Bush. As Rabbit begins what more than one critic has
alluded to as a slow suicide, nostalgia dominates his thoughts, as much as sex dominates
them in Rich. Rabbit’s nostalgia carries with it a great irony, since Rabbit’s past
encompasses great personal tragedies but also the trials and tribulations of his country,
including Rabbit’s impressions of phonies and fraud that characterize American society.
In Rest, Rabbit has come to revere the period and lament the end of the Cold War. He
admits that he misses it: “it gave you a reason to get up in the morning,” and he later
thinks, “without the cold war, what’s the point of being an American?” (320).
Accompanying the end of the Cold War is the end of Reagan’s presidency, a presidency
awash in nostalgic propaganda and determined to build America into an incomparable
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military juggernaut. Indeed, one of the primary missions of the Reagan administration
was to erase the haunting aura of America’s failure in Vietnam by rebuilding the
American military and making it more technologically advanced. Counteracting Soviet
aggression and expansionism against Afghanistan, Reagan sought to exert American
power against communism in Central America and the Caribbean. If the end of the
Vietnam War had caused Ford’s and Carter’s hesitancy to act militarily, Reagan and a
reinvigorated conservative movement had no such qualms. For Rabbit, Reagan exhibited
the qualities of stronger presidents he had known in his youth: Roosevelt, Truman,
Eisenhower, and Kennedy—World War II heroes and Cold War warriors unapologetic
about America’s might. These presidents contrast greatly with the seemingly weaker
presidents of Rabbit’s later years: Johnson and his failures in Vietnam, Nixon and his
dirty tricks, Ford and his brief, uninspired tenure, Carter and his inability to get hold of
the energy and hostage crises. Alone among the men in his golfing group, of whom the
other three are Jewish, Rabbit liked Reagan. The world, Rabbit muses, “became a better
place under him. The Communists fell apart, except for in Nicaragua, and even there he
put them on the defensive. The guy had a magic touch. He was a dream man” (55). In
Rich, Rabbit recalls the World War II propaganda film in which movie actor Reagan
fought “against the Japs,” and now Reagan has returned to his consciousness as the
dream-magic man leading America against the Soviets (268). Rabbit eventually conflates
Reagan with God: “Harry misses Reagan slightly, at least he was dignified, and had that
dream distance; the powerful thing about him as President was that you never knew how
much he knew, nothing or everything, he was like God that way, you had to do a lot of it
yourself” (268). As in Redux, Updike’s narrative derides Rabbit and his religious awe of
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America’s leaders, although in Rest this awe is limited to Reagan—as Bush seems
weaker and transparent to Rabbit. Rabbit’s Jewish golfing pals are Democrats and have a
realistic perception of Reagan and the US in general. Somewhat ashamed of his reverence
for Reaganism, Rabbit dares not disclose to them that he voted for Bush in the 1988
election. Imparting some realism in contrast to Rabbit’s dreamy view of America,
Rabbit’s golfing partner Bernie Drechsel tells the group that the difference between Bush
and Democratic nominee Michael Dukakis was that
Dukakis tried to talk intelligently to the American people and we aren’t
ready for it. Bush talked to us like we were a bunch of morons and we ate
it up. Can you imagine, the Pledge of Allegiance, read my lips—can you
imagine such crap in this day and age? Ailes45 and those others, they made
him into a beer commercial—head for the mountains. (54)
Rabbit, of course, is part of the electorate who was mesmerized by Bush’s slogan driven
campaign. Nevertheless, for all of Rabbit’s nostalgia, he senses Reagan’s vacuity
underneath the charm. A continuation of the 1970s decline, in the 80s “Everything is
falling apart, airplanes, bridges, eight years under Reagan of nobody minding the store,
making money out of nothing, running up debt, trusting in God” (6). Rabbit characterizes
Reagan’s administration as “like anesthesia,” and in this dreamy haze he prefers to think
of America, particulars be damned (55). Indeed, the opening of the novel casts Rabbit as
a kind of Walter Mitty, driving too fast as his wife chides him, while lost in a daze of
fantasy and mind wanderings. But Rabbit does not share Mitty’s heroic daydreams; he
thinks of planes crashing and exploding in midair, like the tragic Pan Am flight blown up
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over Lockerbie, Scotland a few days before the novel begins.46 With Bush, Rabbit senses
a great step down in American power from Reagan, which mirrors his own declining
health. There is something about Bush that Rabbit does not trust; he does not carry for
Rabbit the God-like aura of Reagan. He tells his employee Elvira: “Do you ever get the
feeling . . . now that Bush is in, that we’re kind of on the sidelines, that we’re sort of like
a big Canada, and what we do doesn’t much matter to anybody else?” (324). Although
Rest’s composition and publication came before the Persian Gulf War, it is doubtful that
Rabbit would have been impressed by Bush’s invasion of a third-rate power such as Iraq,
which was even further diminished by its costly decade-long war with Iran. Regardless,
Updike uses the Bush presidency as a sign of—if not further decline—uncertainty.
Reagan, in Rabbit’s mind, had vanquished the Soviet Union without firing a shot, and
now with the great enemy gone the point of American power seems elusive. He
completes his thought to Elvira, “It’s kind of a relief, I guess, not to be the big cheese,”
but Rabbit really does not believe it (324). For Rabbit’s generation, victory in World War
II infused the US with moral and political capital that, as the tetralogy documents, were
spent recklessly in America’s postwar failures at home and in the jungles of Vietnam.
Rabbit’s nostalgia, thus, rests in the ideal that America never attained, but through
Reagan, Rabbit had sensed the recapture of America’s former glory. In The Age of
Reagan, historian Sean Wilentz argues that the “Reaganite myth” is actually twopronged: One prong consisted of the nostalgia for “close-knit families and neighbors,” a
“simpler America” straight out of a Frank Capra film where neighbors help neighbors—
“a land before a time of ghetto riots, flag-burners” (Wilentz 135). Where trouble “reared
its head in the Reaganite homeland . . . decent Americans always rallied ‘round, and by
46
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the grace of God, defeated the villains’ plots” (135). Certainly, this prong of the
Reaganite myth invoked the perceptions of the 1950s despite the underappreciated
undercurrents of civil unrest during this decade. The other prong, Wilentz proposes,
“stood in paradoxical relation with a decidedly unparadisaical element” of the first: “the
legend of the rugged, competitive individual,” the “lone cowboy,” and the “hardworking
entrepreneur who takes risks and, living by the inexorable market laws of supply and
demand, either fails the test or makes a fortune” (135). Although Wilentz does not
attempt to account for this paradox, Reagan’s political journey from ardent Roosevelt
Democrat to the definitive icon of Republican conservatism offers clues—and, more
importantly for my purposes, hints at one of the major struggles that underlies the Rabbit
tetralogy and is ultimately played out in the conclusion to Rabbit at Rest.
Wilentz, wisely, does not attribute the dreamy, nostalgic myth exclusively to
Reagan—the innocent, benign community and the rugged individual myths are not only
Reagan’s. In fact, Carter’s speech from which I quote in the Rich section specifically
plays to these tropes and even laments the loss of “close-knit” communities from some
idyllic American past (Wilentz 135). Nevertheless, Reagan hitched his wagon to these
myths perhaps more tightly and certainly more successfully than both Carter and later
George H.W. Bush, and Updike certainly picks up on Reagan’s infectious and effective
use of these tropes. In fact, Reagan so much believed in these myths—to a point that
those within his circle found unnerving—that certain aspects of his policies attempted to
reconcile these paradoxical elements (138). For example, Reagan’s passion for
deregulation had at one end the idea that the government was too intrusive and
encroaching on the individual freedom of entrepreneurs, but Reagan also believed that
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government was just as destructive to communities as it was to the individual.
Government men were bureaucratic outsiders who interfered in the affairs of local
communities, disrupting the town hall decision-making process that did not need their
stamp of approval—otherwise, the process would resemble Soviet-style governance.
Furthermore, Reagan’s slashing of social programs for the poor was in part a reflection of
his belief that social programs created government dependents—cynically represented by
Reagan’s image of the welfare queen and, in line with certain interpretations of the
Moynihan Report, also destroyed communities (Wilentz 180). Reagan’s ideal was to
provide “individual freedom” in the hopes that it would foster willful communities
brought together by shared economic interests of supply and demand—or as a byproduct
of supply-side economics. Rabbit’s sense that during the Reagan years “you had to do a
lot of it yourself,” then is certainly an accurate representation of how many Americans
felt about his policies—for better or for worse. However, as opposed to even more
extreme conservatives or libertarians for that matter, Reagan held firm to that strain of
Roosevelt Democrat concern for communities—regardless whether or not his policies
seemed to suggest otherwise. As Gary Wills explains, Reagan felt more at home with
domestic policy than any president since Roosevelt (344). Reagan believed his policies
would work for all Americans. Reagan’s remark “that the function of government is not
to confer happiness on us, but to give us the opportunity to work out happiness for
ourselves” (Wilentz 136) is similar to Updike’s assertion that government should
“guarantee the individual maximum freedom within a social frame of minimal laws [to
ensure] — if not happiness — its hopeful pursuit” (Updike, Interview, NPR). Updike,
though, was critical of Reagan-Bush tax policies, calling for a progressive tax that
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lessened the gap between the rich and the poor (Updike, More Matter, 14). Further,
Updike cites vast economic inequality as a roadblock to freedom rather than as evidence
of it. As his decidedly Democratic political alliance indicates, Updike never viewed
government as an inherent enemy of freedom and individualism, but rather a potential
protector of both—if used responsibly. Updike adds that there cannot be freedom without
equality, the latter of which, he intimates, must be brought about through government
action. The abuse of the American system under Reagan-Bush, Updike argues, is a
culmination of a gradual confiscation of wealth by the few. For Updike, the Reagan-Bush
policies had clearly been manipulative, an abuse of government rather than a restriction
of it—as it had been advertised. In his speech, Updike chooses his dates strategically,
correlating 1929 to 1989. Indeed, in Rest, Rabbit tells Nelson that another Depression is
looming. Despite whatever hopes Reagan may have had for American communities, his
administration’s intentional refusal to enforce civil rights laws, attempts to roll back civil
rights legislation, and demonizing of social programs certainly obfuscated for many any
chance that Reagan’s domestic program was in any way uniting or was interested in
strengthening communities. Second, his deregulatory campaign led to infamous incidents
of vulture capitalism, which further underscored the “individualist” prong of the Reagan
myth.47 In terms of Reagan’s legacy, the individualist prong is what has endeared him to
conservative Republicans and stoked the ire of Democrats and other Reagan critics.
For certain, Rabbit prefers Reagan’s go-at-it-alone-gunslinger image to Reagan’s
Capra-esque America. After all, he had fled from the trappings of the latter in Run. As the
tetralogy has documented, America’s gradual spiritual decline in white Protestant middleclass America exacerbated the gradual disconnect between individual happiness and
47
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community well-being. Since the white middle-class dominated the electorate, its
spiritual decline,48 Updike attempts to show, correlates to the crumbling of the collective
outlook that once anchored many American communities. By 1984, white middle-class
Americans had deserted in droves the collective narrative of the Democratic Party—
which had won eight of twelve presidential elections between 1932 and 1976—losing
two of these to the moderate and war hero Eisenhower. The Reagan Revolution, as
conservatives enthusiastically refer to it, so effectively combined elements of Roosevelt’s
and Kennedy’s optimistic rhetoric that swaths of blue-collar white voters, many of them
normally Democrats, were attracted to the Reagan image and message (Wilentz 1).
Although critical of Reagan, Updike chooses the Reagan aura to hover God-like over
Rest because Reagan radically attempted to reconcile politically what Updike sees as the
irresolvable tension of American society. By undoing and undermining years of
regulatory legislation, Reagan attempted to unfetter the individual economically, and the
individual in turn would invest in community growth. More abstractly, this played to
notions of harmony between unrestricted individuals and their relationship to the
American dream. Reagan’s failure to balance financial deregulation, a vast military buildup, domestic spending cuts, the budget, and investment in America’s crumbling cities
were a disappointment of his presidency. In Rest, Updike portrays this as an aesthetic
failure as much as a political failure of the Reagan dream to reconcile such incongruent
elements. As Toyota district manager Mr. Shimada points out, America is having trouble
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figuring out the right balance between “order and freedom,” and the “needs of outer
world and the needs of inner being” (Rest 356). To Mr. Shimada, whose company is the
victim of Nelson’s financial fraud, America has too much emphasis on freedom at the
cost of the community: “Everybody [in America] mention freedom. . . . Everywhere, dog
shit, dogs must have important freedom to shit everywhere. Dog freedom more important
than crean [sic] grass and cement pavement. . . . Too much disorder. Too much dog shit”
(356). Mr. Shimada criticizes America for protecting trivial freedoms—or freedoms at
any cost. Such trivial freedoms include too much fun at the cost of family and
community. He lays Nelson’s crimes at Rabbit’s feet: “Who is father and mother of such
son? Where are they? In Frorida [sic], enjoying sunshine and tennis, while young boy
prays [sic] with games and autos” (356). Nelson, who embodies a reckless, drug-obsessed
America, has not only repeated many of Rabbit’s mistakes but has underscored the
repetitions with greater collateral damage. Nelson, at first, insists his drug use is
recreational, but soon his recreational use is revealed to be a full-blown addiction,
resulting in his assault against Pru, his wife, and the fraud that brings down the Springer
Toyota dealership. Macrocosmically, Nelson’s generation, interested in self-absorbed
recreation rather than work, shares the responsibility of America’s falling behind
countries such as Japan, symbolized by the loss of Springer Motors to Japanese
financiers. Nelson’s attitude toward economic success epitomizes the get-rich (or getricher) schemes and philosophy through aggressive financial speculation that exemplifies
the darker aspects of the financial industry in the Reagan era. Mr. Shimada complains
that America wants to lower taxes and “do acquisitions and mergers” rather than build or
create (356). Nelson tells Rabbit that in America being successful is just being lucky and
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money just flows. Not much angers Rabbit more about Nelson than his flippant attitude
toward money and his belief that the $200,000 he owes and will have to borrow from his
parents is not “in this day and age, an awful lot of money” (368). For Nelson, the money
does just flow, since he steals it from the company and has no remorse about Janice and
Rabbit having to pay the bill through the sale of their property. Although he lives in a
house with no mortgage since he inherited it, Nelson is inexplicably angry that he has to
pay the property tax on it. In Rich, he had claimed that money is shit, and this attitude has
carried over to Rest. However, Nelson sees money as a means to an easy end: to get what
you do not need, and to get it now. Since he thinks of money as lacking intrinsic value, he
justifies wasting it. Thus, Updike draws a contrast between two extremes: Nelson, the
prodigal son who wastes, and Rabbit, the miser father of Rich who hoards his gold.
Nelson feels about his debt the way that Rabbit imagines the country feels about the
national debt: “the government owes trillions and nobody cares” (361). Rabbit’s
resentment that “no one has to pay—not Mexico or Brazil, the S and L banks, not
Nelson,” is incongruous with his reverence for Reagan, who he senses is not “minding
the store” and who himself admitted that the national debt was one of the great regrets of
his presidency (6).
The incongruity in Rabbit’s reverence for Reagan and his sense that the nation is
falling apart is further exemplified by Rabbit’s admonishment of Nelson’s actions and
Rabbit’s own selfishness. Although Nelson’s drug use and its consequences dominate
much of the novel, Updike has Rabbit commit another monstrously selfish act—as Janice
describes it—that trumps his son’s actions. Feeling weakened by his heart trouble and
resentful of Janice’s attempt to become a real estate agent—coupled with his troubled
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relationship with Nelson—Rabbit sleeps with Pru while Janice is in class and Nelson is
away in rehab. Revenge against Nelson motivates Pru as well as Janice’s attempt to take
control of Nelson and her family. Later, Rabbit and Pru’s lovemaking becomes the trump
card that Pru plays on Janice to keep Janice from enacting her plan to move them all into
one house together. But for Rabbit, the sexual encounter means something more than just
revenge on Nelson and Janice. Janice and Nelson have formed a camp against Rabbit, to
keep him in the dark about their plans to get Nelson out of debt and transform Springer
Motors. Consequently, Rabbit feels useless, and his feelings are further exacerbated by
Janice’s neglect of him in favor of her career. Throughout the tetralogy, transgressive sex
serves as a reinvigorating force for Rabbit, and in Rest, Rabbit’s final transgression is
sleeping with his daughter-in-law. “Paradise blundered upon, incredible,” Rabbit thinks
(314). This will be his last monumentally sinful act, one that makes him feel more alive.
When confronted by Janice, Rabbit asks rhetorically, “Whajou think, I was dead
already?” (393). An assertion of his self, his freedom, and his life, Rabbit’s incestuous
iniquity comes at great cost to his family, recalling the time that he had told Ruth in Run:
“if you have the guts to be yourself . . . other people’ll pay your price” (Rabbit, Run
129). “He wants, he wants,” Rabbit complains about Nelson, and as much as the lives of
the father and son resemble one another’s, the reader should realize that Rabbit is also
unconsciously referring to himself, or at least to the appetite of ego (Rest 222). That
paradise is blundered upon, attained through sin, reinforces Updike’s theological view
that sin is necessary for individual freedom, but always at someone else’s cost. Rabbit’s
insatiable ego comes at Janice’s expense—her attempt to better herself Rabbit can see
only as another abandonment of him, a replay of her desertion of him in Redux.
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Throughout the novel, the four main characters—Rabbit, Nelson, Pru, and Janice—act
with such self-interest that their family has split into factions: Nelson and Janice on one
end, and with Rabbit and Pru briefly aligned, until Pru tells Janice and Nelson about her
and Rabbit, leaving Rabbit alone. Janice’s selfishness manifests toward the end of the
novel where her career and financial interests take precedent over Rabbit’s life. Peter
Bailey notes that Updike hints early in the novel that Janice’s neglect of Rabbit
contributes to his death, making her culpable in his demise (180). Updike makes this
point more vividly when Janice thinks that Rabbit’s death will help her real estate career
(Bailey 181). But in the Updike universe, Janice is no guiltier than Rabbit has been; her
quest for her own freedom, like his, comes at a cost—and the cost is her husband.
Although Updike largely approved of Janice’s affair in Redux, here he is harsher as
Janice’s quest for freedom is largely financially motivated rather than resulting in the
mind-body restoration she achieved through her affair with Stavros. With subtlety,
Updike gives Janice a type of job in an industry that the narrative criticizes as part of
America’s decline: real-estate. Janice’s plan to flip properties for profit epitomizes Mr.
Shimada’s critique that American business is no longer centered on building, but rather
ping-ponging the same product back and forth at increasing prices—the “acquisitions and
mergers” that Mr. Shimada decries. Indeed, Janice attempts to take on Nelson’s
problems—from which she and Nelson gleefully believe they will profit—while Pru and
Rabbit become further alienated from their respective marriages. Literally, Pru stops
Janice’s attempt to merge everyone under the same roof by revealing her tryst with
Rabbit. Although Updike is sympathetic toward Janice’s attempts to improve herself—
she basically tells Nelson that women cannot sacrifice their own egos for the sake of
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men—the prospect of profiting and gaining her freedom from Rabbit through his death
makes her as guilty and self-serving as her husband. The novel concludes with a
repetition of how the tetraology began—Rabbit fleeing from Janice and Nelson. Feeling a
“set-up” from his family, Rabbit sets out on a drive to Florida rather than face the fallout
from his one night stand with Pru (437).
Rabbit’s flight south is awash in nostalgia, a fitting ending to the tetralogy, as it
begins the way it ends. Rabbit’s Celica is Huck’s raft sailing southward on the
Mississippi River, the Pequod launching from Nantucket, Dean and Sal palling around
North America, the road narrative once again playing out in American fiction. The
chronotope of the road may function as the iconic American trope, but while Dean’s road
goes on forever, Rabbit’s always circles back. True, Rabbit never returns to Pennsylvania
because he dies, but he phones home twice hoping Janice will give in and either beg him
to return or join him in Florida. Before he gets to the Florida condo, though, Rabbit flips
through channels on the radio, searching for the oldies stations in hopes of hearing the
songs of his youth. As part of the dramatic irony, the reader knows that Rabbit deludes
himself; his past was never as great as he wants himself to believe. With him is the
American Revolution history book, Barbara Tuchman’s The First Salute, which he’s
been mildly trying to finish. Getting out of range, he turns off the radio in disgust when
all he can find are news stations filled with current events. He thinks he remembers
“when the bottom fell out” of America (419). He had been “reared in a world where war
was not strange but change was” (419). For Rabbit, America began to go downhill when
Kroll’s, Brewer’s old-fashioned department store, closed “because the downtown had
become too frightening for white people. . . . If Kroll’s could go, the courthouse could go,
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the banks could go. When the money stopped, they could close down God himself”
(419).
On his trip south Rabbit has been visiting Reaganland—America’s Disney-esque
past49—but the sight of the real Disney World spurs his recognition of the fraud—just as
watching the Mickey Mouse Club and Jimmie the Mousketeer did thirty years before.
Soon Rabbit will feel the pull of the more authentic America, one that he has been both
frightened and fascinated by. After arriving in Florida, Rabbit wanders into the parts of
Deleon, FL where tourists fear to tread. He finds neighborhoods that remind him of “the
town of his childhood, Mt. Judge in the days of Depression and distant war;” he finds the
black neighborhoods, “a vast stagnant economic marsh left over from Deleon’s Southern
past,” that supply the “the hotels and condos with labor” (Rest 434). The blocks “feel like
a vast secret” among the “glitzy community of elderly refugees” (434-435). He returns to
this section of town: It is “the widespread black section that draws him back” because it
“is in some way familiar, he’s been there before, before his life got too soft” (442).
Ridding himself of Reaganesque nostalgia, Rabbit, though he often felt threatened by the
racial and ethnic other, melds into the world of a more recognizable and real America.
The “other” ceases to be as he identifies the blue collar neighborhood of Deleon with that
of his own childhood—his real one, not the safe, unchanging memory of Kroll’s
department store and its white-only downtown, but the “mysterious” passageways of Mt.
Judge (442). Deleon is the America Rabbit grew up in, working people living in
“glorified cabins put up after the war for people without much capital who yet wanted a
piece of the sun,”—and where boys play basketball (442). After interrupting a game
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previously (as he did at the beginning of the tetralogy), Rabbit plays his final game
against a black kid the narrator names Tiger, for the tiger stitched on his shirt. Though
Tiger is apprehensive about playing basketball with this old white man, the game relieves
this apprehension—Tiger smiles and tries to pretend that he’s not having as much fun as
he is. In playing, “neither player calls a foul;” though they play aggressively against each
other, a sense of respect has been built (460). But Rabbit’s heart gives way and he
collapses on the court. Here, Updike identifies Tiger as the new Rabbit, as Tiger runs “in
the middle of the block,” and “under the high excited sky,” language reminiscent of
Rabbit running in Rabbit, Run (461). Compare the former passage to Rabbit running after
his game with the boys thirty years before: “Running. At the end of this block. . . .
Overhead, a daytime bulb burns dustily” (Run 7-8). As Rabbit lies dying, America is
handed off to this Tiger, destiny unknown. But they both share the instinct of the self;
Tiger flees, not wanting “to get mixed up with nobody;” perhaps his experience might
suggest he fears being blamed for this white man’s death, as Skeeter had fled the flames
that had consumed Jill in Redux, an act of self-preservation, an act Rabbit himself could
come to respect (Rest 461).
Considering his reverence for Reagan, it should come as no surprise that Rabbit
resorts to nostalgia, and particularly the nostalgia that yearns for the innocence of small
town America where department stores were locally owned and staples of the
community. They were not just stores but symbols of American entrepreneurial success,
the small business owner striking for America a small blow against communism—
everyone doing their part. Somewhere in this hazy remembering, America had achieved
its place as the utopia of individual freedom, but somewhere this innocence was lost—we
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do not know where exactly but presumably somewhere in the 1960s—which corresponds
to the closing of Rabbit’s beloved Kroll’s. Though, if we compare this remembering to
Rabbit’s view of Kroll’s at the time, we find the falsity of this nostalgia: “Every
employee hated Kroll’s,” Rabbit had thought (Run 14). Reagan’s dreamy re-envisioning
of America glosses over the era of segregation, widespread institutional racism and
sexism, and the economic collapse of the Great Depression and persistent economic
disparity among ethnic, racial, regional, and class lines. Rabbit’s America of the 1950s is
Reagan’s dreamland America where reality has little place in the reimagining of the
American past. Although not a racist per se, or in the overt ways we might recognize,
Reagan built narratives tinged with racial overtones; the pining for a past that does not
acknowledge America’s deeply embedded racial struggles threatens to whitewash
American history—part of America’s national forgetting, as Toni Morrison characterizes.
Rabbit’s reverence for Kroll’s also tinged with racism because he imagines that blacks
moving into the downtown area drove whites away, and hence the money. Of course,
white flight is real, but the pre-black downtown is part of his idealization of it. But
Rabbit’s nostalgia does in fact fade. He grows tired of the “the old songs all that syrup
about love, love, the sweetness, the cuteness, the doggies in the window and Mommy
kissing Santa Claus. . . . It’s all disposable, cooked up to turn a quick profit” (Rest 419).
At the moment of his reminiscence about Kroll’s Rabbit fittingly passes by Disney World
and thinks about the falsity of the products being sold everywhere.
“Visiting Reaganland,” Garry Wills tells us in Reagan’s America, “is very much
like taking children to Disneyland” where there is a “safe past, with no sharp edges to
stumble against,” where “one [is] immunized against any troubling incursions” (387).
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Throughout the tetralogy, the core of Rabbit’s authentic self occasionally punches
through the layers of jingoism, propaganda, racism, sexism, advertisements, pop culture,
religion, politics, and family. It is what leads him away from the fake and fraud of
Florida’s propped-up fantasy of America, with its glittering condos and hotels, Sea
World, and Disney World. Underneath these layers, for Updike, is the core of American
identity, the legacy of the core of Protestantism, individuals alone with their God. It is
actually the antithesis of Reaganism, which is why Rabbit intuitively senses that the
Reagan myth is fraudulent. Reaganism attempts to freeze both past and present in some
American ideal, resists historical change, and, most importantly for my purposes, it
codifies American identity within the myth it proselytizes. Life is “a dialectical
situation,” Updike observes, “A truly adjusted person is no person at all” (qtd. in Samuels
34) Identity is personal and national dialectical, the two in conflict with one another. This
friction deconstructs paradigms of American identity along racial, gender, and even
religious lines. For if nothing can come between an individual and God, then this
relationship remains sacred, private, and, therefore, necessitates political and ideological
freedom. This freedom allows America to change and progress, not remain stuck in either
Rabbit or Reagan’s idealized past, but ready to be passed to the Nelsons, the Tigers, and
Rabbit’s grandchildren, and the America they make from it.
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CHAPTER III
TONI MORRISON’S TRILOGY:
CULTURAL TRAUMA AND THE SEARCH FOR IDENTITY
The overwhelming majority of African Americans, hardworking and stable, are out of the
loop, have disappeared except in their less-than-covert function of defining whites as the
‘true’ Americans. –Toni Morrison (What Moves at the Margin 146)
Tony Morrison’s Trilogy in Context
Although Toni Morrison has acknowledged that the novels Beloved (1987),
Jazz (1991), and Paradise (1998) form a trilogy, little critical work has paid attention to
the trilogy as a whole. In the Cambridge Companion to Toni Morrison, Justine Talley
notes this “critical silence” in regard to the series, even though each of the novels has
received “copious” amounts of critical attention as singular works (75). One of the main
reasons for the lack of scholarship on these novels as a trilogy, Tally argues, is because of
the apparent lack of substantive connections among the three works. In attempt to
illuminate the subtle but important connections that bind these novels together, Tally
establishes that these novels are linked through various notions such as Bakhtin’s notion
of the chronotope, themes, and the historiography of African American history, and
suggests that each novel is grounded in mysteries and center on the “question of
ontology” (76). However, Tally focuses on the novels as a “concern for theories of
discourse that dominated the end of the twentieth century,” such as Foucault’s power and
discourse theories (89). Therefore, Tally is primarily interested in how language
constructs power dynamics throughout the trilogy. Alternatively, in her 2000 article, “The
Past is Infinite: History and Myth in Toni Morrison's Trilogy,” Barbara Christian centers
her discussion on Morrison’s trilogy as an exploration of the relationship between history
and memory. Christian argues that Morrison’s insistence “on the centrality of memory”
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over history stems from African Americans exclusion from the narratives of American
history written by whites (411). As important as these issues are and as much as they help
foreground my attempt to explore the connections among these novels, I argue that the
strongest bond that binds these novels into a coherent trilogy is their collective
preoccupation with the problematic notion of American identity. In the years between the
publications of Jazz and Paradise, the second and third installments of her trilogy, many
of Morrison’s talks centered on American identity. In 1994, for example, Morrison wrote
in “On the Backs of Blacks” that characters such as Pap from Huckleberry Finn and
Wash from Absalom, Absalom! are the best clues “to what the country might be like
without race as the nail upon which American identity is hung” (Morrison, What Moves
147).50 In these novels, Morrison’s reconstruction of one hundred years of American
history not only tries to give voice to those whose history is largely ignored in
mainstream American culture and society but demythologizes tenets of American
identity, revealing their damaging effects on African-Americans and hindrance of social
progress. Connected by themes rather than a consistent cast of characters, Morrison’s
trilogy covers the lives of African Americans from the 1850s to the mid-1970s.
Morrison’s fiction, Richard Schur argues, resists “the banner of one signifier, such as
singular ‘black’ or ‘African-American’ culture,” and, as I will argue, resists American
identity (32). Morrison’s trilogy illuminates African Americans’ alienated position within
American history and the sheer impossibility and impracticality of their sharing in the
predominant myths of American identity without risking cultural destruction.
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Morrison explains that without their “glowing white masks” these characters cease to be
American, as exemplified by Pap’s avowal not to vote if blacks were granted the same right and Wash’s
murder of Sutpen once the latter treated him like a “nigger” (Morrison, What Moves 148).
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Born into the same generation as John Updike, who came of age during the
Great Depression and the Second World War, Morrison criticizes Americans of the
postwar era for the onset of the nation’s amnesia toward slavery: “somebody forgot to tell
somebody something,” she declared, in addition to asserting that slavery “wasn’t in the
literature at all” (Morrison, What Moves 41). Slavery, in Morrison’s view, was pushed
aside in favor of more romantic versions of the American past that centered on stories of
successful immigrants from European nations. Furthermore, Morrison argues that blacks
too tried to forget about slavery and “abandoned the past and a lot of truth and sustenance
that went with it” (Morrison, What Moves 41). Morrison claims that in the postwar era
blacks’ ideas of success were based on white models: “the old verities that made being
black and alive in this country . . . were being driven underground—by blacks” (41). As
Morrison portrays in Paradise (1998), the postwar rise of many African-Americans into
the middle class not only marked an uneasy assimilation into and adoption of mainstream
American culture but also came at the price of forgetting and even selectively
reconstructing the past. Postwar cultural forgetting was not limited to the black
community; it was an effect of the vast assimilation strategies of the era. Jennifer Slivka
points out that Philip Roth, for example, laments in his autobiography The Facts that
“there was no nostalgia for the Jewish old country” (qtd, in Slivka 145). Additionally,
Slivka argues that Roth attributes this forgetting to the Jewish community’s desire to
leave behind what Roth characterizes as an “awful” life before coming to America and
also an American identity that marginalized Jewish ethnicity as foreign. Slivka concludes
that in The Plot Against America Roth criticizes history that “excludes minority input and
authorization” (128). In fictionalizing history, Morrison and Roth attempt to reimagine
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and retell American history that counters WASP hegemony. However, both writers are
acutely aware that black and Jewish histories in America cannot be divorced from
mainstream America. Instead, they are more interested in the ways that blacks and Jews
must carve an identity for themselves within this history.
Paradise closes the series with a look at the failure of an all-black town that
has abandoned its cultural roots. Founded after World War II, the town of Ruby slowly
begins to unravel because of the sexism, racism, and greed of its founders. By pointing to
the postwar era as marking the genesis of American, and even specifically African
American, forgetting of slavery, Morrison alludes to the intense wave of nationalist
propaganda that pervaded the United States in the postwar era and the kind of necessary
national forgetfulness that attempts to forge a single national identity. For example, in
Paradise the town of Ruby mimics much of postwar middle-class white society and
culture and, in doing so, the town’s leaders purposefully obfuscate Ruby’s history. Just as
Updike’s Rabbit at Rest characterizes the Reagan myth as an attempt to return to the
seemingly idyllic postwar America, the historical context surrounding Morrison’s trilogy
(1980s-1990s) is framed by American conservatism’s resurgence during the Reagan Era
and its recycling of the postwar American dream. More telling is that Morrison acutely
recognized that the postwar amnesia toward slavery and its legacy had once again
affected the American consciousness, just as Rabbit Angstrom had all but forgotten
Skeeter and his lessons by the time of Rabbit at Rest. The Reagan myth romanticized preCivil Rights America, and the Reagan administration instituted a backlash against the
legislative legacy of the Civil Rights Movement by taking aim at government support of
the black community. Specifically, conservatives based their crusade to undermine and
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repeal affirmative action laws on the notion that such policies were no longer needed and
discriminated against whites. Second, the Reagan myth, awash in nostalgia, was
constructed to rally the nation around a political narrative that conspicuously excluded
the experience of black Americans and ignored the institutional and cultural racism that
pervaded the United States in the pre-Civil Rights era. For Morrison, the “overwhelming
majority of African-Americans, hardworking and stable, are out of the loop and have
vanished except for their function of defining whites as the ‘true’ Americans” (Morrison,
What Moves 146). Morrison cites George H.W. Bush’s Willie Horton ad as an example
of a paradoxically unifying racist strategy that portrayed black Americans as the unstable
Other—the non-American—that threatened “true” Americans. Morrison’s observations
about the use of race in Bush’s political campaign echo passages from her celebrated
monograph Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination in which
Morrison asserts that “within the word ‘American’ is its association with race . . .
American means white, and Africanist people struggle to make the term applicable to
themselves with ethnicity and hyphen after hyphen after hyphen” (47). Not surprisingly,
an increase in Morrison’s political and social commentary coincides with the genesis of
the trilogy. Setting the opening novel, Beloved, in the heart of the nineteenth century,
Morrison graphically portrays slave life in an era that, Morrison argues, celebrated and
birthed in its literature components of American identity, such as the Enlightenment’s
conception of freedom and Emersonian individualism (Morrison, Playing in the Dark 3839).While championed as the defining characteristic of this new American man,
individualism, Morrison claims, results in “ the problematics of wielding absolute power
over the lives of others” (44). The others, of course, are blacks and women—the slaves
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and even the post-Civil War blacks and their shared progeny who, over the course of the
next century and a half, have been saddled with a cultural identity not of their making.
Morrison asserts that Emerson’s “The American Scholar” was part of the “highly
problematic construction” of the “American as the new white man,” an identity conjured
with deliberate difference from black Americans (44). Specifically, this identity was
assembled in reaction to blacks’ very bondage by a nation that bound them. Since
Morrison notes post-World War II as the beginning of the forgetting of slavery, it is
striking and not coincidental that Morrison’s trilogy is filed consciously among three
postwar eras: Beloved set in the years after the Civil War, Jazz set in post-World War I,
and Paradise set in the decades after World War II (Tally 75). With the exception of the
war of the country’s genesis, the Civil War and World War II mark America’s most
transformative years. America’s military victories, while unifying to some, like a young
John Updike, further consolidated a nationalist identity that remained centered on the
primarily white, Protestant, and male. Postwar failure is a common refrain from
Morrison. Her early novel, Sula (1973), for instance, portrayed the damaging effects of
World War I on the character Shadrack, who foreshadows the deterioration of a black
community. In regard to Beloved, Morrison’s option was to set the novel primarily in the
1850s. Instead, Morrison chose to set the story during Reconstruction and in Ohio (most
slavery narratives are set in the antebellum South). The outcome of the Civil War only
alleviated the most barbaric aspects of racism—slavery—while Reconstruction
resuscitated institutional restrictions on black freedom. In choosing the 1870s as her
setting, Morrison decided to focus on the memory and trauma of slavery rather than the
immediate experience of it. Slavery’s legacy, rather than the evils of it alone, was clearly
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her subject for explication. The problem with reading Beloved in isolation and not part of
the trilogy is to miss Morrison’s grand scope. For it is easy to understand that slavery as
experienced by those who Sethe and Paul D represent was cruel and barbarously
inhumane. However, the trilogy reveals the reverberating aftermath of slavery through
generations. Morrison’s powerful telling, as evidenced by the novel’s reception, perhaps
served part of its purpose by reminding Americans what Morrison believed they were
choosing to forget. And most harrowing to Morrison, it seems, is that American identity
continued to be defined by difference to black Americans in terms all too similar to the
nineteenth century; she claims that “much academic and public discourse” has returned to
“nineteenth-century liberalism” (Morrison, What Moves 197). For Morrison, then, the
questions that Beloved begins to investigate involve slavery’s impact on blacks who try to
construct cultural and individual identities in a nation that continues to define itself
against them.
As Beloved demonstrates, the end of slavery did not mean that blacks began to
experience freedom in the same way whites did, either legally or, more significantly for
Morrison, culturally and individually. Morrison illustrates the disconnection between
whites’ conception and experience of freedom and blacks’. Beloved’s place at the head of
the sprawling trilogy shows that this disconnect remains. Morrison is not alone in
representing this disconnection; Updike’s Rabbit Redux glimpses at this conundrum. In
Redux, Rabbit believes racism to be past, something that Skeeter needs to get over, and
assumes that since Skeeter has the same legal freedoms as he, then their experiences
should not differ: “This is the freest country around,” Rabbit tells Skeeter, make it you
can, if you can’t die gracefully” (Redux 204). But Skeeter’s history lesson serves not only
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to enlighten Rabbit about America’s past transgressions but to force Rabbit to
acknowledge the black presence that has shaped American identity while being
marginalized by it: “We fascinate you white man. We are in your dreams. We are all the
good satisfied nature you put down in yourselves when you took that greedy mucky turn”
(204). Skeeter argues that whites like Rabbit define their freedom in relationship to
blacks. For example, Rabbit believes black freeloading and violence limit his economic
and spatial freedom. Though police brutality against blacks, Skeeter indicates, protects
whites’ fears of the loss of their freedoms. While Rabbit—representing white America—
insists that such racism is all in the past, Skeeter recognizes how whites’ freedoms
continually depend on the subjugation of African Americans. While Rabbit Redux alludes
to what Morrison refers to as the Africanist presence in the shaping of American identity,
Beloved attempts to get at the root of it in primarily two ways. First, Morrison takes us
through the spectacle of Sethe and the killing of her unnamed child who seems to return
in the ghostly form of a girl called Beloved. Here I compare the true story of Margaret
Garner, Morrison’s inspiration for the novel, to Sethe’s story in terms of national
spectacle, which Morrison posits as primarily narrative. Second, Morrison seeks to
reestablish cultural sites that function as touchstones for American identity through the
chronotope of the ship—as in the slave ship—which is most fully realized in the novel’s
twenty-third chapter. The chronotope is, as Bakhtin defines it, where “time, as it were,
thickens, takes on flesh, becomes artistically visible; likewise, space becomes charged
and responsive to the movements of time, plot and history” (The Dialogic Imagination
84). In other words, time and space in a text are interwoven, affecting characters in
specific ways as they move through this literary space-time. The chronotope not only
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dictates how space-time manifests in a text but also how this space-time shapes the
identity of characters. As Talley notes, the chronotope features significantly in the
Morrison trilogy, and in my reading, I illustrate how Morrison uses the chronotope in
order to explore the identity of her characters. For example, in Beloved, the chronotope of
the ship stands as a monument to black history, ever present in the cultural memory of its
characters In Jazz, Morrison’s polyvocal narrative technique moves loosely through
different modes: the realism of Joe Trace’s narrative abruptly shifts to the allegory of
Golden Gray. Surrounding the allegory are the narrator’s digressions on the City—the
chronotopic point of confluence for the novel’s characters as they migrate to the City in
search of their individuality as a way of escaping their traumatic pasts filled with racism
and the constraints of segregation. Rounding out Morrison’s trilogy is Paradise in which
Morrison extensively explores the damaging effects of didactic, static myths, especially
the replication of dominant American paradigms of identity by the all-black town of
Ruby, Oklahoma.
Beloved: The Spectacle and the Chronotope of the Ship
Beloved is the story of Sethe, a woman who killed her baby in order to protect
it from slavery. The novel opens in Ohio in 1873 where Sethe lives with her eighteenyear-old daughter, Denver, in a house known as 124, which is haunted by the spirit of her
murdered child. Shunned by the black community, Sethe is visited by Paul D, a former
slave, and the two begin a love affair that is hampered by the presence of the ghost. One
day, Sethe takes in a mysterious young woman calling herself Beloved, who later appears
to be a manifestation of the baby she killed eighteen years before. The novel flashes back
to Sethe’s and Paul D’s life as slaves on a Kentucky plantation called Sweet Home during
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the 1850s. Once run by relatively kind owners, Sweet Home is taken over by a cruel and
sadistic slave owner, known to the slaves as schoolteacher. Schoolteacher’s cruelty
knows no bounds, and eventually Sethe escapes the plantation, but not before she gives
birth to Denver on a small boat while crossing the Ohio River. Eventually, Sethe arrives
at the home of her mother-in-law, Baby Suggs, who resides at 124. Baby Suggs briefly
serves as a spiritual leader of the free black community, but soon they turn on her and
Sethe. Out of spite, they fail to warn Sethe that schoolteacher has come to capture her and
her children. Just after schoolteacher arrives, Sethe kills the baby and tries to kill her
other children. After Paul D learns about these events in 1873, he leaves Sethe, accusing
her of behaving like an animal when she killed her baby. Subsequently, the young woman
Beloved begins to drain Sethe’s life in various ways, and Sethe becomes deathly ill.
Eventually, the community comes to her aid, Paul D returns, and Beloved mysteriously
vanishes.
Morrison’s dedication in Beloved pays homage to the sixty million and more
who died as a result of slavery. The dedication sparked controversy when a few critics
suggested that Morrison simply multiplied by ten the Jewish death toll in World War II to
arrive at her figure and to portray blacks as bigger victims than Jews. Morrison, though,
stated in an interview that sixty million was the most conservative estimate she received
from historians. Naomi Mandel notes that Morrison was calling attention to the lack of
historical documentation regarding slavery and its victims rather than trying to provide an
exact number. As Mandel posits, the dedication illustrates the limits of language and
dares to speak the unspeakable—juxtaposing a known figure of six million Jewish deaths
with the unknown number of those who died as a result of slavery. The controversy is
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worth revisiting because the very fact that there was a controversy explains much about
the context from which Beloved emanated. As Richard Schur observes, since the Civil
Rights movement the “tenuous coalition” between Jews and African Americans
“splintered,” leading to conflict rather than cooperation (19). Tellingly, the plans for a
Jewish Holocaust museum in Washington, D.C. had publicly come to fruition around the
time Morrison began Beloved, and President Reagan helped lay the cornerstone for the
museum within a year of the novel’s publication. As Mandel points out, Morrison
reflected on the lack of a national—or any—memorial for victims of slavery; Beloved
was in part written to stand in as such a monument. That the discussion centered on
suspicion that Morrison had conjured the number as a direct affront to the Jewish
community obscured the larger issue to which Morrison was pointing: that very few
knew or seemed to care how many blacks had died during slavery. Rather than foster a
discussion about tragedies of two groups of people, critics attacked a black woman’s
credibility over the validity of the amount of black suffering. Thus, when considering the
wholesale national remembrance of the Jewish Holocaust while the Reagan
administration aggressively attempted to repeal Civil Rights legislation as well as the
general historical ignorance (much of it willing) of black history, Morrison’s dedication
screams for recognition in the face of historical obliteration. Morrison had earlier
criticized Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman’s economic study of slavery for
minimizing its brutality (Morrison, What Moves 49).51 Black suffering minimized and
black achievement ignored, these Morrison saw as an attempt to erase blacks from
American history: “There is little scholarly recognition,” she claims, “that a major part of
American history is the history of black people” (What Moves 48).
51
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Excluded from the national narrative (or included as only bit players), blacks are
excluded from national identity. Thus, in recovering not just black but American history,
Morrison attempts an integration of cultural narratives that destabilizes the prevailing
hegemony of American identity. Morrison’s continual refrain is not to separate out
histories by race or ethnicity, but rather to point out the interconnectedness and
dependency among each group’s narratives. Thus, any attempt to suppress or ignore
black history creates a paradox in which Reagan’s America, for example, denies or
overlooks the existence of black presence that is, in fact, necessary for even its own
construction of American identity. Critics’ hostile questioning of the accuracy of
Morrison’s figure of sixty million did not come from benign historical interest, but rather
in large part as a reaction to her audacity to challenge the national narrative that had
omitted slavery and its effects from national consciousness: “ . . . black people don’t want
to remember, white people don’t want to remember. I mean it’s national amnesia,”
Morrison declared (Morrison, Conversations 120). Beloved attempts to force recognition
of slavery and its horrors as primary in American identity and not simply belonging only
to blacks as part of their obscured history.
Morrison’s dedication had a profound effect. Even her critics had to admit their
ignorance regarding the extent of slavery’s genocide. Second, the conversation stirred
public interest in the very question—even if some of the interest was sneering. But
perhaps more importantly for Morrison is that her dedication, coupled with the novel and
its title, attempted to provide an identity for the millions of human beings killed as a
result of the slave trade. For as much as Beloved, both the title and the character, refers to
Sethe’s murdered child, the name also stands as a monolithic signifier for slavery’s
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victims. Further, Beloved invokes African mythology, spirituality, and religion, filling the
cultural void carved by the slave trade. Morrison’s use of these African elements
defamiliarizes, challenges, and reconceptualizes notions of American identity.
At first, Morrison presents Beloved as the incarnation of the nameless baby whom
Sethe murdered to prevent her return to slavery. Although Morrison’s modeling of
Beloved on the case of Margaret Garner is widely known and discussed, infanticide and
abortion were not unheard of in slavery as mothers made heart wrenching decisions on
whether death for their children was preferable to a life of slavery. Indeed, Sethe’s
mother killed all of her children spawned by rape. Moreover, slave children “died in
droves” as a result of poor prenatal and postnatal care, and the number of miscarriages
caused by conditions of slavery perhaps cannot be calculated but was surely significant
(King 149).
In light of these high numbers of dead children, Morrison’s use of the Margaret
Garner case as the primary plot implies irony because Garner is made out to be a criminal
for attempting to protect her newborn from slaveholders. Sethe’s killing of her child to
protect her from slavery certainly serves as the fulcrum of the plot. And as with the
Margaret Garner case, Morrison suggests that there is no ethical or moral system from
which Sethe can or should be judged, at least certainly not in the United States then. In
fact, the novel even portrays as misplaced Paul D’s and the black community’s
condemnation of Sethe for the killing. More importantly, to ask whether Sethe’s (or
Garner’s) decision was right or wrong is wrongheaded to begin with; such a question
attempts to place Sethe within a binary, racially constructed moral system—specifically,
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it is “white” to ask such a question from Morrison’s point of view. Why? For several
reasons.
First, some of Morrison’s harshest criticisms are directed at white intellectuals
who study or seek out blacks as part of their theories or to satisfy their curiosity, no
matter how benign these theories may seem. In Beloved, the more racist of those are
represented by schoolteacher, the cruel slave owner who documents the animal
characteristics of his slaves. In Garner’s case, the story is relayed by Reverend P.S.
Bassett and appeared in a newspaper article from 1856, which Morrison included in The
Black Book (1974) (she was its editor). Although Bassett, an abolitionist, visited Garner
to expose the evils of slavery, he expresses surprise not only at Garner’s rationalizations
but her mother-in-law’s admission that she “would probably have done the same” (qtd. in
Plasa 41). Just as Bassett sets out to understand why Garner killed her children, readers
and characters try to understand Sethe’s actions. But the irony of Beloved’s plot rests in
the absurdity of exploring the nature of Sethe’s guilt in light of the incalculable number
of slavery’s victims. Bassett wants to find out why Garner killed her child. He asks if she
were in a state of madness, and so this fascination with why this one black slave woman
would commit such an act becomes the focal point rather than why Garner was being
pursued by slave catchers, that slavery existed, and the deaths of scores of black children
at the hands of white slave owners and traders. Additionally, Garner became known as
the black Medea, and her case was, though politically interested, a spectacle. Likewise,
Sethe suffers a similar fate as her trial gains notoriety. Garner’s case became a tug-of-war
between white abolitionists and slavery supporters. Slavery supporters characterized
Garner as animalistic, needing to be tamed. Abolitionists countered that Garner did it in
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order to protect her child from slavery’s brutality. In either case, whites obsess over the
reason a black person would commit such a crime—and it is up to them to find the
reason. In discussing another famous trial involving an accused black person—O.J.
Simpson—Morrison reflects on the consequences of the narrative whites construct when
deciding black guilt:
In order to succeed it [the narrative] must monopolize the process of
legitimacy. It need not ‘win’ hands down; it need not persuade all parties.
It needs only to control the presumptions and postulates of the discussion.
. . Spectacle is the best means by which an official story is formed and is a
superior mechanism for guaranteeing its longevity. Spectacle offers signs,
symbols, and images that are more persuasive than print and which can
smoothly parody thought. . . .The spectacle is narrative. (Morrison, Birth
of a Nation’hood xvii).
The effect is to “rapidly enforce the narrative and truncate alternative opinion” (xvi). Not
coincidentally, a primary refrain of the Simpson case was the media’s attempt to cast
Simpson in animalistic terms, and by identifying him as an animal, the public would
understand his primal motive: sexual jealousy. In regard to the Garner case, the narrative
spectacle serves a similar purpose. Garner is either animal or victim in need of white
care. As it applies to slaves in general, the latter is one of the conclusions of the most
famous abolitionist text written, Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin.
Regardless, the spectacle of the black person on trial, whether real or fictionalized, allows
for whites to probe, dissect, and reach conclusions about black identity, answering “Who
are they and what motivates them?” The spectacle, thus, places the burden on blacks to
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exhibit humanity comfortable for whites. But because whites have to discover evidence
of such, it reinforces racial hierarchy. Since the discovery is made through the spectacle,
the drama that plays out codifies white dominion dynamically through symbols, signs,
and images. Moreover, through the spectacle white guilt is temporarily exorcised, since,
in the cases of Garner and Sethe, they will either be judged guilty and animal—thus,
slavery and racism justified—or exonerated because of white justice and mercy.52
In Beloved, the narrative is so firmly entrenched that Paul D recoils when Stamp
Paid shows him the article in the newspaper about Sethe’s crime along with Sethe’s
picture; at first he cannot believe the woman is Sethe: “That ain’t her mouth,” he tells
Stamp Paid (Beloved 158). Unable to read, Paul D is forced to learn about Sethe from
Stamp Paid, who withholds information about the black community’s refusal to warn
Sethe about the schoolteacher and the slave hunters. Against his instincts, Paul D buys
into the dominant narrative about the killing and decides to confront Sethe. He intimates
that in killing the child she acted like an animal: “You got two feet, Sethe, not four,” an
insult that springs up “a forest” between them (165). Paul D’s insult is doubly cruel to
Sethe: it mimics the language of the slave master and recalls the incident where
schoolteacher’s nephews rape her. Then, to animalize her, they “milk her like a cow,”
throw her in a pit and whip her, scarring a tree-like image on her back to inscribe her
identity so she could not forget (Plasa 125). The scarring of Sethe’s back reinforces not
just schoolteacher’s dominion over her body but defines her as an animal. The whipping
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carves a definitive mark on her back that mimics schoolteacher’s writing: he takes notes
on the supposed animal characteristics of the slaves at Sweet Home. Though Paul D
wonders why he himself had insulted Sethe, Paul D has a “conviction” that he “was being
observed through the ceiling” (165). His insult makes him recall his own shame: when
schoolteacher forced a bit in his mouth, animalizing him as well. Paul D senses the
overarching narrative watching over him as he adopts the language of the master. Sethe’s
whipping and Paul D’s physical humiliation suggest Foucault’s imagining of the body, as
Judith Butler puts it, as the “site where regimes of discourse and power inscribe
themselves, a nodal point or nexus for relations of juridical and productive power” (601).
Both Paul D’s and Sethe’s bodies are sites of juridical power, or the hosts of the
confluence of the relations of white power. The power is productive because it constructs
the subjects (Paul D and Sethe) where the master’s narrative is internalized, catalyzing
the system of control. Indeed, both Sethe’s and Paul D’s physical humiliations are so
severe that neither escaped the past. As their bodies have been inscribed with
schoolteacher’s discourse both have interiorized it to the point of rendering them
figuratively immobile: Sethe keeps herself and Denver in the house while Paul D keeps
his trauma locked up in the “tobacco tin buried in his chest where a red heart used to be”
(86). As David Lawrence points out, schoolteacher’s discourse “abstracts the human
corporeality of the slave into a sign for the other in the discourse of dominant ideology . .
. as blacks find themselves unable to assert an identity outside the expectations imposed
upon them” (89). This presents a stark dilemma for blacks after slavery. In regard to
identity, the black community cannot begin as a blank slate once slavery is ended. While
the legality of slavery has ended, the deeply imbedded ideology that maintained it is still
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ingrained in blacks and whites alike. To demonstrate the pervasiveness of slavery’s
effects, Morrison focuses primarily on a black community isolated from direct white
interference. The 124 before Sethe’s filicide was a “cheerful, buzzing house,” the focal
point of the black community, a place where “not one but two pots simmered on the
stove; where the lamp burned all night long” (Beloved 86-87). Through Baby Suggs’s
spiritual leadership, the community flourished, especially in the revivals held in the
Clearing where the free blacks began to reclaim their identity from white supremacy. The
community’s spiteful turn on Baby Suggs and Sethe seems inexplicable at first, and the
turn is further catalyzed when Sethe kills her baby to protect her from schoolteacher. The
community’s rejection of Baby Suggs and Sethe marks a striking return of the narrative’s
juridical power. This confluence of power relations is on one hand marked by the
spectacle of Sethe’s arrest. The notoriety of the crime persists for more than a decade;
other children taunt Denver about her mother’s deed.
Schoolteacher’s arrival at 124 serves as a reminder of the reach of white power,
that despite the hopes of the Clearing—the hope for a sanctuary of black space—the
narrative still rules. Indeed, even the black community is fixated on Sethe’s crime and
obsessed with her guilt as judged by hypocritical whites. On the other hand, the black
community’s ostracizing of Baby Suggs and Sethe predates schoolteacher’s arrival.
Morrison posits this as what at first seems to be a superficial backlash against Baby
Suggs’s pride—as if the community were that fickle. However, the community’s reaction
against Baby Suggs’s pride once again reflects the depths to which the white narrative
has been ingrained.
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Certainly, schoolteacher’s attempt to capture Sethe and her children reestablishes
white supremacy over the black community: he and his nephews come armed and with
the sheriff. Not only are the black onlookers warned with rifles, but the presence of the
sheriff represents the legal power whites hold over them. However, schoolteacher’s
arrival is framed in religious terms: his posse consists of “the four horsemen” (148). The
religious incantation of schoolteacher’s arrival at 124 culminates from the previous
chapter in which the community begins to reject Baby Suggs for her supposed pride. In
these two chapters, the confluence of powers—religious and legal—drop down from
above on the black community; the latter is not trivial, but ideologically tethered to the
narrative, the identity inscribed into the black psyche. In regard to religion, the dominant
narrative among slaves was American Protestantism, and specifically as it pertains to
blacks, the kind of American Christianity slaves would have been taught, experienced,
and what they filtered from whites to absorb into the slaves’ own version of it. Although
slave owners as a group often had mixed feelings about Christianizing their slaves and
many slaves viewed Christianity as a white man’s religion, the groundswell of black
Christian churches and church membership after Emancipation testifies to the
pervasiveness of Christianity on the plantation (Raboteau 209). Black identity was firmly
grounded in Christianity as it was “the one institution which freed blacks were allowed to
control” in addition to being “the center of social, economic, and political activity”
(Raboteau 320). Thus, the conflict results from a religious crisis—one that threatens the
trajectory of black identity. The community sees Baby Suggs’s growing influence as
undermining their Christian beliefs:
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Where does she get it all, Baby Suggs, holy? Why is she and hers always
the center of things? . . . healing the sick, hiding fugitives, loving, cooking,
loving cooking, preaching, singing, dancing and loving everybody like it
was her job and hers alone. . . . Now to take two buckets of blackberries
and make ten, maybe twelve pies. . . . Loaves and fishes were His
powers—they did not belong to an ex-slave. . . . (Beloved 137).
A target of Morrison’s critique throughout the trilogy (and expressed more pointedly in
Paradise), postbellum black Christianity, with its emerging patriarchical and other
hierarchical structures, modeled too closely white Protestantism—the very religion often
used to keep slaves in order. True, plantation Christianity often inspired slave resistance
and escapes and was crucial in many instances for forming slave communities, which is
why slave owners were hesitant to Christianize their slaves. However, postbellum black
Christianity formalized and distanced itself from many aspects of the slaves’ Christian
practices—especially those that had been influenced by African beliefs and traditions.
Similar to John Updike, Morrison is interested in teasing out America’s intertwined
religious heritages. Both want to uncover what has been lost in the confluence. While
Updike’s Rabbit tetralogy seeks to recover the core of Protestantism—the individual
alone with his God, Morrison tries to recover not only African influence but black
Americans’ collective religious identity stripped from white hegemony. Baby Suggs’s
revivals in the Clearing resemble the descriptions of secret slave meetings often
discreetly held in places away from the purview of their masters. In such places, slaves
could worship as they pleased (though at great risk) and construct their own brand of
Christianity. Slave owners who permitted slaves to attend or hold religious gatherings
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often forbade slaves to meet religiously without white supervision (Raboteau 215). Slaves
noted a sharp contrast between white preachers who taught obedience to their masters
and the lack of formal hierarchy in their own meetings—in essence the slaves’ services
were more akin to African influences: dancing, singing, and celebration; if preachers
emerged they emerged because they were admired for their rhetoric. Thus, these meetings
were more participatory—not didactic—and, therefore, more egalitarian. Baby Suggs’s
emergence as a spiritual leader follows in this vein:
she had nothing left to make a living with but her heart—which she put to
work at once. Accepting no title of honor before her name, but allowing a
small caress after it, she became the unchurched preacher, one who visited
pulpits and opened her great heart to those who could use it. . . . In the
heat of every Saturday afternoon, she sat in the clearing while the people
waited among the trees. (Beloved 87)
Prior to Baby Suggs’s arrival, the community had been primarily the domain of Stamp
Paid, who feels entitled because of his aid to runaway slaves. As Baby Suggs’s influence
grows, she prepares a feast made from Stamp Paid’s picked blackberries. However, the
community interprets her feast as a disruption of the social hierarchy—an attempt to
usurp not only Stamp Paid’s position, but also usurping those who the community
believed to have suffered more during slavery. Thus, Baby Suggs represents an
alternative order and identity—an alternative that threatens the fragile stability the black
community has newly found. The gatherings in the Clearing culminate into the feast;
here, the community recognizes that Baby Suggs is on the verge of becoming their
spiritual leader, and from her they remonstrate. Why? To conclude that the community is
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superficial as some criticisms suggest is to overlook the power of the confluence of
powers that hold the former slaves. Lawrence argues convincingly that “the unwritten
codes of the community cannot yet entirely accommodate joyous self-celebration” and
“the community itself remains an ‘ex-slave,’ unable to define itself outside the
parameters of the slave experience” (91-92). Moreover, Baby Suggs, in taking the
community in the Clearing, takes it temporarily out of the purview of the white narrative.
Here, Baby Suggs helps the community to reimagine itself in opposition to their masters’
language:
in this here place we flesh; flesh that weeps, laughs; flesh that dances on
bare feet in grass. Love it. Love it hard. Yonder they do not love your
flesh. . . . The dark, dark liver—love it, love it, and the beat and beating
heart, love that too. More than eyes or feet. More than lungs that have yet
to draw free air. More than your life-holding womb and your live-giving
private parts, hear me now, love your heart. For this is the prize. (Beloved
88-89)
Her preaching attempts to wrest black identity from the master’s narrative, starting with
the reclamation of the body. Since the slave body is the text on which the master’s
narrative is written by the pen-like whip—as the scars on Sethe’s back attest—black
salvation from the slave mentality begins with the flesh (Tally 84). In declaring the
reclamation of the body as the prize, Baby Suggs counters Christianity’s spiritual
salvation with an earthly one. For blacks to be the owners of their souls, they must first
be the owners of their own bodies. Second, this love of the flesh counters white
Christianity’s distaste for it, which is even more intensified if such flesh is black. Baby
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Suggs leads the community to reinscribe themselves in the Clearing, without the master’s
code. Born in Africa, Baby Suggs has brought with her to the Clearing African influence
(Zauditu-Selassie 159). Not coincidentally, Baby Suggs’s leadership reaches a climax
during the feast. As Zauditu-Selassie and Linda Krumholz have each pointed out, the
feast represents an African ritual of healing for the community. Underscoring the
egalitarian spirit of Baby Suggs’s preaching is the tradition of African ritual specialists as
“servants of the people” rather than hierarchical leaders; rites serve to “strengthen” the
community, and “in times of colonial oppression and rapid social change, ritual symbols
have also served to create and reinforce new religious and political movements” (Ray
17). Therefore, the ritual is not just to heal, as Zauditu-Selassie argues, but reveals a very
real and practical need to break from the oppressor’s religious and political power.
However, on the precipice of breaking free, the community recoils. Here, Morrison
rejects an unrealistic option: that the community could so easily choose to release itself
from the prisonhouse of the master’s narrative, for the legacy of slavery and the master’s
narrative remain intertwined in the fabric of black identity. After Sethe kills her child and
she and Baby Suggs are ostracized, Baby Suggs goes silent; the gulf between Baby Suggs
and Sethe and the community represents the conflicted sense of identity within the black
community. Therefore, blacks, Morrison argues, experienced in the nineteenth century
the fractured identity associated with postmodernism.53 Rejected by whites and internally
fractured, blacks, Morrison dramatizes, begin post-slavery existence still chained to white
hegemony.
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One of Morrison’s most innovative achievements in the novel is to feature a
character who embodies this fractured sense of identity: the eponymous character
Beloved. The myriad of critical interpretations of Beloved attests to the complexity and
the difficulty of pinning down succinctly what or who Beloved stands for. In fact, the
very elusiveness of a definitive interpretation is perhaps the very point of Beloved, as she
represents loss and the unspeakable—her meaning cannot be adequately articulated,
much like the trauma of slavery. At once, Beloved represents the spirit of those who died
because of slavery, and also those who were not born, died in infancy, and who did not
get to become. The loss Beloved represents, therefore, is not just a loss of lives but a loss
of all that would and could have been. Primarily, Morrison laments the stifling of African
progress because of Western “rapacity” and the diverted progress of black Americans in
the seventeenth century as racial lines were being prescribed: What might have become
of both, she asks (Morrison, What Moves 53). Fittingly, Morrison centers Beloved’s
surreal poetic dialogue in chapter twenty-three not on Sethe’s act of murder but on a
slave ship. Even more innovative, Morrison attempts to merge Sethe, Denver, and
Beloved into one voice—they are all Beloved: “I am Beloved and she is mine . . . I am
not separate from her” begins the chapter (Beloved 210). From there, the monologue
transitions to the description of events on a slave ship. As the novel progresses, Morrison
first presents Beloved as a lost girl, then gradually as the ghostly incarnation of Sethe’s
murdered child; however, the monologue ultimately reveals that her embodiment is not
limited to the latter.
The narrative’s turn to the slave ship posits the ship as one of the major
chronotopes of novels about slavery, and thus about black/American identity (others
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being the plantation as in Sweet Home, and the river [the Ohio]). Like the plantation, the
slave ship serves as a formative space of American identity. Interestingly, Beloved leaves
the ship, emerges from the water, and seeks out Sethe—“I want the join,” she says (213).
Beloved’s movement from the ship to the water and toward her “mother” implies birth as
it correlates to Denver’s birth in the leaky boat along the Ohio River. We also should
recall that Sethe’s mother emerged from the slave ship; thus it’s clear that the ship/boat is
the chronotopic point of origin for these characters. Of course, in Bakhtin’s imagining of
the chronotope, the space-time through which a story takes place is usually more clearly
outlined and persistent throughout, so there may be some hesitation to accept the
characterization of the ship as a chronotope. However, Morrison’s primary settings are
sites of memory and, thus, noetic—taking place within the memory of its characters
rather than an actual physical space. We might compare this to, say, Joyce’s Ulysses in
which much of the setting and time play out within the characters’ heads rather than
externally. Though we are taken back to the plantation, for example, it’s the plantation as
remembered by each of the characters. Since memory is how we encounter these sites,
our usual picture of the space aspect of the chronotope is fractured by memory, especially
when this memory is presented as a collective memory, such as the ship. Thus, the spacetime of memory is where we are located mostly in Beloved—characters certainly meet in
the actual physical settings of the novel, such as 124 and other locations that occur in
present time, but mostly they relate and connect through memory. Second, by presenting
time through memory, Morrison reconceptualizes time not as linear but as similar to what
Benjamin Ray refers to as “time-out-of-time,” a more African concept of time than a
Western concept (41). In this African conception of time, the “past is recoverable,” a
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“constant source of new beginnings, of ontological renewal” (41). Morrison’s emphasis
on the ship-plantation-river are not just necessary settings, but function as monumental
memorial sites, vital to understanding not just black identity but American identity as
well. Upon these sites hovers whiteness—schoolteacher/the Garners on the plantation,
Amy Denver on the river, and the slave traders on the ship (referred to as the men without
skin). Morrison turns conventional origins of American identity on their head.
Conspicuously, Morrison downplays white Christianity’s formative influence. The novel
does not necessarily reject, say, Updike’s Protestantism as a main source of
Americanness but posits slavery as at the very least equally essential. The return to the
slave ship in this monologue is crucial for two primary reasons. First, since the novel
centers on the question of why Sethe killed her child, the monologue returns to the slave
ship as the point of origin for explanation. Time, in terms of the chronotope of the ship, is
made ever-present, since characters are pervading the physical world to meet at these
memorial sites. It is a type of collective stream-of-memory rather than an individual
stream-of-consciousness. Therefore, in the truest sense of Bakhtin’s imagining of the
chronotope as literary space-time, the three women experience time as it is relative to
their pain together in the site of memory, and for Morrison, the horrors of the ship are just
as relevant to the horrors of the plantation in regard to Sethe’s “crime.” Thus, the
explanation for Sethe’s killing of her child, inasmuch as there can be one, does not lie in
the immediate “facts” collected as part of, say, a trial, but rather the explanation lies in
the transcendent trauma of slavery woven into the identity of each affected individual.
Second, the ship, symbolizing a point of origin of American identity, marks the genesis
of the racialized master/slave society. Somewhere along the Middle Passage, cut off from
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their families and culture, the Africans become Americans as “the men without skin”
establish ownership of their bodies, chaining them to the hull and sticking “them through
with poles” (211-212). Indeed, Beloved laments the loss of the Africans’ possession of
themselves, wanting to see their teeth through which they once sang and spoke, which
recalls the significance of the bit forced into Paul D’s mouth; she watches as a man fights
“hard to leave his body”—his freedom can only come through death (210-211). But the
return to the ship in this chapter is not just to delineate the genesis of this master/slave
dichotomy of American identity. As much as the ship remains a monument of slavery, the
novel indicates it must not be forgotten either, hence the narrative’s return to it. Finally,
as Bakhtin also theorizes, there is the other dimension of the chronotope of the reader’s
world. By reading about bringing the three women together in this chronotope, the reader
can also experience it with them; thus, the chronotope of the ship invites an experience
among characters, reader, and writer; it is the memorial site where all “meet.” While in
reality, there is no escaping the ship except through death, Beloved figuratively escapes it
through this poetic retelling: “I am not taken,” she asserts and there is no longer an “iron
circle” around her neck and “no men without skin” (212). “I am not dead,” she continues,
and she is ready to reconcile with Sethe: “we can now join,” the chapter concludes (213).
In John Updike’s handling of identity, there exists a core of identity that is
continuously overlain by and in conflict with social, cultural, and political forces that
threaten it. It is this dialectical antagonism that sets the individual’s drama with the world
in motion, hence the persistent antagonism among Americans and social, cultural, and
political limits. Morrison, however, sees identity forming more collectively from
collective memories, traditions, and cultural trauma shared among individuals who are all
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connected within that very nexus. Updike wants us to see the individual uncovered by the
blanket of these very forces, for these are hindrances and obstacles to freedom, while
Morrison believes that recovering this history is vital to African American freedom from
white hegemony. The disruption of the dominant narrative of American history must
come from the reimagining of narrative sites that challenge the spectacle that attempts to
confine black identity into the realm of the other or to define it on the terms the spectacle
sets forth. Morrison, however, is not opposed to a notion of individualism, for the dignity
and autonomy of each individual is one of the goals of black struggle. For this, Morrison
turns to her second novel in the trilogy, Jazz.
Jazz: The Limits of Allegory and the Chronotope of the City
To say Morrison completely transitions from one epoch to another is to miss the
recursive nature of her trilogy. With Jazz, Morrison has moved from primarily 1873 to
the 1920s, but the narrative of the novel returns to Reconstruction, reminding readers that
the past, as Faulkner proclaimed, is never really past but always at work shaping culture,
society, and individual lives. Jazz (1992) tells the story of Southern migrants, Joe and
Violet Trace, who come to the City (Harlem, NY) in the early 1900s after Joe is deprived
of his land by racist whites. In 1925, Joe begins an affair with a young woman named
Dorcas. In a jealous rage, Joe shoots Dorcas, who refuses to identify him as her killer
before she dies. Also violently jealous, Violet assaults Dorcas’s corpse at the funeral, and
the narrator attempts to explain Violet’s actions and the effects of the City on its
inhabitants. In a drastic departure from the main narrative, the narrator flashes back to the
1870s and relates the story of Golden Gray, a biracial man who was raised to believe he
was white. However, he later discovers that his father was a slave who had an affair with
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Gray’s white mother. Gray attempts to find his father in order to kill him, but his quest is
interrupted when he discovers a pregnant woman in the woods. Although Gray meets his
father, he does not kill him, and the narrator breaks off the tale before she reveals his fate.
The novel eventually returns to the story of Joe and Violet. Violet and Dorcas’s aunt,
Alice Manfred, forge a friendship, and the novel ends with the narrator musing about the
meaning of the story and her relationship to the City.
Although choosing the era of the Harlem Renaissance to succeed Beloved’s preCivil War and Reconstruction settings may not be surprising considering its cultural
importance to African Americans (and America in general), Morrison’s skepticism about
the era belies the title of the novel; there’s irony here. As in Beloved, the novel centers on
the murder of a young girl, and instead of a celebratory account of a vibrant Harlem full
of poets, musicians, and civil rights leaders, Morrison paints a picture of a crowded,
urban ghetto failing to deliver on its promise to offer a much better life than the South.
Life was safer from violence by whites in the North only by small degrees as Northern
race riots and Northern lynchings occurred, and, economically, life for blacks was only
marginally better in the cities. Politically and legally blacks fought Jim Crow in the North
too, as civil rights laws went ignored and segregation was just as common above the
Mason-Dixon line as it was below it. After all, race still mattered in the North as it did in
the South. Moreover, blacks came into Harlem at the beginning of the twentieth century
largely because of avaricious real estate prospectors, white flight as a few blacks moved
into the area, and racial violence against blacks in lower Manhattan. Nevertheless, blacks
moved north in droves, in part because of the cruel irony of the results of the passing of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The amendment redefined citizenship for blacks in 1867, but
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by the 1880s the amendment was being used not for civil rights for people but to expand
the “rights” of businesses led by the infamous robber barons of the Gilded Age. As
laissez-faire capitalism increased, rights of laborers, which included millions of blacks
who headed north to work in factories and plants, decreased—for blacks their situation
was even further exacerbated because unions often excluded them from membership and
many Northern whites resented having to work alongside blacks (Wintz 3). For Morrison,
the Reagan-era backlash against civil rights legislation must have seemed reminiscent of
the late nineteenth century when many Reconstruction civil rights laws were either
repealed, ignored, or rendered useless by subsequent legislation. Thus, despite the 14th
Amendment, most whites and their laws still denied blacks as true Americans deserving
of real citizenship.
In the Clearing from Beloved, Morrison presents a short-lived attempt by Baby
Suggs to help the black community reimagine black identity, and like a rubber band the
notion stretches too far, snapping back and leading to Baby and Sethe’s ostracizing and
ultimately the realization that the reaches of white power have not been escaped. In the
subsequent novels of the trilogy, Morrison returns to this notion of the Clearing
expanded—black havens and black utopias. Jazz offers a further explication than
Beloved. Since blacks were denied American identity legally and culturally, they set out
to find spaces in America where they could begin anew and perhaps forge new cultural
identities cut off from their past as slaves and the purview of white vigilance. The
Northern migration created such opportunities, though limited, as blacks carved out
neighborhoods in cities, the phenomenon that Jazz addresses while Paradise portrays the
legacy of blacks’ westward movement.
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The title of the novel underscores Morrison’s much discussed narrative technique:
a narrative of improvisation, and syncopatic rhythms; or in short, a technique that mimics
the music of jazz. But jazz is also the conceit for American identity. An amalgam of
African and European musical forms, mainly blues and classical, jazz illustrates the
plight of blacks in the aftermath of Reconstruction. To take this conceit further, jazz uses
European/ “white” instruments and elements from classical music in a way that blacks
had to make use of the “instruments” and “elements” of white society in order to survive.
Indeed, jazz, much like the blues, is music about cultural and individual survival
(Lesoinne 157). Although it makes use of white instruments, jazz is a result of the
antagonistic relationship between African and European styles: the instruments and
certain elements European while retaining the spirit of black angst found in the blues and
the polyrhythms of African music. Indeed, jazz sometimes appropriates and revises
classical music, often to the point of parody (Lesoinne 157). But also jazz explodes
classical music’s strict compositional form through variation and dynamic improvisation
as a way of rebelling against white music’s prescriptions, and in turn creating something
very different and very new. Since jazz is the product of an uneasy relationship between
African and European—or we might say black and white—music, it serves as an
appropriate metaphor for American identity. Jazz, in fact, is the musical product of
blacks’ taking what they can from white society and attempting to forge a new identity
outside of the plantation.
Additionally, blacks’ use of white music and instruments was reciprocal, if
begrudgingly so. Wealthy whites used black jazz musicians as their source of
entertainment and white musicians appropriated popular forms of jazz to capitalize on its
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notoriety. Even the title of the 1920s as the Jazz Age refers mainly to whites’ conception
of it, so Morrison’s novel attempts to redefine this jazz age on its own terms, terms that
are more consistent with the depth, complexity, and emotional impact of the music. The
image of black jazz musicians performing for wealthy white audiences looking for a good
time in the Roaring Twenties, especially in Harlem—a place where blacks fled in part
because of white violence and rent exploitation—speaks to the complex racial dynamic
involved not only in the genre but also in the performance of jazz. Although the novel’s
characters are principally black, the narrative detours into the past, to Reconstruction, to
uncover the racial identity of Golden Gray, a privileged Southerner secretly born to a
white mother and black father. The jazz-like performance aspect of Morrison’s narrative
has been acknowledged, but the novel’s plot seems to have little to do with the music—
there are no nightclub and dance hall scenes or musicians that figure into the storyline;
however, there is more to the narrative than just the jazz-technique: the very sounds of
jazz, the performance of it tells a story of a troubled national identity, forged in
antagonism, epitomized in Golden Gray who wanders the Southern backwoods only to
find his black father and struggles with whether or not to embrace him or kill him; even
his name is paradoxical, colors that don’t quite fit but somehow must. In the Golden
Gray section we encounter the antagonism of his quest while the story of Joe and Violet
Trace epitomizes the new kind of American identity.
The Golden Gray section deviates from the primary narrative unexpectedly, an
example of Morrison’s jazzy, improvisational technique. But like the divergence from a
rhythm in a jazz piece, although abrupt and jarring, the narrative’s detour, while
unexpected, eventually resonates with the rest of the story. The transition to the Golden
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Gray section is not seamless, but the narrator hints at its purpose: “Risky I’d say, trying to
figure out anybody’s state of mind. But worth the trouble if you’re like me—curious,
inventive and well-informed” (Jazz 137). Since in the previous section Joe Trace’s
monologue ends with Joe telling Dorcas what it was like to be black “back then” and
about his “state of mind,” the narrator uses the Golden Gray section to explain Joe and
Violet Trace’s story: why he killed Dorcas and why Violet slashed at her corpse (135).
For Joe had been “new seven times,” his identity in flux as he traversed the American
landscape, moving from place to place, country to city, South to North (135). The
narrator’s risk is to venture into a historical explanation of Joe’s and Violet’s states of
mind, risky because it threatens to dispossess them of agency and individuality. The risk
also highlights the tension among art, the construction of history, and the idiosyncratic
nature of a lived experience (the real to which we have no access). Indeed, the narrator
comes close to apologizing for the effects of her risk, her inability to portray accurately
the depth of Golden Gray’s pain. In one sense, Jazz is a novel about blacks emerging as
individuals, especially as they move into cities away from the communal hold of the
plantation and thus the plantation mentality. Therefore, the narrator, through her
apprehensive tone, realizes that she risks undermining Joe’s and Violet’s roles in their
own choices and control over their own bodies and depriving them of their own
identities. It is this tension between individual and communal experience (where does one
end and the other begin?) of which the narrator is wary. At the beginning of the Golden
Gray section, though, the narrator sounds confident, declaring herself inventive and wellinformed. However, this confidence erodes in the middle of her improve. Such erosion is
telling because in her attempt to explain, the narrator offers up her Golden Gray tale as
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an allegory; the narrative of Jazz not only has changed storylines, but it has shifted from
the gritty, urban realism of Joe’s and Violet’s lives to the allegorical mode. Second, the
narrative detours from the chronotope of the city to the chronotope not so much of the
plantation per se but of the South as remnant of the plantation. Golden Gray, in the quest
for his father, moves across the obliterated landscape of the post-Civil War South, an
eerily ghostly place, where Wild, the specter-like woman roams and Hunter the lonely
figure resides. In this episodic (within the novel), Faulkner-like allegorical romance, the
narrative takes on a fairy tale-esque aura: the South becomes a magical realm, the
chronotope of the totalizing quest through which Gray believes his identity will
ultimately be reconciled. Indeed, True Belle, we learn, filled “Violet’s head with stories”
about the orphan/prince Golden Gray throughout her childhood (139). Along the road to
find his father, Gray encounters a young woman asleep; he thinks she is not real but a
“vision” (144). The shift to allegory has multiple implications.
First, allegory bridges the past to the present by “rescu[ing] that which threatens
to disappear” (Owens 68). Allegory always points toward the significance of the past and
attempts to render an experience universal while conscious of its inability to perfectly
capture particulars—hence its reliance on convention and overt artifice. Joe and Violet’s
migration to the North marks an attempt to break from the past, the South—the last straw
coming when they are run off their land. But in the North they find Jim Crow and racial
violence as well. Since allegory is an instructive use of the past, the narrator’s tale of
Golden Gray attempts to reconnect Joe and Violet to the South and their origins. In the
previous chapter, Joe’s monologue, the past is rendered more concretely but without
instructive or universalizing purpose. Allegory treats the past as distant, for its
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overarching themes, which is why the tale of Golden Gray seems remote from the novel’s
main plot. Additionally, allegory, as Erich Auerbach indicates, presents time as
teleological, in that the events in the past are to be read as prefiguring future events (1314). Second, allegory is conscious of its own limitations and exhibits anxiety over its
inability as a totalizing signifier. Walter Benjamin’s theory of allegory is instructive here.
True, Benjamin theorizes that allegory attempts to house truth, but inherent in allegory is
that it is cognizant of its failure to do so.54 Consequently, allegory “unmasks the official
monuments to progress, the stabilized totalities and transfigured appearances of the
dominant culture” (McCole 139); allegory purposefully dramatizes not only where
synthesis between the signifier and the signified is perpetually deferred but where
meaning ultimately breaks down. Golden Gray personifies such a breakdown in the
sociopolitical construction of race. Gray is raised to believe he is white—and his outward
appearance, golden-haired and fair skinned, makes this a natural assumption. Gray’s
grandfather, a Southern planter, has fathered seven children with his slaves, and so Gray
embodies the repressed blackness of the nation’s racial identity. His mother, Vera Louise,
buys him the finest clothes, clothes that he proudly wears on his journey to kill his black
father; he wears them, we are told, to flaunt his superiority, to let his father, Henry
Lestroy, know that he is above his blackness. But his grandfather’s wealth, coming from
the labor of black slaves, has paid for these clothes. Even more ironically, the money by
which Gray was spoiled and pampered financed his mother’s banishment for her shame.
When Gray learns that he is black—for in the legal construction of race he is black
despite his whiteness—he becomes enraged. Gray later tells Lestroy that he wants to live
not as a black man, but as a free man. Perhaps for Gray to say as a white man is
54
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synonymous with free legalistically, but Gray’s race is not in danger of being discovered.
Therefore, Gray’s anger stems from his realization that he does not control his identity.
His mission, to kill Lestroy, then, is to erase his blackness and to gain autonomy over his
self. Since the onset of his quest, Gray has tried “shaping the story for himself,” to enact
the narrative he has created (Jazz 154). Saving the injured, pregnant black woman, Wild,
gives Gray even more of a chance to show Lestroy his honor and his paternalistic power
over blackness: “He wants to brag about this encounter, like a knight errant bragging
about his coolness as he unscrews the spike from the monster’s [Wild’s] heart and
breathes life back into the fiery nostrils” (154). His honor from being a man in control of
his own identity (he believes) gives him power over life and death; this he wants to show
Lestroy: that he is able to transcend his black blood and be his own man. Read
allegorically, Gray, like America, wants to deny that blackness is a part of him;
consequently, this denial dehumanizes blacks and, ultimately, incites violent against
them. But Gray’s narrative cannot hold; he senses this, reminiscing about how True Belle
used to smile at him and now realizing she smiled because she knew the secret. He had
thought that race fit easily into categories, that there was one kind of blackness, “True
Belle’s kind,” but he now knows “there was another kind—like himself” (149). Although
in his rage-filled quest, he attempts to regain control over his identity, eventually Wild,
whom he firsts detests for her dark skin, derails his plans. What becomes of Gray is
unknown; his story fades into the narrative. But Wild and her pregnancy remind him of
the fragility of his own being, how little power he has over his self; even his encounter
with Lestroy does not go as planned. Lestroy’s attention is more on the care of Wild and
her baby than on Gray’s revelation. Gray, the narrative hints, fully immerses himself into
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blackness by running off with Wild into a cave, unable to live in a world where he is not
in control of his identity. Still, the narrative hints at another possibility in that “he
disappears into the expansive promise that is the post-bellum United States” (Brown
636). If it is the latter, Gray chooses to pass as a white man or as a black man (which is
less likely); either way he retains some power over his identity while acknowledging that
his choice of race will determine his American destiny.
Just as Gray’s own narrative falls apart, so does the narrator’s allegory. Cognizant
of it, the narrator asks, “What was I thinking of? How could I have imagined him [Gray]
so poorly?” (Jazz 160). Earlier, the narrator had called a Gray a hypocrite and wondered
why he didn’t wipe Wild’s face. Her answer was that he wanted Wild to look savage to
confirm his racial superiority. But now, she has “to think this through, carefully” and,
instead, wish “him well” (161). She admonishes herself for not noticing that his “hurt . . .
was not linked to the color of his skin, or the blood beneath it. But to some other thing
that longed for authenticity” (160). As much as allegory may illustrate America’s racial
drama, the narrator recognizes that allegory cannot depict accurately individual
experience. More specifically, in an attempt to allegorize Gray she risks depriving him of
his individuality and downplaying the enormous internal conflict for Gray or any other
mixed-race individual. The narrator claims, “I have been careless and stupid and it
infuriates me to discover (again) how unreliable I am” (160). Thus, while the allegory
may serve a particular purpose, it fails to totalize experience, yet deconstructs race as a
definable category on which American identity rests. Moreover, race is a lived experience
more than it is just a matter of skin color. Even if Gray chooses to pass as white, he is not
necessarily white simply because a community treats him as such—race is not just what
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the community perceives, but how individuals live with race within their own mind. Gray
realizes that even if he passes as white, he will still live not as white, but as a black man
passing.
The interruptions of the narrator indicate the anxiety of representation; the
mixture of styles, the earthy realism of Joe and Violet and the allegorical Golden Gray
tale, also suggest Morrison’s postmodernist formal posturing. However, the juxtaposition
of two modes, as in jazz, may represent not only the limits of representation, but also the
power of their confluence. In Jazz, history as allegory implies the inseparable yet
complicated relationship between historical determinism and individual freedom. As
contrast, the allegory is surrounded by and, indeed, segues back into Joe and Violet’s
story. Individual freedom among blacks must be prefaced with a collective breaking
away from white dominion. The first step is to recognize the fatal flaw in whites’
conception of race. True Belle conveys this to Violet through the allegory of Golden
Gray; indeed, the storytelling of this former slave serves an instructive purpose for her
grandchild. The narrator imagines that Violet may have come to love Golden Gray; the
stories True Belle introduced to her at age twelve and this introduction in Violet’s
pubescent years suggest a connection to her later love for Joe, the child of Wild, who we
learn is himself probably of mixed blood. When Violet reminisces about Joe, she thinks
of the “golden boy” who “tore up” her “girlhood as surely as if we’d been the best of
lovers” and “from the very beginning” Joe was “a substitute” for her first love, Golden
Gray (97). Admittedly, the narrative never directly tells the reader of Joe’s mixed
heritage, but this opacity illustrates the sordid, and often hidden, history of
miscegenation.
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Morrison’s inspiration for Jazz was an old photograph she found in James Van
Der Zee’s The Harlem Book of the Dead. The picture was of a dead girl, killed by her
lover. Just before she died, friends asked her to tell them who shot her; not wanting her
lover caught, she replied, “I’ll tell you tomorrow” (Stave 59). The scene is fictionalized
in Jazz, as Joe shoots Dorcas, and she refuses to identify him as her killer. Read often as a
testament to the power of love—and thus a figurative expression of blacks’ reclamation
of their own unique emotions (their right to love whom and how they please), the scene is
overlooked for the way in which it depicts the black community’s attempts at autonomy
within America (and its resistance to white authority). In Beloved, the aftermath of
Sethe’s filicide forms the core of the spectacle, the narrative of black guilt/innocence that
whites control. Dorcas’s refusal to implicate Joe and her aunt’s subsequent decision to
forego police/prosecutorial involvement illustrate how members of a community often
choose their own version of justice rather than submit even criminals among them to the
justice system of the ruling elite. Communities that feel culturally, ethnically, and/or
racially isolated from the state often prefer to handle justice internally, not wanting to
subject their members to various types of humiliation and deprivation of dignity or to a
type of justice that violates their own customs and/or sense of morality. Indeed, Jazz
opens with just such an explanation of Joe’s legal status: Dorcas has been murdered; the
community knows who did it. Whites can’t prosecute because there were no witnesses,
and, more significantly, Dorcas’s aunt, Alice, does not pursue the case for two reasons.
First, she “didn’t want to throw money around to helpless lawyers and laughing cops,”
and she “found out that the man who killed her niece cried all day and for him and for
Violet that was as bad as jail” (4). Alice decides ultimately (despite her private longing to
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attack Violet) that Joe and Violet’s grief serves a truer sense of justice than the kind of
justice that whites could supply. Since the narrative stresses Joe’s suffering, justice in
Jazz is rendered closer to its more natural form than its corruptible bureaucratic one;
additionally, justice is what the community and one’s true peers deem as sufficient
punishment for a crime rather than the pronouncements of an alienated system that has no
emotional or cultural stake, ties, or investment in the verdict—especially within a system
that does not fully recognize blacks’ American identity. Indeed, the narrative transitions
from Alice’s satisfaction that justice is being done to the community’s concern for Violet.
Her name is mentioned at the Salem Women’s Club “as someone needing assistance”
despite “the grief” she caused when she tried to attack Dorcas’s corpse during the funeral
(4). True, the women’s club decides against helping Violet; however, this is because the
club decides that a family who had lost everything in a fire needed help more.
Regardless, the community’s concern is for both victim and perpetrator where
community well-being is valued more than retributive actions against a criminal. This is
especially made clear because the extent of Joe’s guilt is not so clear cut—he shoots
Dorcas in the shoulder, and Dorcas tells those at the party not to call an ambulance when
she might have been saved. The true healing for the community comes not from Joe’s
legalistic punishment, but from Violet’s and Alice’s growing friendship as Violet seeks to
understand and forge a connection to Dorcas.
While celebrating some aspects of the City, Jazz insists on the need for such
communal connection as an essential part of American identity. The North’s defeat of the
South in the Civil War made one thing abundantly clear: the United States was headed
toward industrialization and urbanization. Jazz renders one aspect of these consequences:
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blacks leaving the South to work in the North. In this new era, black leaders laid out
different conceptions of the “New Negro.” Booker T. Washington’s A New Negro for a
New Century posits the New Negro as “twentieth century capitalists” in order to use
economic power to eventually integrate, while Ida B. Wells argued that whites were
retaliating against black businessmen for competing against them (qtd. in Stewart 14).
Indeed, Jazz accommodates Wells’s position more so than Washington’s. Joe explains he
was inspired by Washington’s having “a sandwich in the President’s house” and “decided
to buy me a piece of land” (Jazz 126). However, whites forced him off the land “with two
slips of paper I never saw nor signed” (126). Washington’s strategy having failed him,
Joe says that this is when he became new for the fourth time, finally leaving the South for
good.
The narrator is the key into the City, then, and we enter this City through the
beginning of this gossip. Morrison’s City, though, is chronotopic—it is based on Harlem,
but the City, as its generic name might suggest, is figurative. As a chronotope, the City
functions almost identically to Bakhtin’s notion of the chronotope of the road. In fact,
much of Jazz resembles a road narrative: Joe narrates his story on how he came to the
City, the trips and events from his journey from the South to the North; Golden Gray’s
quest from the city into the country attempting to discover the roots of this identity.
According to Bakhtin, the chronotope of the road “is a particularly good place for chance
encounters” where “varied people . . . intersect at one spatial and temporal point” (The
Dialogic Imagination 243). The City, as presented by Morrison, is like an open road
where people meet by chance and the cosmopolitan makeup of the city allows the
meetings of people from a variety of backgrounds. Indeed, Jazz shows the diversity of
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African Americans, rather than presenting them as monolithic in culture and thought. Joe
and Violet are from the South, while Dorcas is from the Midwest, and Alice has been
living in the City, each with varying attitudes and experiences within the nation. Yet, here
they meet at this particular spatial and temporal point. The City, according to the narrator,
is not closed off—as could have been presented, a suffocating stifling place—but rather it
is intimidating for its openness, spontaneity, and unpredictability. The beginning of the
novel is, in fact, a chance encounter, presumably along a city street, the narrator seeing
Violet from not too far away. For the narrator the streets of the City are where it’s at,
where lives unfold for the narrator to peek into. The City is the place where blacks from
across the country have fled, into what they believed to be their road’s destination, but in
fact is just a continuation of “the course of life” that unfolds in the City as it does on the
road (Jazz 244). At the end, the narrator realizes this, having been just a listener, and now
desires to get out and begin to live a life of her own (220). The City, like the road, is a
place where identities can be lost, which the narrator seems to have lost, but also remade,
but only if the past itself is first reconciled rather than forgotten.
The City in Jazz appears to offer another conception of the New Negro: that of
self-determination as espoused chiefly by Alain Locke (Stewart 15). But Morrison
appears hesitant to embrace this view as well. Self-determination downplays, if not
denies, the influence of the past. Second, it seems too closely aligned with the
individualist mentality, which resists the need for community. The City provides the
allure and illusion of individualism that involves, as Madhu Dubey argues, the “erasure
of history” (136). As Dubey further points out, the narrator echoes the sentiment: “There
goes the sad stuff. The bad stuff. The things that nobody-could-help stuff. That was

177
everybody then and there. Forget that. History is over, you all, and everything’s ahead at
last” (Jazz 7). However, Joe cannot flee totally from the past; his assault on Dorcas stems
in part from his mother’s rejection of him. In addition, the narrator declares, “When I
look over strips of green grass lining the river, at church steeples and into the cream-andcropper halls of apartment buildings, I’m strong. Alone, yes, but top-notch and
indestructible—like the strong. . . . At last, at last, everything’s ahead. The smart ones say
so” (7). But the narrator’s need to tell the story of Joe and Violet betrays her own need to
belong. Culture and community are the muses from which the artist must work. Updike’s
Rabbit is in the community, but his real self plays out inwardly, and he meanders in the
Kierkegaardian “zigzag” (Updike, Higher Gossip 70). As we see in Philip Roth’s trilogy,
Nathan Zuckerman retreats from the world in order to write about it, but Morrison’s
narrator moves within the milieu in which she is working. The individual is not masked
by or does not need to retreat to the margins of society in order to discover the self, but
instead finds themselves most creative when part of and responding to the community.
This is the lesson that Golden Gray finds difficult to learn. Morrison posits her storyteller
as a natural storyteller, a gossiper, who sees someone along the street and turns to a
listener and says, “Sth, I know that woman”—the sound and words that open the novel—
a sound like a hushed gasp a gossiper might make when surprised and excited to see
someone they can talk about (Jazz 3). The “Sth” sound indicates the story is not planned,
but spontaneous, ready to roll off the tongue and through each breath of the narrator—
like a jazz musician beginning to play, to riff off and expand on a note, a mood, a feeling,
a thought that plays off the cue given from the City. The individual is not one who seeks
to separate, or flee, but one who seeks and even longs for community. There are, though,
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similarities between Morrison’s concept of the individual and Updike’s. Rabbit’s zigzag
is the result of the constant tension between his individuality and his desire to come back
to his family (he repeats his flight-return pattern). In Jazz, the narrator needs to feel
separate from the City in order to observe it, but ultimately wants to return to it, to
become a part of the community and connect with other people. And herein lies the
drama of identity in Jazz: in order to re-experience community, blacks after slavery and
because of Jim Crow need to experience individuality before they, hopefully, recommune. From this expansion and contraction, a new American identity can be forged.
Paradise: Myth and Ritual
In Paradise (1998), a group of men that leads the all-black town of Ruby, OK
massacre women in order to preserve their power over the town’s inhabitants. The
massacre takes place in 1976, but the novel flashes back to the nineteenth century when
black settlers began to move into Oklahoma in addition to various moments leading up to
the massacre. The murdered women had lived at a place called the Convent some miles
outside of the town’s limits. The women at the Convent are a loose collection of
personalities, women who come and go as they please. The Convent is run by Consolata,
who takes in the female transients and provides them with spiritual leadership as well as
room and board. The novel explains the origins of Ruby, founded in 1952 primarily by
Deek and Steward Morgan after the failure of Haven, another all-black town that
collapsed largely because of the Great Depression. The Morgans are intent on controlling
the town’s founding mythos, symbolized by the Oven, a monument built by the original
founders of Haven. Additionally, many of the men want to keep Ruby racially pure, and
they ostracize those whose skin is too light. As the town begins to deteriorate, the men
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use the women at the Convent as scapegoats and shoot the women, presumably killing
them all. However, the women’s bodies are never recovered, and the details of the event
remain obscure. Pat Best, one of the women ostracized because of light skin, begins to
reconsider the town’s history and investigates the shooting.
From the chronotopes of the ship and plantation in Beloved to the city in Jazz,
Morrison concludes her trilogy by shifting to the American West. An ideological space
forming one of the main tenets of American identity, the Western myth is not only
deconstructed by Morrison but comes to symbolize the failure of a racial utopia. Part of
America’s Western myth is the desire for white men to move further into the American
wilderness, to remake themselves as purely American—finally distinct from their
European counterparts—to displace or defeat the “savage” Indian, to help America to
fulfill its manifest destiny, and to bring about the ultimate evolution of the white race by
fleeing, in essence, blacks to prevent miscegenation (M. Johnson 58). Blacks settling the
West, however, could not and did not participate in this mythology except as the
antagonistic and threatening force that helps drive whites further into the frontier.
However, the myth and the reality are distinct planes: blacks did move westward,
ironically, largely to flee whites or at least their systems of oppression before and after
the Civil War. Ideologically, black participation in the settlement of the West was not
commensurate with the mythic narrative, and, not coincidentally, blacks’ roles in
westward expansion were ignored and even today remain largely absent from the national
consciousness about the West, as the lack of blacks’ presence in popular representations
of the era attests. More importantly, exclusion from the mythos means exclusion from
American identity then and subsequently, a recurring denial each time the Western myth
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is invoked. However, blacks moving westward sought land ownership as a way to assert
their rightful claim to American citizenship. Bonnie Lynn-Sherow quotes William
Eagleson, a black farmer and later editor of the Langston City Herald in Oklahoma, as
declaring, “We propose to exercise our prerogatives as American citizens, be it on a
forty, eighty, or 160 acre tract. . . . We are in this race to finish” (qtd. in Lynn-Sherow
42). Such a declaration was necessary because many white farmers were intent on
driving blacks off the frontier, illustrating that the West was as unaccommodating to
blacks as the rest of the nation. The racism led to the formation of all black towns,
especially in Oklahoma, the primary setting of Paradise. Although immigrant whites and
American whites who moved westward did not as individuals necessarily see themselves
as part of a grand myth—survival and a chance at prosperity were their immediate
goals—the myth’s pull and influence centered on the notion of the “Virgin Land” unused
and virtually uninhabited.55 Since in the mythic construction the Indians did not cultivate
the land—in the Lockean sense of mixing labor with the land, which justifies private
ownership—they did not own it but were simply an unfortunate part of the landscape. In
American literature, Washington Irving and Walt Whitman wrote as if Indians were
invisible peoples; Irving was especially oblivious that “Indian management practices had
in fact created the park-like scenes [he] found so appealing” for their “wild” beauty (qtd.
in Lynn-Sherow 9). Thus, the mythic frontier was clearly a white space while a
continuation of whites’ struggles against the non-Americans among them. Blacks,
though, were determined to forge recognition of their American identity through owning
and cultivating land; to some degree and while in competition with Indians for land some
black farmers appealed to whites that Indians did not know what to do with the land they
55
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had (Lynn-Sherow 9). Part of blacks’ experience on the frontier was an enactment of
Booker T. Washington’s theory of racial progress: prove Americanness by demonstrating
economic productiveness through the means available. Indeed, the men of Ruby in
Paradise have mastered the craft of land ownership and set up a society that mimics
white America.
However, symptomatic of the postwar era, black assimilation, Morrison finds,
results in a near cultural death trap for blacks as they replicate white racism and
patriarchal Protestantism. Beginning and ending in a massacre of women in 1976,
Paradise more pointedly attacks male-dominated Christianity as the men of Ruby eerily
reenact scenes from American history, such as the persecution of women akin to the
Salem Witch Trials and racial segregation. Similar to John Updike in some respect,
Morrison appears to reject postwar utopian thinking, though it is not entirely clear
whether or not she rejects utopian thinking categorically as Updike does (Morrison states,
“Paradise is about going into the wilderness and attempting to create utopia, then asking,
‘Why does it collapse?’” [Morrison, Conversations 204]). Additionally, while Updike
sees American postwar Christianity as a corruption of the spirit of Protestantism,
Morrison suggests that the patriarchal system and exploitative capitalism are inherent in
white American Protestantism, so the novel pushes beyond this traditional Christianity as
a defining element of American identity. Paradise visits some of the themes of Updike’s
Rabbit, Run: the restrictive elements of hierarchical organized religion in postwar
America; additionally, one of the women of the Convent, Mavis Albright, hits the road
like Rabbit, fleeing her husband and children while searching for an opaque sense of
freedom. Mavis, similar to Rabbit’s wife, Janice, is negligent in the death of her children
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who die in similar ways (Janice accidentally drowns her daughter while Mavis leaves her
twin toddlers to suffocate in a locked car). Mavis, then, seems to enact the part of a
fleeing Janice—a woman saddled with overbearing domestic responsibilities and a lousy
husband. Furthermore, the sex scene between Mavis and her husband Frank reads very
similarly to a scene in Rabbit, Run where Rabbit uses Janice lustily. After leaving her
family, Mavis stops at a gas station with “a Florida map” in the car—Rabbit stops at a gas
station and intends to drive to Florida the night he leaves Janice (Paradise 29). Mavis,
though, goes west, dreaming of California, all the while picking up female hitchhikers in
search of friendship. She eventually finds it at the Convent and thrives among the allfemale group. Mavis and the other women in Paradise have found the nuclear family,
which Morrison declares a white model, unfulfilling, a patriarchal family structure in
which men can easily dominate—and as in Mavis’s case—abuse them (Morrison,
Conversations 123). Thus, Mavis’s idea of freedom differs from Rabbit’s in at least one
respect: rather than the angst of the private self, it is a search for a real physical freedom
from an abusive husband as well as the mental prison that comes along with such abuse.
Indeed, in the “paradise” of Ruby, the men have seized not only power over the town and
its religion, but also over their families. The seizure of power, we learn, began in 1952,
marked by the death of Ruby Morgan for whom the town is ironically named. The year
1952 ushered in the Eisenhower era, a time when the full force of cultural propaganda
centered on the primacy of the white patriarchal nuclear family.
The US’s victory in World War II reinvigorated American myths, especially that
of American exceptionalism; although this myth took on a more decidedly geopolitical
element (as we recognize it today), it also carried with it the myths of the past, such as
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America’s Christian religious destiny. Indeed, the two are intertwined to disputable
degrees, but nevertheless, the symbiosis exists. As America began to remake itself in the
glow of its new global power, these myths replayed, albeit galvanized in modern form.
As mentioned previously, Morrison believes the postwar period was a critical period for
the black community because this is when slavery and black history were forgotten
and/or not discussed. Through the men of Ruby, Morrison dramatizes the consequence of
this forgetting. Rather than cull their founding mythos from a unique slavery experience
(outside of Christianity) or Africa, the men instead replicate the Puritan narrative of the
founding of a new Promised Land. True, most blacks moved to Oklahoma for practical
reasons—to escape Southern oppression; notably, blacks left Memphis for Oklahoma
after three lynchings; Oklahoma was then referred to as “the Land of the Negro,” or the
destiny of the “Exodusters,” those blacks who left the South for the Midwest (Goble
119). Nevertheless, some blacks saw themselves as part of a Judeo-Christian myth: an
exodus from a land of slavery ordained by God.56 Morrison, though, does not seem
completely critical of this narrative; in fact, it’s perhaps culturally necessary and, maybe
more importantly, inevitable that black migrants would find solace in this myth, having
left the South. Scholars such as Ana Maria Fraile-Marcos, Katrin Dalsgard, and Marni
Gauthier each note that the men of Ruby mimic America’s Puritan myth
microcosmically. Fraile-Marcos, for example, identifies the irony of this mimicry: that in
trying to maintain a “paradise,” in essence resisting outsiders and trying to protect itself
from white America, the town of Ruby actually becomes an “index” to their very
“Americanization” (Fraile-Marcos 10). As much as Morrison appears critical of this
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myth, she is also interested in exploring the cause of its replication. The novel informs us
that Haven was founded in 1890 when black settlers in Oklahoma were turned away not
only by whites but by other blacks as well. Known in the novel as the Disallowing, this
event becomes a revered religious-like myth for the residents of Haven and later Ruby,
who incorporate a reenactment of the Disallowing into their Christmas pageant alongside
Joseph and Mary’s journey to Bethlehem. The settlers were “aggressive[ly]
discourage[d]” by “Negro towns already being built” (Paradise 13). Morrison intimates
that blacks were already replicating white racial and economic prejudice; they disallowed
the settlers because they “did not have enough money “to satisfy the ‘self-supporting’
Negroes required” and also because of the blackness of their skin (14).57 The rejection is
especially traumatic to the settlers because they believed that they shared with other
blacks the unifying mythos of the black Exodus—that they were collectively “destined”
to find the Promised Land. However, since the blacks who already were there deemed
themselves as specially chosen because they were the first to settle, they began to see
themselves as different from the newly arrived. Thus, the novel illustrates the problem
with the myth of “chosen peoples”—everyone else becomes “others” who are
antagonistic to their destiny, just as many white Americans viewed other races in their
midst. In turn, the new settlers use this rejection; it becomes “the controlling” tale that
“explained why neither the founders of Haven nor their descendants could tolerate
anybody but themselves” (13).
Although the rejection by other blacks boils the blood of Haven’s founders,
continual white racism also serves as a motive to isolate the town. First, Zechariah
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Morgan, a Haven patriarch, was once named Coffee until he renamed himself after white
men shot him in the foot for refusing to dance, and he set off further into the frontier. To
Zechariah, every group of white men looked like a threatening posse on the lookout for a
chance to lynch blacks. By the turn of the century, Oklahoma had indeed become as
threatening to blacks as areas of the South, culminating in the 1921 Tulsa Race Riot, the
worst race riot in American history. According to Alfred Brophy, expert on the origins of
the riot, “Oklahomans spoke of ‘negro drives’—the use of violence to drive out blacks
from a town or county” while law enforcement did nothing to prevent and probably even
aided these efforts (8-9). The Tulsa Riot was preceded by other attacks on black
individuals and communities. The increase of violence against blacks by whites in
Oklahoma was “partially the response . . . to the rising aspirations of blacks” (Brophy10).
Further, lynchings were often the result of faux-outrage over the supposed rape of a white
woman by a black man. This calls to mind Morrison’s famous opening line to Paradise:
“They shoot the white girl first” (Paradise 3). Although the identity of the white girl is
not ever made clear in the novel, that the black men kill her first and feel that “with the
rest they can take their time” indicates that the there is a significance in the first killing
(3). Since the black men attack the women at the Convent from a deranged sense of
communal preservation, killing the white girl first demonstrates an immediate snuffing
out of the symbol of racial purity used to justify racism and violence against blacks.
Indeed, whites singled out the fear of miscegenation as outright justifications for racism
and lynchings, thus around white women hangs the emblem of their degradation. The
reason the men feel that they can take their time for the rest is because these are lives they
can control more easily—figures within their control as they have already controlled to
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their satisfaction the women of Ruby. The men, thus, attempt to re-seize power over the
myth by eradicating those they believe have threatened it. As Jill Matus points out,
“Morrison has observed” (157) that when women break away or attempt to break away
from patriarchal power “is when we are assaulted (qtd. in Matus 157). The novel seems
to ask why these men replicate a social structure they themselves despised. The novel
sketches around the origin of the Christianity-based patriarchal origin of Haven—or at
least the role of women in its origin is not altogether clear. One explanation is the passage
in the novel where Pat Best remarks that the men favored Booker T. Washington’s
methods to achieve progress, a critical allusion to Washington that echoes Jazz (Paradise
212). Critics of Washington’s approach felt, in one respect, it too imitative of white
society (as well as naïve expecting that whites would simply accept them as economic
competitors). Evidence exists that shows some black men, particularly black cowboys,
adopted the American Western myth in order to assimilate more easily with whites on the
frontier; for example, Michael Johnson argues that Nat Love’s The Life and Adventures
of Nat Love (1907) was influenced by Booker T. Washington’s Up From Slavery (1901)
and functions as “a narrative of assimilation” (M. Johnson 98). In Love’s narrative, he
sets out to demonstrate his masculine bond with whites which is “cemented by shared
acts of violence sometimes against minority racial and ethnic groups,” and his
transformation into a cowboy “hinges on the myth of regenerative violence” (M. Johnson
102-103). Love’s narrative is one example, but Johnson offers examples of black men at
times adopting white masculinity as part of the Western myth (as well as their
deconstruction of it). Additionally, Johnson sees Morrison’s Paradise as a critique of
such. Thus, the novel shows a confluence of two powerful patriarchal constructs:
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Christianity and the frontier myth. Within the context of the trilogy, Morrison had earlier
marked the rejection of Baby Suggs as a failed moment to reclaim the more African
matriarchal religious aspects (but not matriarchy as a system) which, as demonstrated in
Paradise, gave way to a male-dominated religious order.
The second act of white racism that fuels further isolation comes in 1952 when
Ruby Morgan is refused treatment in a white hospital; instead, the nurse calls a
veterinarian to treat her, and she dies. Outraged, Deek and Steward Morgan, World War
II veterans and new patriarchs, seem to name the town Ruby more as a reminder of
another “disallowing” than a tribute to their sister, thus recycling the mythic founding of
Haven for the new town. In the instance of this second disallowing, Deek and Steward
see the failure of postwar America to move beyond the racism of the past. First, Haven
suffers greatly from the Depression, and even after the war Haven does not benefit from
the postwar boom. Though eventually the prosperity touches Ruby as the consumer
goods begin to pour into the town throughout the 50s, “an increase in bounty that had
never entered their dreams. . . . In every Ruby household appliances pumped, hummed,
sucked, purred, whispered and flowed” (Paradise 89). But consumerism leads to
competition of status, or the “garden wars” among the housewives of Ruby, since the
appliances give them idle time to plant flowers “for no good reason” (89). The plants they
grew “could not be eaten” but “spread” leading to a “frenetic land grab;” “the
consequence,” the narrator explains, “remained—fat, overwrought yards” (90). The
excess leads not to communal prosperity but more toward greed as the Morgans begin to
consolidate even further their hold on the town financially and politically. Additionally,
Sargent Person, another wealthy townsman and friend to the Morgans, participates in the
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murders at the Convent for economic reasons—i.e., so he can take over the land the
Convent is on. Indeed, the novel seems to allude that this is eventually where
Washington’s process of racial uplift will lead since it is modeled on white capitalism.
Like Rabbit in Rabbit, Run many characters in the town, including the Morgans
themselves, begin to feel disillusioned, though the novel focuses more on the
disillusionment of some of the female characters, such as Soane Morgan and Sweetie
Fleetwood, who feels pulled spiritually toward the Convent. Despite their growing
concerns, the Morgans choose isolation and stasis rather than openness and progression.
Whites mean death, and they go to great lengths to ensure that they do not enter the town
either actually or through blood. The Morgans’ resistance to change sets up a conflict
between Reverend Misner along with the younger townspeople and the old guard as
Misner encourages involvement in the Civil Rights Movement. In one scene, a white
family pulls up to Ace’s Grocery where the husband gets out to ask for directions. Anna
Flood, who is suspicious of the Morgans, and Reverend Misner are polite and attempt to
help him, but Steward is hostile. Misner tells him that “God has one people, Steward.
You know that” (123). But Steward replies, “I’ve heard you say things out of ignorance,
but this is the first time I heard you say something based on ignorance” (123). The
Morgans’ attempt to keep the town racially pure extends to prejudice against marrying
light-skinned blacks: the novel uses the term “8-Rock blood” to describe the “pure”
blacks in the town (named for the blackness of the 8th layer of rock beneath the earth).
The light-skinned blacks are looked down upon, such as Pat Best and her daughter Billie
Delia, who eventually goes to the Convent. To keep the town racially pure, the Morgans
believe that contact with the outside world must be avoided. However, some of the old
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guard begin to break ranks. Royal Beauchamp, for example, begins the charge to change
the name of the Oven, the sacred shrine that goes back to the founding of Haven. Worse
for the Morgans is that Royal wants to give it an African name; Soane Morgan, wife of
Deek, thinks she “had the same level of interest in Africans as they had in her: none”
(104). Royal represents the rising black power movement and wants to confront whites,
arguing that the Morgans’ way of isolation “was slow, limited to just a few, and weak”
(104). The Morgans, though, believe that getting involved with the Civil Rights
Movement is a fatal mistake since they believe they have achieved their goal of a black
utopia that flies under the radar of white law and society. However, the novel undermines
this naïve assumption: many of the townsmen have served in the two world wars while in
Haven, including the Morgan twins themselves, and now since Ruby’s founding the
Vietnam War. The Vietnam War hangs ominously in the background of the narrative.
Several of the town’s young men are killed in the war, such as Billy Cato and both of
Deek Morgan’s sons, while Menus Jury suffers from PTSD and Jeff Fleetwood’s children
suffer from birth defects as a result of his apparent exposure to Agent Orange or some
other war chemicals. The effects of the war decimate the town’s already lagging morale
as well as the pool of young men; the town is sterile. The war and its toll on Ruby prove
that no true isolation can exist. Eventually, America’s global politics would find its way
even into rural Oklahoma just as consumerism had flowed into the town the previous
decade. But rather than concede the town’s demise or the fatal flaw of its design, the men
turn to the Convent as a scapegoat.
American identity has never been politically or economically controlled by
women, so Morrison hesitates to speculate on what such a female-led model might look
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like. If freedom, that opaque American cry, means anything in the hands of Morrison, at
its very least it means the freedom to come and go while not beholden by anything other
than one’s own desire. While American novels in the past have engaged this concept
from a male perspective, Morrison asks the reader to reconsider this notion. But the novel
never gets beyond this most nascent manifestation of women’s freedom; they are cut
down violently. The notion appears simple enough, but as the novel bears out, the men of
Ruby cannot bear such a prospect of unregulated women. Typically, it appears that from
Morrison’s perspective, that male ideas of freedom have usually meant an abandonment
of social responsibility or an abuse of power—the freedom to hold another in bondage.
Indeed, American identity historically has rested on the regulation of female behavior
whether through prescription or harsh social punishment. Additionally, this has also
meant either relegating the familial and economic burden of children to women who
suffered as a result or to place women under the control of husbands and fathers under the
law who could then do as they pleased. Women often died a legal death in marriage, and
in Paradise this is dramatized in the living deaths that some of the women in Ruby lead.
The Morgan wives, for example, feel powerless to challenge their husbands. Of course,
this is exacerbated by race, but by disguising the race of the white girl Morrison obscures
the specific implication of its meaning in regard to sexism. Since white women
themselves have been under patriarchy, it is impossible to know how racism would
manifest from them under other conditions. The novel has been criticized as a malebashing treatise, since it is the story of men who massacre women, so Morrison appears
to see sexism as much of a problem as racism. However, the two, in the context of the
trilogy and in the cultural context of America, are intertwined. Since the men of Ruby
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mimic white America and much of their isolationist stance is in response to white racism,
it is important to see the men’s attack on the Convent in the entire context that the novel
provides. Because much of American identity has been predicated on male freedom, that
freedom has come at the expense of women’s. To reiterate, Morrison charges that
American notions of freedom have typically translated into the freedom to subjugate
others; paradoxically, this type of freedom she associates with slavery and racism.
Paradise, though, makes it pointedly clear that sexism has as much to do with this
equation as well. Since slavery and subsequent Jim Crow laws were based squarely on
race, white men’s freedom to enslave or to discriminate also depended heavily on their
ability to control white women’s sexuality; miscegenation was a palpable threat to
undermine the entire system of race-based laws. Indeed, Colonel Gray’s slapping of his
daughter Vera Louise from Jazz, in spite of his own sexual misbehavior, is about his
inability to control her (an anathema to his whole sense of being). American identity
based on this notion of white men’s freedoms was not just abstract, but a real ideology
with real legal and political consequences for the entire nation. So interwoven into the
fabric of the country was this ideology that a pervasive force of laws and social mores
maintained it. Morrison writes in Playing in the Dark:
There is still much national solace in continuing dreams of democratic
egalitarianism available by hiding class conflict, rage, and impotence in
figurations of race. And there is quite a lot of juice to be extracted from
plummy reminisces of “individualism” and “freedom” if the tree upon
which such fruit hangs is a black population forced to serve as freedom’s
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polar opposite; individualism is foregrounded (and believed in) when its
background is stereotypified, enforced dependency. (64).
Jim Crow may have targeted specifically blacks, but women, regardless of race, lived
under laws that denied rights reserved for full citizenship: property laws that forced
dependency, voting laws, and laws that governed and monitored their sexual behavior.
Since the men of Ruby have effectively replicated this system, if not in actual legal terms
then in cultural terms, their violent reaction to their inability to control the women at the
Convent indicates just how vital subjugated women are to their notion of male freedom.
Coming from slavery, the most emasculating form of servitude, the men of Haven, the
narrative indicates, are susceptible to the Western masculine myth. Having the chance to
start a town from scratch, the men attempt to reassert their masculinity, first, by going
west, but after the “Disallowal,” the desire to prove themselves as men is fully ignited.
This ideology of American masculinity is inextricably tied to land/property ownership, so
the men of Haven “seal their triumph” of “cutting Haven out of mud” and
“monumentaliz[ing] . . . what they had done” by constructing the Oven and forging its
inscription (6-7). It is a Faulknerian moment: in Absalom, Absalom!, emasculation in part
motivates Thomas Sutpen to go west from Virginia and eventually to Mississippi to stake
his land and enact his own design. Sutpen is “disallowed” at the front door of a wealthy
landowner and it is then that he discovers owning things, land, and having control of
others make one’s “arms and legs and bones” superior (Faulkner 229). Like Sutpen,
then, men try to control not only the land but the destiny sprouting from it. The forceful
myth that the men of Haven construct masks women’s roles in the town’s history; thus,
the assertion of masculinity often means silencing the feminine. Since the men of Ruby
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claim that the “Old Fathers” founded the town they justify their own power. Additionally,
the men ensure their own masculinity: the “new fathers, who had fought the world, they
could not (would not) be less than the Old Fathers” (Paradise 6). Eventually, the
assertion of masculinity becomes more important than history as Deacon Morgan tries to
obscure his grandfather’s slavery. At a town meeting, the men try to determine the
meaning of the inscription on the Oven (“beware the furrow of his brow”). Royal
Beauchamp believes that the didactic interpretation is a misreading of the inscription. He
declares that no ex-slave would want “us to be scared all the time. To ‘beware’ God . . .
keep us down” (84). Although Royal’s interpretation actually shows the dignity of the
ex-slave by explaining that the latter would not want to characterize God as a slave
master, the naming of his grandfather as a slave embarrasses Morgan. In discussing the
Oven, Morgan declares, “Nothing was handled more gently than the bricks those men—
men, hear me? Not slaves, ex or otherwise—the bricks those men made” (85). He tries to
forget slavery as part of his history. Here, the novel draws a distinction between myth and
history. Mythmaking often involves exclusion, since myths often dramatize the
perception of a homogenous people who share a destiny while history is unquantifiable,
and only somewhat measurable, and should involve a cautious reconstruction while
recognizing the reconstruction’s limitations. In short, myth is teleogical, and the men of
Haven and Ruby, because of the scars of slavery, the Disallowal, and continued racism,
find in their narrative an exclusionary myth. Indeed, just as Steward Morgan hints to
Reverend Misner, the men believe that they are chosen by God. History, though,
threatens the myth, as Pat Best discovers as she begins to investigate the genealogy of the
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town. Her history uncovers silenced voices incongruent with the town’s myth. As Marni
Gauthier points out, the Convent itself stands as a monument to silenced peoples:
the mansion was formerly a Catholic school for Indian girls . . . [it]
functions as another echo of the nation’s suppressed history; the removals
and forced assimilations of American Indians. Previously in residence
were Indian girls who “whisper[ed] to each other in a language the sister
had forbidden them to use,” and who “softly s[ang] forbidden Algonquin
lullabies.” (Gauthier 398)
The outcasts who begin to congregate at the Convent do not fit within the mythical
narrative of Ruby; thus, their very existence at the Convent serves as a constant reminder
that there is something outside of the myth—other communities, other peoples, perhaps
harmless in their own way; in fact, because the women at the Convent are innocuous, this
poses even more of a threat because it undermines their need for isolation. As Gauthier
also points out, the men’s assault on the Convent is an almost inevitable act of violence
against those who are seen as a threat to the narrative (398).
Does Morrison abandon myth? Not necessarily. In the next chapter, we will see
how Philip Roth savagely deconstructs mythical thinking in his American trilogy.
However, Morrison is more interested in deconstructing what she feels are destructive
myths but not all myths. In a 1995 interview, Morrison explains that she tries to “stay out
of Western mythology;” if there are myths that she deconstructs then they are those of the
“Western tradition in order to signal something being askew” (Morrison, Conversations
113). In Paradise, the problem is not mythical thinking per se, but rather the men of
Haven and Ruby adopting Western-style myths. As we have seen in Beloved, Morrison

195
finds African myths and folklore useful in order to recover the African traditions that are
an important part of American identity. Additionally, Paradise places an emphasis on the
ritualistic aspect of myth as the women in the Convent engage in ritual as part of a
bonding and healing process. Ritual in African traditions tells the individuals that they
“matter” and that they “are part of the wider community” (Mbiti 132).
The ritual in the Convent held by Consolata resembles what Mbiti refers to as a
type of “Homestead Ritual,” which “are intended to bring about blessings upon the
homestead, to remove the impurities of sickness, and to strengthen social ties” (140).
Additionally, Morrison is a practicing Catholic, a religion also steeped in ritual.
Consolata, interestingly enough, was rescued/taken from Brazil, where African cultural
influence is highly visible, by a nun, Mary Magna, who becomes her spiritual guide.
Consolata’s race/ethnicity is unknown, but her affair with Deek Morgan suggests that she
is black or at least partly black. In researching Beloved, Morrison made a trip to Brazil to
view artifacts from the slave trade. Plus, since Brazil was one of the largest ports for
importing slaves, the Brazilian-African connection would be richly significant. So the
evidence suggests that Consolata’s religious-like rituals are a hybrid of African,
Brazilian, and Catholic practices.58 Additionally, at the beginning of the ritual Consolata
announces “Eve is Mary’s mother. Mary is the mother of Eve” and speaks of “scented
cathedrals” (Paradise 263). Mythmaking is part of the ritual as Consolata tells stories as
the women fall into a trance. After the women are massacred, they, too, become mythical
figures in the minds of the women of Ruby when their bodies mysteriously disappear.
Although Matus points out that the women are “mythologised [sic] amazon warrior
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women, honing their amazonian power in preparation of splendid vengeance,” this is only
how one woman, Billie Delia, hopes to see them when and if they return (166). Later, we
see the women’s mythological presence is peaceful, and they are healers rather than
vengeful spirits. Their meaning, Morrison shows, is open to the interpretation of each
reader of the myth. The last point is significant because this myth, as opposed to the men
of Ruby’s myth, is not a didactically controlling myth, but a myth where no one controls
the meanings for others. Matus refers to Morrison’s paradise as a “democratic” one, and
so I apply this word to the myth as well (167). Morrison’s myth is a democratic one,
hybrid of different races, cultures, and religions, and thus, the most American of myths.
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CHAPTER IV
PHILIP ROTH’S AMERICAN TRILOGY: ZUCKERMAN’S PASTORAL ELEGY
“My genius is rebuked”-MacBeth (3.1.55)
Philip Roth’s American Trilogy in Context
Throughout much of his work, Philip Roth details his struggle with the conflict
between his Jewish and American identities. From The Ghost Writer (1979) to Operation
Shylock (1993), Roth’s novels are primarily concerned with how a Jewish writer juggles
his ethnic identity with his national one—the tension between Jewish tradition and
morality and the modernity and splendor (and dangers) of American excess. The subject
of the Zuckerman Bound novels of the 1980s, thus, is mostly Roth himself—the writer,
his world, and his relationship to his art, to his ethnic community, and to his country.59
Operation Shylock, though not a Zuckerman novel, is yet another self-conscious novel
and came at a personally trying time for Roth: in the midst of a failing second marriage
and reputed personal breakdown. In a particularly pointed criticism, John Updike wrote
in the pages of the New Yorker that Operation Shylock was Roth’s most self-indulgent
work, judging that “this cultivation of hypothetic selves,” had become “an endgame” for
Roth’s fiction (Updike, “Recruiting Raw Nerves” 110). “The muse,” Updike, concluded,
“needs its harness” (110). As Timothy Parrish notes, Roth often “creates his work in
antagonistic cooperation with his critics’ reading of him,” and subsequently since Shylock
Roth’s Zuckerman novels take a decidedly less self-reflective turn (Parrish, “Imagining,”
576). In other words, Roth often writes in response to critics’ assessments of his work.
Roth’s novels after Shylock are some of the most celebrated in his career: Sabbath’s
59

The Zuckerman Bound novels are The Ghost Writer (1979), Zuckerman Unbound (1981), The
Anatomy Lesson (1983), and The Prague Orgy (1985). These novels are primarily narrated by Roth’s
literary alter-ego, Nathan Zuckerman, who narrates the American trilogy.
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Theater (1995) won the National Book Award, and it was followed by the Pulitzer Prize
winning American Pastoral (1997). Mark Shechner points out that beginning with his
American trilogy—American Pastoral, I Married a Communist (1998), The Human Stain
(2001)—Roth’s works “have been much celebrated for Roth’s turn toward social issues”
(142). Shechner, though, remarks that still he thinks that these works, “tell us more about
the man than the nation” (142). Indeed, Michael Kimmage’s recent book on the trilogy,
In History’s Grip: Philip Roth’s Newark Trilogy (2012), examines the trilogy in
relationship to Roth and his use of Newark, NJ, its history, its people and values; in fact,
Kimmage insists that “Newark trilogy” is a more accurate name than “American trilogy”
(3-4). Certainly, Roth’s biography and Newark are vital aspects to understanding the
trilogy, but to limit the scope and depth of the novels in such respects would be similar to
limiting our understanding of Faulkner’s works to his biography and how Oxford, MS
informs his oeuvre. In short, Roth’s ambitions are greater and the novels taken as a whole
are profound, obsessive examinations of the nature of American identity. Indeed, in this
American trilogy, Roth’s alter ego and narrator of the series, Nathan Zuckerman, relates
stories of three protagonists and, crucially, their struggles with Americanness. That Roth
primarily comes at this problem through the lens of Jewishness is not any more limiting
than Updike using the white-male Rabbit as his ticket to America or Morrison explicating
American identity through her African American characters. Finally, Roth’s conclusion
to this trilogy features Coleman Silk, a black man passing as a white Jew in order to
attempt to escape the trappings of racial—and even national—identity. The trilogy’s
concern with the role of history, national myth, and the complicated confluence of
ethnicity and race as they relate to the construction and consequence of American identity
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across four decades of American history distinguish these Zuckerman novels from the
novels of Zuckerman Bound.
American Pastoral, for example, finds Roth confronting the defining myths of the
postwar generation, much like John Updike does throughout the Rabbit tetralogy and
Toni Morrison does in her series’ culminating novel, Paradise. The similarities between
American Pastoral and the Rabbit tetralogy are striking—too much to be coincidental.
Perhaps more of a coincidence is that American Pastoral, similar to the nomenclature of
Morrison’s aforementioned novel, is bookended by sections headed by the word
“paradise” (Paradise Remembered, Paradise Lost). Coincidence to be sure, because
Pastoral was released in 1997 and Paradise in 1998, but the fact that both authors
explore postwar America ironically as a paradise begs comparison between the two. Both
novels feature ethnic minority characters mimicking to their own peril what Roth in
American Pastoral continually refers to as WASP America. Postwar America as failed
paradise is also a theme of Rabbit, Run as Rabbit Angstrom finds middle-class
domesticity and consumerism as unfulfilling to the needs of his soul. Two common
interpretations of Roth’s novel have emerged: (1) Swede Levov’s tragic fall results from
his abandonment of his Jewish identity in favor of the WASP paradigm of American
identity and (2) Swede is a victim of history, obliviously complicit to a degree, but no
more than any other member of, as Roth put it, “the most propagandized” generation in
American history (qtd. in Stanley 1). Nevertheless, both critical perspectives agree that
Roth sets out to deconstruct American myths. But in doing so, where does that leave
American identity? Jeffrey Rubin-Dorsky argues that American Pastoral insists on the
primacy of Jewishness in the American Jewish experience. Mark Shechner, though,
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maintains that Jewish fanaticism as demonstrated by Lou, the Swede’s father, is actually
the definitive influence on Merry’s own extremism. However, since both perspectives
agree that Roth demythologizes the postwar American narrative, American Pastoral
complicates any idea of an essential American identity. National identities derive from
national myth; without them, the paradigms of national identity, whether these are Jewish
American paradigms or WASP paradigms, begin to disintegrate. Indeed, Swede is caught
between the two—both paradigms put demands on and expose him to certain risks.
Undeniably, Roth implicates the Jewish community’s complicity in pushing Swede
toward WASPness—it championed him for becoming the ultimate shining example of
the assimilated American Jew because of his very WASP characteristics. Compare
American Pastoral to Roth’s 1957 short story “Eli the Fanatic.” Eli Peck believes that he
and his family have easily assimilated into postwar America until he comes face to face
with “old world” Judaism—a yeshiva in the middle of his suburban neighborhood. Both
Eli and Swede might be seen as abandoning their Jewishness, but really the story and the
novel posit Eli and the Swede in the middle of an identity conflict between Americanness
and Jewishness. Although Eli attempts to reconnect to his cultural past by donning the
garb of the Hasidic Jew, in the end he cannot psychologically sustain the two identities.
But Eli and Swede really have no choice in the matter—they are caught in a particular
historical moment that offers no real solution, suggesting that the dilemma itself is the
new identity for American Jews and characterizing American identity not as a static
category dictated by paradigms but as a dialectical dynamic.
Roth picks up his trilogy in I Married a Communist, detailing the downfall of Ira
Ringold, non-practicing Jew, American radio celebrity, and fanatical communist married
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to a self-hating Jew, American actress, and fanatical social climber. In this follow-up to
American Pastoral, Roth deals more directly and savagely with WASP American
propaganda and persecution, the obsessive quest to root out un-Americanness through
state apparatuses such as the ironically named House Un-American Activities
Committee. Set primarily in the late 1940s to the 1950s, I Married a Communist
examines the fallout of the communist hysteria in the postwar period. Nathan Zuckerman
returns as the main narrator. Visiting his elderly mentor Murray Ringold in the 1990s,
Nathan learns that he was denied a Fulbright scholarship because of his association with
Ira, Murray’s younger brother. Ira married the American actress Eve Frame, and because
of their tumultuous marriage, she exposes Ira as a communist in a tell-all book. In
examining I Married a Communist, I revisit Toni Morrison’s notion of the spectacle in
analyzing Murray Ringold’s deconstructive reading of Richard Nixon’s 1994 funeral.
Roth had written satirically about the Nixon administration in his 1971 book Our Gang.
In I Married a Communist, the pomp and pageantry of the Nixon funeral unfolded on
television more as national propaganda than a tribute to Nixon himself. Nixon’s corpse is
the MacGuffin in the coffin—it doesn’t matter who’s in there, but it is a chance to
perform America, with the national hymns and flag waving and draping that re-solidifies
American stability. The media’s and politicians’ nostalgia for Nixon is really a nostalgia
for an illusory America, a story of patriots who sometimes, in the narrative of the funeral,
are patriotic to a fault, an illusory America where vigilant citizens once stood up to the
un-Americans among them. The spectacle legitimizes corrupt power, the corrupt power
of HUAC, McCarthy, and Nixon himself; it identifies “true” Americans because those
who do not commune in grief at the altar of the television screen are disrespectful to the
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memory of such a devoted countryman. All are forgiven who are part of this narrative,
including Nixon’s team of crooks who gleefully obeyed his orders. The narrative
homogenizes and trumps all counternarratives that go silent amid the televised ritual.
Here Roth connects the events of 1950s to the continuation of this sort of American
identity and the 1990s—which he will explicate more fully in The Human Stain. From
the spectacle of the funeral, I explore Roth’s engagement with the confluence and
divergence of Jewish and American identity. The young Zuckerman mistakenly believes
that American identity is new, apart from Jewishness, a separate and singular category
that demands the renunciation of all things Jewish. He believes that he can remake
himself with the influence of the cultural past—a cultural past that his father and Murray
represent. Though, they do not direct Nathan to hold onto at least part of the Jewish
character, they do it by the reflective examples they set, in contrast to Ira who mindlessly
exchanges identities for others.
Concluding the trilogy is The Human Stain in which Roth shows how the
persecuting spirit, a demented American national pastime, continues the legacy of
McCarthyism. But in the 1990s it is more debased and primitive as it zeroes in on
President Bill Clinton and finds its way through the American pastoral of New England
to Coleman Silk. In The Human Stain, the Monica Lewinsky scandal serves as the
backdrop to the ordeal of Coleman Silk, a professor of classics at Athena College. The
Puritans may have thought they had wandered into the New Eden and discovered their
own biblical American pastoral, but in reality they brought their sins with them, just as
Coleman believes he has escaped into a pastoral plane in which he could remake himself,
as his exuberance in overhauling the faculty of Athena attests. While calling roll in class
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one day, Silk refers to two absent students as spooks. The students, unknown to Coleman,
are black, and the charges of racism and sexism begin to fly from the faculty, led by
Delphine Roux. In the aftermath, Coleman’s wife dies, he leaves the college, and he
begins an affair with Faunia Farley, a janitor at the college and part-time dairy worker.
She is forty years his junior. Their affair is hampered by Faunia’s ex-husband, Vietnam
veteran Lester, who suffers from PTSD. Delphine continues her persecution of Coleman
by sending him a letter admonishing him for his affair with Faunia. But Coleman’s
biggest secret is that he is a black man who has passed as a white Jew for more than forty
years. The spectacle of the narrative plays out on the national stage through the Clinton
scandal and pervades into the far reaches of rural America into Coleman’s life. While
Zuckerman ponders whether or not Coleman had actually pulled off the fantasy of selfcreation, the narrative is undermined by Coleman’s inexplicable utterance of the word
“spook” that comes to haunt him throughout the novel. Additionally, as Zuckerman
meshes the facts of Coleman’s life with his own musings, it becomes clearer that
Coleman’s supposed self-fashioning is an illusion. Characters in the The Human Stain are
thwarted by historical forces: Lester Farley by Vietnam, Faunia by her foray into the
most abusive places of the American domestic realm, and Coleman by his attempt to
escape the social and political forces that are determined to have a say in his identity. In
the backdrop, is the American pastoral, a delusion of Farley, and of Zuckerman, who
realizes that his five years in isolation are over—there is nowhere to retreat to escape the
American berserk. It is no coincidence that Zuckerman returns to the city in Roth’s 2007
novel Exit Ghost.
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American Pastoral: The Price of Myth
I want to begin this discussion of American Pastoral (1997) as it relates to
American identity by comparing the novel directly to John Updike’s Rabbit Redux (1971)
and other aspects of the Rabbit tetralogy and to Toni Morrison’s Paradise (1998). This
will help clarify how Roth engages with myth and its relationship to American identity.
As previously mentioned, there is evidence to suggest that Updike’s review of Operation
Shylock indirectly led to the turn Roth’s fiction took with the onset of the American
trilogy. But even with the more anecdotal evidence aside, the similarities between
American Pastoral and Rabbit Redux are striking. Both include the struggle of the male
protagonists to come to terms with the social upheaval of the 1960s exacerbated by the
Vietnam War. Oddly, the novels’ many similarities have gone unnoticed by critics. Like
John Updike’s male protagonist Harry “Rabbit” Angstrom, Philip Roth’s protagonist,
Seymour “the Swede” Levov, is a former star high school athlete whose seemingly idyllic
family life unravels at the height of the 1960s. Swede Levov’s troubles begin when his
sixteen-year old daughter Merry bombs a post office in the small-town of Old Rimrock,
NJ, killing a local doctor. Swede was once the pride of the Newark Jewish community, a
symbol of successful Jewish assimilation into America in the aftermath of the US’s
victory in World War II. Like Rabbit Angstrom, Swede had been a star athlete in high
school, and he runs a successful business while being married to the love of his life,
Dawn Dwyer, a former Miss New Jersey. Swede is more successful than Rabbit since
Rabbit’s life is not idyllic, but in the ten years between Run and Redux Rabbit has at least
settled into a reserved, blue collar class contentment. Nominally, Roth relates the Swede
to his literary forebear. Although Levov is Jewish, his nickname “the Swede” links the
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character to Harry “Rabbit” Angstrom’s own Swedish surname. Additionally, several
other characters in American Pastoral serve as cognates to characters in the Rabbit
tetralogy. For example, in Rabbit Redux and American Pastoral are the tragedies of Jill
and Merry, respectively, both teenage girls who run away from privileged middle class
families, join the counterculture and meet with horrific ends.
The comparison is instructive because despite plot and character similarities,
Roth’s technique is decidedly different from Updike’s. True, Skeeter serves as the
demythologizing agent for Rabbit, but Updike’s use of myth in his fiction underscores the
importance of its function, though as Redux indicates, myths can obscure reality and
history. Roth, then, goes one step further. Specifically, Roth’s novel serves as a response
to earlier Updike’s cathartic rendering of the 1960s. Thus, Roth’s wrath is limited not to
demythologizing the American postwar myth, but to any myth that lends itself to
idealization. A humorless, dark, and depressing novel, American Pastoral presents a
bleak picture of America and its failure to deliver on its promise of the postwar American
dream. Although Rabbit Redux gives a grim overview of increasing crime, drug use, and
social deterioration, Updike’s novel is surprisingly less pessimistic and more forgiving.
While Updike was and remained critical of many aspects of the Sixties’ movements,
Rabbit Redux is a novel about redemption and restoration. Consequently, American
Pastoral paints a darker picture of the consequences of the younger Sixties’ generation as
well as Swede’s. While Updike ultimately restores Rabbit through his eventual
ambivalence toward the Vietnam War (he at least begins to question it), his new
appreciation of his wife, and his recognition of racism, Roth portrays the Swede and his
family as victims of a misguided and out of control society.
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In a 1981 interview, Roth was asked to assess the sixties; he replied:
I have no judgment to make of something so colossal as ten years of world
history. As an American citizen I was appalled and mortified by the war in
Vietnam, frightened by the urban violence, sickened by the assassinations,
confused by the student uprisings, sympathetic to the libertarian pressure
groups, delighted by the theatricality, disheartened by the rhetoric of the
causes, excited by the sexual display, and enlivened by the general air of
confrontation and change. (Conversations, 124)
By 1997, however, Roth was ready to make that judgment. Though in an earlier interview
Roth credits the 1960s with demythologizing the idealized myth of American
exceptionalism, he later characterizes the Sixties’ movements as “insidious” and
“demonic” that would “not give an inch in behalf of that idealized mythology” (Reading
Myself 90). American Pastoral, in turn, attempts to demythologize the idealized myth of
sixties’ social progression. Indeed, the novel portrays much of middle-class America’s
fascination with the counterculture as infantile, obsessing over sex, tearing down the
previous generation, and displaying empty intellectualism rather than any sincere,
dedicated attempt at social progress. In his autobiography The Facts (1988) and his ode
to his father, Patrimony (1991), for example, Roth laments the deterioration of the
Newark neighborhood of his youth, more than once referring to the presumably
unemployed black men who roam there; in American Pastoral, the Swede echoes these
sentiments as he tells Zuckerman how Newark has disintegrated into black slums (in
American Pastoral, Rita Cohen insists the slums exist because of capitalistic exploitation)
(Roth, The Facts 16; Patrimony 22). In demythologizing the 1960s through American

207
Pastoral, Roth challenges Updike’s accommodation of the 60s myth in Rabbit Redux and
Updike’s mythical, cathartic approach.
American Pastoral, however, resists mythmaking and attacks the myth of social
progress through catharsis that Rabbit Redux espouses. Roth rejects myth, and sees the
degradation of Merry, Swede’s daughter, as only tragic. As other characters such as
Nathan Zuckerman, the novel’s narrator, and Jerry, Swede’s brother, seek explanations
for Merry’s rejection of her father, the novel—and even Zuckerman—portrays these
attempts as empty exercises in mythmaking that cannot make sense or give a reason for
Swede’s tragic life. Therefore, Roth seeks to demythologize Updike’s cathartic myth
because it provides justification for the aspects of Sixties’ culture and hypocrisy that Roth
finds demonic and reprehensible. Thus, to reject myth, Roth cannot limit himself to reject
only the postwar myth but also the myth of 1960s radicals and their sympathetic
chroniclers.
Why might Roth see the latter as mythic? David Farber notes that as the debate
about the Vietnam War dissipated, social conservatives remained passionate and insistent
that the real damage the sixties’ culture inflicted was on traditional American families
(Farber 169). Let’s be clear: Roth is no conservative in the Republican sense; but such
social and political conservatism was not exclusive to right wing ideology; laws favoring
censorship of supposedly offensive material met with bipartisan support. The historian
Richard Hofstadter once referred to the 1960s as “The Age of Rubbish” (qtd. in Mann 1).
Consequently, with the dawn of the Reagan Era strong currents of political and social
conservatism pervaded American culture propagated by an array of socially conservative
organizations and factions that pointed to the degradation of the nuclear family as a main
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cause of society’s ills. One of the primary targets of conservatives was the legacy of the
1960s counterculture (Farber 169). Critics such as Sandra Stanley have aligned American
Pastoral with this stream of social conservatism that seeks to revise the legacy of the
1960s. Stanley argues that “Roth pits Swede Levov as a true believer in ‘the benign
national myth’” of the World War II generation “against his sixteen-year-old daughter
Merry, a militant radical who articulates what Roth describes as the ‘counterpastoral’
impulse,” this “demonic reality” (1-2). Encapsulating this struggle in Zuckerman’s
narrative, Roth assaults and challenges historical metanarratives propagated by liberal
intellectuals who romanticize the contributions of middle-class Americans to the socially
progressive and antiwar movements. The conservatism of American Pastoral is mainly
social, but it is also politically conservative because it disavows the revolutionary and
violent veins of the antiwar movement. Roth shared equally with sixties’ liberals the
hatred of Richard Nixon and all things Republican, as well as the disenchantment with
Lyndon Johnson. However, American Pastoral expresses bewilderment at the rage of
white, middle-class, educated, and privileged Americans directed not always at political
figures, but rather at the previous generation who had fought in World War II and whose
work ethic provided the subsequent generation with the privileges they threw back in
their faces with revulsion. American Pastoral, then, serves not so much as a defense of
the 1950s, but rather a scathing critique of many of the Sixties’ activists’ condescension
toward a generation who—from the novel’s perspective—valued family, hard work,
craftsmanship, and sacrifice with the hope of providing a better life and opportunities for
their children. In examining the cause for Merry's left-wing militancy, Roth’s novel,
Stanley claims, is “the existential realization of the moral and political style of the sixties
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bourgeois intellectual” (184). Merry, then, is the “perfect embodiment” of the “infantile
leftist radicals who turn against their overly indulgent parents, and naively spout
politically radical creeds and succumb to their own fascination with violence” (Stanley
184). American Pastoral attempts to demythologize any pretentious assertion that the
sixties’ generation was superior to the one that preceded it: “[Swede] heard them
laughing, the Weathermen, the Panthers, the angry ragtag army of the violent
Uncorrupted who called him a criminal and hated his guts because he was one of those
who own and have” (American Pastoral 257). For example, at Swede’s dinner party,
Lou, Swede’s father, and the other guests, primarily liberal Columbia professor Marcia
Umanoff, argue over the conflicting values between Lou’s generation and the current
one. The novel shows Marcia as a typical, snide academician whose views and politics
ignore or are indifferent to the realities of life:
The privileged place in Marcia’s feelings went to the Vietnamese—the
North Vietnamese. She never for a moment compromised her political
convictions or compassionate comprehension of international affairs, not
even when she saw from six inches away the misery that had befallen her
husband’s oldest friend. (342)
The dinner conversation with Lou reinforces this view of Marcia when the conversation
devolves into an argument about pornography. Calling pornography trash, Lou then
equates pornography to other dimensions of social decay: crime; breakdown of
education; and overall urban filth of unclean streets, fires, poverty, and drugs. Marcia
claims that wanting to see pornography is “human nature,” a point that Lou rejects (347.
In fact, Lou criticizes the idea that pornography is anything to be fascinated with:
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These goddamn movies? Well of course, they’re not new either you know.
. . .Well, I hate to tell you but he [Abe] had all these kinds of movies right
in his house...The two of us played gin for an hour, until there was this
hullabaloo in the living room. . . and to this day I remember sitting with Al
Haberman playing cards while the rest of them were drooling like idiots in
the living room. (347)
To Lou, pornography is not about human nature, but about immaturity and
irresponsibility, and he questions any social need to make pornography so readily
available to children. Lou does not argue pornography’s legality but rather its cultural
value, nor does he understand the big deal. Significantly, the argument revolves around
pornography more than any of the other issues that Lou has brought up, such as racism
and unemployment, suggesting that the counterculture was more about sexual
promiscuity than anything else. The text reinforces this position by having the
conversation take place at a dinner party at which Swede discovers that Dawn, Swede’s
wife, has been having an affair with Bill Orcutt. Furthermore, Marcia’s cavalier attitude
about the effects of pornography on children and society reflects the novel’s portrayal of
her overall view. Dawn suspects that Marcia may have encouraged Merry, and even if
she did not, that she was at least “altogether pleased about what Merry was alleged to
have done” (342). Although Zuckerman writes that Dawn was mistaken about Marcia
harboring Merry, he confirms Marcia’s intellectual vacuity: “Marcia was all talk—always
had been: senseless, ostentatious talk . . . words expressing little more than Marcia’s
intellectual vanity and her odd belief that all her posturing added up to an independent
mind” (343).
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In the novel’s final moments, Bill Orcutt’s wife, Jessie, stabs Lou near the eye
with a fork. Marshall Bruce Gentry argues that overbearing patriarchy as handed down by
Lou’s generation has resulted in Merry’s rebellion. He states that Jessie’s assault
symbolizes the women of the novel’s attack on patriarchy. However, Gentry overlooks
the point that it is the drunken Jessie Orcutt who delivers the blow. Jessie is not just a
victim of “deep American misogyny,” represented by Lou’s generation, but also a victim
of the sexual permissiveness that leads Bill to cheat on her with Dawn (Gentry 15).
Jessie’s drunkenness demonstrates her impaired judgment; she is stabbing at the wrong
person. Jessie’s blind and drunken rage represents the misdirected anger at Lou’s
generation while Marcia’s laughing reaction at this act of violence represents her
nihilistic view that any act that tears down the previous generation is enjoyable to watch.
Although Roth shows that Dawn’s assumptions about Marcia’s involvement in Merry’s
disappearance are not accurate, Marcia’s reaction to Lou’s stabbing that supports Dawn’s
assessment of her nihilism is. Dawn tells Swede that Marcia only supports antiwar priests
because “they are doing something that taints the Church. Because they are doing
something outside the church. . . . That these priests are an affront to everything that
people like me grew up with, that’s what she likes” (343). In this last episode, Roth
attacks the hypocrisy of those who claimed they were against the violence in Vietnam
and yet supported or were indifferent to acts of violence at home. Nevertheless, the
novel’s ending indicates that the legacy of the 1960s is not totally about the war but
rather about transgressing and breaking down sexual mores.
The emphasis on sex at the end of American Pastoral is similar in theme to John
Updike’s ending of Rabbit Redux where Janice teases Rabbit about his prudish behavior.
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Rabbit Redux treats sex more refreshingly than does American Pastoral. Rabbit, like Lou,
is concerned about the openness of everyone’s sex life: “But all this fucking, everybody
fucking, I don’t know, it just makes me too sad. It’s what makes everything so hard to
run” (Redux 346). Janice responds that “Human things,” like sex, make life run and asks
him, “When’re you going to grow up?” (346). Rabbit indeed comes off as ridiculous in
this final scene, trying to make sure that the hotel clerk knows that they are married. For
Janice, maturity lies not in repressing sexual instinct and enjoyment but embracing it as
part of being human. Janice has discovered that sexual drive and intimacy make
“things”—love, marriage, life—run. In American Pastoral, however, neither Dawn’s or
Swede’s affairs have such rejuvenating powers. In fact, sex lacks the creative and
refreshing powers it has in Rabbit Redux; it is a destructive and even sterile force that has
lost its generative and vital qualities. Dawn’s affair marks the end of the marriage, not its
renewal, and Swede’s affair with Sheila comes during his darkest hour. Zuckerman
himself tells Jerry that his sex life is over, which appears to color his attitude toward
sex’s role in the novel. Zuckerman imagines Lou becoming angry when he learns of
Jerry’s latest divorce. In this recreation, Lou accuses Jerry of making all these kids and
yet destroying homes in the process. Additionally, Zuckerman offers that one of the
reasons Merry became a bomber was a result of an incestuous moment between her and
Swede. From this point on, Merry is continually victimized sexually, having been raped
multiple times. Interestingly, both Updike and Roth share a perspective toward the
consequences of the sixties’ attitude toward sex. Rabbit tells Jill, “You have no juice,
baby. You’re all sucked out and you’re just eighteen. You’ve tried everything and you’re
not scared of nothing and you wonder why it’s all so dead” (Rabbit Redux 104). But
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Updike, thus, distinguishes between the role of sex in Janice’s replenishment and Jill’s
degradation. Janice finds sex rewarding because she and Charlie love and respect one
another while for Jill it has become a task, a way for paying Rabbit and Skeeter for what
they give her. Sex and adultery, thus, are presented in Rabbit Redux as not necessarily
acts of shameless indulgence and betrayal but rather as complicated facets of the human
condition. In contrast, American Pastoral allows for no such nuance. The celebration of
sexual freedom in Roth’s Portnoy’s Complaint (1970) is gone. Sex in this generation has
become in American Pastoral a destructive force.
As Michael Kimmage points out, “In the Newark trilogy, 1960s radicalism . . .
[is] generic only in [its] capacity to cause harm” (97). American Pastoral does not engage
too much with the accomplishments of the 1960s’ activists: the prolonged resistance to
the war that Roth himself detested was a significant factor in bringing US involvement to
a close and the Civil Rights Movement brought sweeping legislative changes. Instead, as
mentioned earlier, American Pastoral dwells on many of the negative aspects of the
decade; the social reality of the 1960s aftermath saw the further deterioration of urban
America, especially Newark as it dissolved into a cesspool of poverty, crime, and
corruption (Kimmage 32). Roth, though, does not lay this all at the feet of the 1960s;
white flight had begun decades before. But in American Pastoral, all mythmaking is ripe
for critique, and the alleged social degradation as a result of the “demonic” ideology that
would not give an inch or recognize its own hypocrisy becomes a focus of the novel.
While both Roth and Toni Morrison directly attack WASP American myths,
Morrison does not eschew myth totally. Morrison throughout her trilogy relies heavily on
African myth, encouraging her readers to rediscover African presence in American
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culture and history. The ending of Paradise, for example, sets up the slain women as
mythic figures whose bodies vanish and whose spirits benignly haunt the town of Ruby.
Second, within the Convent, the women practice rituals and are looking to heal
themselves through religious incantation. A practicing Catholic, Morrison, like Updike,
sees the power and usefulness of myth while at the same time recognizing the dangers of
mythical thinking. Morrison’s Catholicism, which has rarely been critically discussed,
helps explain the emphasis on the healing power of ritual and myth; however, the same
cannot be said for Roth and Judaism in regard to American Pastoral. Roth’s critique of
mythical thinking destabilizes the idea of American identity because it renders history as
a collection of fragmented events that are resistant to teleogical exegesis. A collective
identity, such as national, religious, or ethnic, is held together by a shared hermeneutical
approach to historical events by hegemonic narratives, but the fabric of a collective
identity begins to tear apart when the interpretation of history becomes stratified and
perpetually reductive. Such is the case with American Pastoral as Zuckerman and Jerry
Levov60 attempt to interpret the Swede’s history in order to find the reason for his tragic
life. Indeed, Zuckerman’s approaches and versions vary and in the end he questions his
own interpretive approach to understanding Swede’s downfall.
Despite Roth’s savage critique of 1960s radicalism, American Pastoral is no
hagiography of the postwar generation. Nor does the novel, as many critics suggest,
imply a punishment for Swede for trading his Jewishness for WASPness. Swede, as
Zuckerman declares, is instead fettered to history—a character caught in particular
historical convergences of changing cultural signs and meanings. National and ethnic
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Jerry is Swede’s younger brother. Jealous of Swede’s life, Jerry takes pleasure in blaming
Swede for Merry’s act of terrorism.
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identities are in the midst of a critical flux, especially within the Jewish American
community at the end of World War II. Rather than attack Swede for abandoning his
Jewishness, a charge that was leveled persistently at Roth himself for years, Roth
deconstructs the notions of essentialism in both Jewish and American identity. However,
Roth does not repudiate Jewishness, but instead ironically comes at this deconstruction
from what might be said to be a Jewish point of view. For example, in Being Jewish in
America, Arthur Hertzberg argues that Jews having been treated as foreigners and alien in
other lands throughout their history have had to guard against notions of essentialism that
threatened their very existence (85). Since American Pastoral never makes clear what
authentic Jewishness looks like, it seems unreasonable to conclude that a return to some
core Jewishness is what it advocates. As Jeffrey Rubin-Dorsky argues, the only
“authentic condition of contemporary or postmodern Jews is freedom . . . to create
themselves as Jews” in “whatever way they wish” (89-90). For Rubin-Dorsky, though,
Swede fails for precisely the reason that he wants only freedom and not the Jewishness.
Rather create himself as a Jew, the Swede creates himself as a WASP “bereft of a cultural
foundation, a spiritual heritage, a historical community, and even an intellectual
tradition” (Rubin-Dorsky 100). However, whatever criticisms that are leveled at WASPs,
the litany just relayed inaccurately describes them. Critics such as Rubin-Dorsky put a
large amount of stock in the rantings of Swede’s brother Jerry who excoriates Swede for
“playing at being WASPs” (American Pastoral 280). But this seems to justify Jerry’s slur
against Dawn, whom he calls “a little Mick girl,” and to admonish intermarriage, as if
Jews should practice the kind of isolationism of the Ruby men in Paradise (280). Second,
Rubin-Dorsky states that both Swede and Dawn are being punished for not “creating
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authentic Jewish lives”—as if Dawn should have adhered to Lou’s demands61 and
abandoned her Catholicism since only living a Jewish life would have avoided this
tragedy and as if somehow authentic Jews cannot have terrible things happen to them
(100). Simply put, why not an authentic Catholic life? In fact, Lou only acts the part of a
strict Jew in order to try to stop Swede from marrying Dawn.
Roth, instead, rejects the idea that only an authentic Jewish identity would have
averted the tragedy. Rubin-Dorsky mentions that Swede is a “Job-type” (100); although
he leaves this topic, it’s worth expanding because the Job analogy is important. First,
American Pastoral asks the same basic question as the Book of Job: why do bad things
happen to good people? Second, the Book of Job represents Jewish thought that contrasts
sharply with certain beliefs that held that God’s favor could easily be ascertained by the
fortunes of individuals (Updike critiques this notion as well, as previously observed).
Job, in fact, also engages myth by illuminating the limits of human understanding: God is
not narratively mythical in the sense that a clear ideology or system of belief is laid out—
God’s will cannot be discerned. In fact, Zuckerman notices that one of the Swede’s books
is The Kid from Tomkinsville about a baseball player who suffers a series of setbacks but
continues to persevere; Zuckerman refers to it as “the boys’ Book of Job” (American
Pastoral 9). He further remarks that “I thought of the Swede and the Kid as one” and asks
himself if the book is “a book about a sweet star savagely and unjustly punished—a book
about a greatly gifted innocent whose worst fault is a tendency to keep his right shoulder
down and swing up but whom the thundering heavens destroy nonetheless” (9). In the
book is also a “reprehensible member” of the team named Razzie Nugent who is a
“hothead, a violent bully fiercely jealous of the Kid” (9). Zuckerman links Razzie to
61

Lou, Swede’s father, tries to stop Swede from marrying Dawn because she is Catholic.
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Jerry: Jerry, Zuckerman describes, is “scrawny,” a “licorice stick” with explosive
aggression that exceeds the Swede’s (9). As a kid Jerry takes out his frustration of being
the Swede’s little brother by playing violent games of Ping-Pong, hitting the ball so hard
that “murder couldn’t have been far from his mind” (6). Razzie is also described as
scrawny and drawn in a “blackish, ink-heavy rendering” similar to the image of Jerry as a
stick of licorice (9). Jerry functions as one of Swede’s accusers just as Eliphaz, Bildad,
and Zophar are Job’s accusers who insist that Job has brought his misery upon himself
and who were jealous of Job. Zuckerman plays the role of Elihu, Job’s sensible friend,
portraying Jerry as an extreme narcissist. In his reaction to Jerry’s first few words to him,
Zuckerman observes:
These few sentences telling me what I was, what everything was, would
have accounted not merely for four wives but for eight, ten, sixteen of
them. Everyone’s narcissism is strong at a reunion, but this was an
outpouring of another magnitude. Jerry’s body may have been divided
between the skinny kid and large man but not the character—he had the
character of one big unified thing, coldly accustomed to being listened to.
(61)
Referring to Jerry, Zuckerman derisively marvels at this “savagely sure-of-himself man”
(61). Zuckerman has Swede interpret Jerry’s tirade as nothing more than a rant—“Jerry’s
grand occasion to tell him the truth”—and he asks himself, “Why does someone in the
midst of your worse suffering, decide the time has come to drive home, disguised in the
form of character analysis all the contempt they have been harboring for you all these
years?” (276). Zuckerman’s antipathy for Jerry, then, suggests his sympathy is with
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Swede. Furthermore, neither Jerry nor the novel offers an alternate path for Swede. What
does either offer that distinguishes the Jewish lifestyle from the WASP? Jerry possesses
the shallowness he accuses Dawn of having, trading off each wife for a younger one:
“Jerry’s been married four times,” Swede tells Zuckerman, “His new one’s in her thirties.
Half his age. Jerry’s the doctor that marries the nurse” (37). It is not said whether or not
all or any of his wives are even Jewish. Zuckerman imagines Lou becoming angry when
he learns of Jerry’s latest divorce. In this recreation, Lou accuses Jerry of making all
these kids and yet destroying homes in the process.
Thus, faulting Swede’s estrangement from his Jewish heritage appears to be more
of a red herring, a convenient way to find meaning in why Merry became a bomber and
why Swede suffered this tragedy. In the waning moments of the novel Zuckerman has
Swede also come to this conclusion, as he thinks, “He should have listened to his father
and never married her. He had defied him just that one time, but that was all it had
taken—that did it” (385). However, Swede comes to this conclusion in anger, just after
he discovers that his wife has cheated on him. In the adulterous Dawn, Swede finds his
scapegoat, but these thoughts are short-lived. The more he thinks about Dawn, he
remembers her as courageous going before his father and being interrogated about her
religion and her family. Furthermore, Jerry’s insistence that Swede paid for wanting to be
WASP contradicts other criticisms of his brother. On one hand Jerry blames Swede for
playing it safe, for not wanting to disappoint anyone; however, he then blames Swede for
not listening to Lou and marrying Dawn anyway. Swede becomes confused about what
kind of life he was supposed to lead that would have averted the tragedy. When Jerry tells
him that Swede wanted to live like a WASP, Swede does not understand him. The WASP
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lifestyle and the Jewish lifestyle have become indistinguishable in many ways—there is
nothing that makes Jerry’s Jewish materialism and vanity any more pure than Dawn’s. In
Zuckerman’s speech that he never gave at his class reunion, he writes that there was a
belief in the idea of the American dream. Jews had not been immune to the appeal of the
American myth in which Swede becomes caught up. Already a not so “slight shift
between” his and Swede’s generation and Lou’s had occurred (41). This new generation,
his and Swede’s, was being encouraged in the afterglow of the end of the Great
Depression and America’s victory in World War II to go and “Make something of
yourselves” and were being “steered in the direction of success” (41). His and Swede’s
generation began to see the lines between Jewishness and Americanness as being blurred.
As Americans, they were to start over again, en masse, “everyone in it together” (40).
Because Swede was a victim of this propaganda, all lines of blame being drawn to him
lead nowhere. In Zuckerman’s own desperation to think of something plausible that
might explain the tragedy that befalls his childhood hero, he imagines Swede in an
incestuous moment kissing his daughter. However, Zuckerman leaves this, indicating
even an act such as that could not explain Merry’s violence.
To find fault singularly with Swede and his choices is to miss the point of
Zuckerman’s observation that he was “fettered to history, an instrument of history”
(American Pastoral 5). Since Swede is an instrument of history, his personal
responsibility is heavily mitigated. As Zuckerman relays, it was the Jewish community
that propped the Swede up as emblematic of their own desire to assimilate into American
culture: “through the Swede, the neighborhood entered into a fantasy about itself and
about the world, the fantasy of sports fans everywhere: almost like Gentiles (as they
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imagined Gentiles)” (American Pastoral 4). Gary Johnson writes that Swede functions
allegorically, the personification of
Jewish-American assimilation, the product of [quoting Zuckerman] ‘each
new generation’s breaking away from the parochialism a little further, out
for the desire to go the limit in America with your rights, forming yourself
as an ideal person who gets rid of the traditional Jewish habits and
attitudes, who frees himself of the pre-America insecurities and the old,
constraining obsessions so as to live unapologetically as an equal among
equals.’ (G. Johnson 240; American Pastoral 85).
The Jewish community praises Swede not for embodying authentic Jewishness but for
escaping the Old World Jewish mentality and entering into Americanness by virtue of his
looks (“the insentient Viking mask of this blue-eyed blond born into our tribe” [American
Pastoral 3]) and his athletic prowess. Zuckerman notes that Jews valued “advanced
degrees” instead of “[p]hysical aggression . . . camouflaged by athletic uniforms”
(American Pastoral 3). Consequently, Swede becomes a mythic figure for the community
to help allay fears and become “a repository for all their hopes,” a symbol of a Jewish and
American alliance needed to defeat the Nazis, the ultimate killers and persecutors of Jews
(4). The community begins to mythologize Swede, and Zuckerman compares him to a
god. More precisely, Swede begins to resemble a golem, a magical creature of Jewish
myth created to protect Jews from persecution. The word golem appears in the Talmud
and in Psalms, meaning a shapeless, yet pliable mass (Weiner 51). The golem, according
to Cathy Gelbin, was part of Jewish folklore necessary to the forming of modern Jewish
identity, or more specifically, the golem signifies the “changing configurations of
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Jewishness beyond … Jewish traditionalism” (Gelbin 7). Furthermore, Gelbin argues that
the golem is the embodiment of the “discourse of the assimilated Jew” and “trigger[s] the
inadvertent collapse of the essentializing cultural and ethnic discourses it is meant to
signify” (7). Finally, Gelbin points out that the golem marks the return of the repressed as
theorized by Julia Kristeva, and thus the golem is “the ambivalent border where exact
limits between same and other, subject and object disappear” (qtd. in Gelbin 4). Indeed,
the Swede is where “Conflicting Jewish desires awakened by the sight of him were
simultaneously becalmed by him; the contradiction in Jews who want to fit in and want to
stand out, who insist they are different and insist they are no different. . . . Where was the
Jew in him?” (American Pastoral 20). Swede embodied for the community the
disappearance of the definitive markers between Jewishness and Americanness.
Furthermore, according to Jewish folklore, the golem is physically powerful but
unintelligent, created only for the purpose of defense. Interestingly then, Zuckerman
attributes the change in Jewish values from the cerebral to the physical since Swede
possessed the kind of physical aggression needed to defeat the Germans. In the Swede’s
room, Zuckerman as a boy discovers that Swede’s books are all about athletes but are
flanked by “a bar mitzvah gift, miniaturized replicas of Rodin’s ‘The Thinker’”—
representing the contrast in traditional Jewish values and the American books about
physically strong and aggressive characters (7). Second, to bring a golem to life, the
creator(s) would dance around it and chant the name of God (Wigoder 512). Zuckerman
explains that during football games “at the peak of frenzied adoration, an explosion of
skirt-billowing cartwheels was ecstatically discharged” as cheerleaders “flickered like
fireworks” in a kind of ritualistic dance then chanted “Swede Levov! It rhymes with ‘The
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Love’.” (American Pastoral 7) Love is an alternate way of invoking God; Swede’s name,
Zuckerman tells us, was “magical” (1). Swede “provided a bizarre, delusionary kind of
sustenance, the happy release into a Swedian innocence, for those who lived in dread of
never seeing their sons or their brothers or their husbands again”; he was “embraced as a
symbol of hope” (4, 5). Therefore, the life that Swede leads, the faint Jewishness “he
wore so lightly” (which Zuckerman admits was idolized along with his “oneness with
America”) was incubated by the Jewish community itself (7). The golem was pliable for
its creators, and Swede was, as Jerry continually insists, anything that anyone wanted him
to be.
If the golem represents a return of the repressed, then what is repressed? There is
the fear among Jews of losing authenticity, and since the golem represents the breakdown
of cultural essence and difference, the drama of the Swede catalyzes the worst of Jewish
anxieties. First, Swede’s physical appearance may make him indistinguishable as a Jew,
but even more terrifying subconsciously for Jews is that the Swede is “blue-eyed and
blond” and “startlingly Aryan” (3,10). Horribly for Jews, then, is that Swede resembles
Hitler’s version of the master race and their horror is further exacerbated by Swede’s
athletic superiority to other Jews—and they love him for it. Zuckerman says that the
Levovs “bestowed” the Swede upon the community (10). Lou, the Swede’s father, is an
authoritarian Jewish father who stands as the personification of the traditional Jew. The
last name of Levov is a derivation of Loew or Löw –the name of the priest who created
the golem to defend Jews from anti-Semitic attacks during the sixteenth century; it is the
most well known and documented of the Jewish golem folk tales (Kieval 3). But as much
as the golem was a protector of Jews, the golem was also a kind of monster, one that
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could get out of control from its creator and wreak havoc. The golem often helped his
creator perform menial tasks as a kind of servant; Swede, at the insistence of Lou, gives
up a chance to play professional baseball in order to learn his father’s glove-making
business. Lou forces Swede to work in the tanner, the worst part of the glove making
process. Swede, Jerry tells Zuckerman, does everything his father demands—until he
defies Lou by marrying Dawn Dwyer, a Catholic. In versions of the golem tale, the fear
was that the golem would be used against the Jews by anti-Semites or fall in love with a
shiksa, or Gentile woman. Thus, the creation of the golem had an air of transgression62
about it (a kind of Jewish Creature of Frankenstein, according to Gelbin), and pieced
together from these fragmented tales is the anxiety of this Jewish creature being lured
into the Gentile culture around it—and deeper still is the fear that Jews themselves would
become fully assimilated and lose their authentic Jewishness. Indeed, Jerry refers to
Dawn as a shiksa and lays much of the blame for Swede’s assimilation on her
superficiality. The shiksa, Frederic Jaher observes, is seen as a “threat to the survival of
Judaism” (518). Additionally, Rubin-Dorsky notes that “Jewish boys lay claim to
America by possessing the blonde-haired, blue-eyed Christian woman” (Rubin-Dorsky,
“Shiksa Goddess” 38). Rubin-Dorksy quotes from Roth’s Portnoy’s Complaint as
Portnoy declares, “O America! It may have been gold in the streets to my grandparents, it
may have been a chicken in every pot to my father and mother, but to me . . . America is
a shikse nestling under your arm whispering love, love, love, love, love” (38). And it’s
their union, the golem and the shiksa, from which Merry the monster is produced.
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At least, that’s how this mythic narrative goes. Since myth is a controlling
narrative, it explains why things happen and ingrains a schema for behavior. Myths bring
order to chaos and give the inexplicable purpose within the cultural psyche. Myths can be
didactic, providing morals to be learned, and here the myth of the Jew marrying the
Gentile seems the cautionary tale, the risk one takes in forsaking one’s authentic culture.
Zuckerman, though, seems to be dramatizing Jewish anxieties not to pass on the moral
but to deconstruct the myth of the assimilating Jew. When tragedy strikes, people seize
explanations, often resorting not to the intricate specifics, but rather they cling to the
controlling narrative that reinforces their cultural schema. Merry’s bombing then serves
as the perfect catalyst for Jews to explain why this happened to the Swede. Jerry and Rita
Cohen, who is the Marxist voice, serve as these very mouthpieces for varying
explanations. Scholars have offered similar versions of both Jerry’s and Rita’s
perspectives. But as discussed earlier, Zuckerman undermines Jerry’s and Rita’s versions.
First, scholars seem to overlook that much of what we know about Swede comes from
Zuckerman’s recreation of events. Much of what is said by Jerry and Rita is taken for
granted, especially their descriptions of Swede, Dawn, and Merry. However,
Zuckerman’s reconstructed narrative is an exercise in the demythification of Swede’s life,
to understand who the Swede is beyond the myth and to understand him as an individual
rather than an allegory for Jewish assimilation anxieties.
A writer, Zuckerman cannot resist the temptation to seek answers; the question of
why persists throughout the narrative. After the Swede sends Zuckerman a letter wanting
him to help write about his father, Zuckerman, unaware of Merry’s bombing at this point,
believes that Swede really wants to talk about some shock he’s had in his own life. But
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when the Swede does not meet his expectations, Zuckerman concludes that the Swede
was “all about being looked at” and that he (Zuckerman) was “craving depths” in his
childhood hero “that don’t exist;” however, he admits: “I was wrong. Never more
mistaken about anyone in my life” (American Pastoral 39). The trap that
Roth/Zuckerman has set up is to introduce each of the primary characters into a type:
Swede, the prodigal Jew; Dawn, narcissist Christian beauty queen; and Merry, the
monstrosity they create. With supporting testimony from Jerry and Rita, other characters,
and sometimes Zuckerman himself, these types are reinforced. However, as
Zuckerman’s narrative of Swede’s life proceeds he begins to hammer away at the statues
that have been presented in order to reveal the complexities of each individual. People
live lives that may seem simplistic, as a moral for our own sense of security and our own
self-righteousness, and we may interpret these lives allegorically, but Zuckerman sees his
duty as a writer to provide Swede with the dignity of living a “real” life. Zuckerman
writes that he “dreamed a realistic chronicle. I began gazing into his life—not his life as a
god or demigod in whose triumphs one could exult as a boy but his life as another
assailable man” (89).
Critics, for example, consistently accept not only Jerry’s version of events but
also the Marxist line that Rita Cohen lays out in her confrontations with the Swede. For
example, Timothy Parrish asserts that Swede exploits both his black and Puerto Rican
workers at the Levov glove factory. However, Roth anticipates this reading. First, the
Marxist clichés that Rita throws out are heavy-handed and obvious. Swede, however,
defends himself, countering that Rita has no idea what she is talking about. The glove
factory was moved not to cut down on labor costs, but because of the degradation of
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social conditions in Newark. It is easy for someone as detached as Rita is from the
factory to make generalized assumptions for what goes on in the business, but her
knowledge is limited to academic theories and a brief tour of the glove making factory.
Second, the workers do not, at first, feel exploited—like the Swede, they are just making
a living. Third, Swede is commended for keeping the factory in Newark despite the social
unrest of the late 1960s. What alternatives are there for either Swede or the workers?
Neither Rita nor Merry has one. They have theories but no practical alternatives.
Moreover, Rita’s charges against Dawn’s parenting are also contested by the Swede—
Zuckerman gives us no reason why we should trust Rita’s version of the business or
Merry’s domestic life over Swede’s. Rita herself is an exploiter by using Merry in order
to extort money from her father.
In fact, through Zuckerman’s narrative, Dawn is transformed from a brainless
beauty queen to a woman intent on leaving the superficialities of her pageant past behind
her. While other characters such as Jerry and Rita are fixated on this one event in her life,
Dawn is rather embarrassed by it. Her participation in the beauty contest was not for
vanity, but to help pay for her younger brother’s college. “She,” Zuckerman writes, “was
always telling people her serious reasons for becoming Miss New Jersey and nobody
even listened. They didn’t want her to have serious reasons. All she could have for them
was that face” (194). In fact, Dawn tries to suppress a story mentioning her as the 1949
Miss New Jersey and gives away her pageant clothes to charity. Her motivations to live
on a farm are not to live in a mythic American pastoral, but to find meaningful and
rewarding work, stemming from childhood memories, and to assert her new identity as
something apart from Miss New Jersey. As an active woman who attempts to build her
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own business, she strives to be more than the wife of Swede Levov and Merry’s mother.
Dawn takes the work seriously, studying cattle breeding, helping with the intense manual
labor on the farm, and caring for the calves. Her facelift comes after Merry’s bombing
and after her mental breakdown, not so much because of simple vanity but in order to
remake herself because of the trauma of losing her daughter. Her desire for a new house
is perhaps not because the old one was not good enough as Jerry tells Zuckerman, but
also because of the trauma Merry’s crime inflicted. Finally, Dawn stands up to Lou
Levov’s Jewish inquisition, demanding that he see her as an individual. Lou obsessively
interrogates Dawn about her family’s degree of anti-Semitism, yet Zuckerman tells us
that Lou likes to tell anti-Catholic jokes. A hypocrite and controlling, Lou tries to dictate
how Dawn and Swede will raise their children, demanding concessions and, though they
compromise, Lou tries to get Dawn to reject her own religion.
As for Merry, much of her characterization also depends on the source we choose
to focus on. From Jerry’s version and portions of Zuckerman’s imagining, Merry appears
to have been born the monstrous character. Her stutter and appearance seem to align her
physical manifestations with the ugliness of her character. However, rather than a
monster, Merry embodies the grotesque, a character whose outward appearance and
mannerisms transgress cultural norms and evoke empathy—at least Swede’s empathy if
not the reader’s. Zuckerman suggests that Dawn was too obsessed with the stuttering as
Merry saw therapist after therapist, and the idea that Merry felt insecure because of her
mother’s beauty persists throughout the novel. But again, a nexus of complex forces seem
to be at work here, influencing and shaping Merry’s upbringing. According to Mark
Shechner, the most damaging influence on Merry is not Swede or Dawn, but rather an
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inherited and learned fanaticism passed on from Lou Levov, and also exemplified by
Jerry’s maniacal rages. Lou, Jerry, and Merry scream together. Her political views mirror
Lou’s, who yells at the television anytime Nixon appears. In an earlier scene, Merry
seems to have learned this type of rage when she screams violently at Lyndon B. Johnson
on the television screen. Merry, Shechner declares, is the return of the Jewish repressed
(147). Return of the repressed or not, Merry’s inexplicable act of terror comes from a
variety of places: psychological, genetic, and the influence of her antiwar peers. Merry,
like Swede, is caught up in the raging momentum of history.
Interpretations of the American pastoral have usually centered on the choice of
the Levovs to live in Old Rimrock and live on the farm raising cattle—a literal pastoral, a
physical place to escape into an ahistorical existence akin to the myth of the American
frontier. Zuckerman writes that Swede wanted to be Johnny Appleseed happily spreading
his seeds across the country. Swede’s version of Johnny Appleseed is not religious:
“Wasn’t a Jew, wasn’t an Irish Catholic, wasn’t a Protestant Christian” (though, the real
Johnny Appleseed preached the Gospel) (American Pastoral 316). Zuckerman posits the
American pastoral more noetically—a state of mind or a way of thinking about the kind
of imagined idyll that people think America should be. The American pastoral is not Old
Rimrock but the myth itself. It’s not just the WASP myth, but the myth the Newark
Jewish community have themselves envisioned; it’s the myth of every immigrant and
ethnic group that constructs for themselves the mythic vision in which their otherness
will fade into “the ordinary way, the natural way, the regular American-guy way” (89).
Zuckerman finds the epitome of this American myth in his imagined recreation of the
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Levov-Dwyer Thanksgiving, which he calls “the American pastoral par excellence”
(402). During this “dereligionalized” holiday, there is a
moratorium on the three-thousand-year-old nostalgia of the Jews, a
moratorium on Christ and the cross, and the crucifixion for the Christians,
when everyone in New Jersey and elsewhere can be more passive about
their irrationalities than they are the rest of the year. A moratorium on all
the grievances and resentments, and not only for the Dwyers and Levovs
but for everyone in America who is suspicious of everyone else.” (402)
American identity, therefore, in Roth’s handling here is not the static perfection of either
WASPness or the assimilated American Jew, but rather a dynamic, fluctuating, complex,
tension-ridden identity that results from America’s multiethnic, multiracial, and
multireligious groups continuously and inevitably conflating with and ramming into each
other. The American pastoral is America’s controlling myth, utopian, but within the
American pastoral lies also “the indigenous American berserk,” the inexplicable—that
which myth can neither control nor explain (American Pastoral 86).
I Married a Communist: Jewish and American Identity Reconciled?
In 1950, RKO pictures released a Cold War propaganda film titled I Married a
Communist, produced and enthusiastically backed by Howard Hughes. The film, which
was renamed The Woman on Pier 13, and its communist-paranoia-plot was downplayed
in trailers after it initially failed to connect with audiences, was a direct product of the
House Un-American Activities Committee’s machinations against communist infiltration
of American culture, business, and media. Because of the power and influence of film,
rooting out alleged communists in Hollywood became one the committee’s primary

230
focuses. Ironically, during World War II, at the secret behest of the US government,
Hollywood had produced pro-Soviet films in order to consolidate public support for
America’s temporary allies in the fight against the Nazis. This allowed certain proStalinist remnants in Hollywood after the war, and their presence helped fuel the 1950s’
circus and self-aggrandizing that became known in some descriptions as the Hollywood
witch hunt (Leab 59-66).63 Among the aims of HUAC was to monitor and censor the
entertainment industry for any aspect of anti-Americanism as regulated by Ayn Rand’s
report for the Motion Picture Alliance for the Preservation of American Ideals, which
prescribed vigilance against any film that might undermine the independent man,
industrialists, and the free enterprise system. These ideals were described in the report as
being “inseparable from Americanism ‘by body and soul’” (Noakes 662). Additionally,
not only were films not supposed to denigrate these “American” precepts, they were
supposed to promote them as well. Spelled out before Congress, the parameters of
American identity were being defined by an unelected coterie of right wing intellectuals
and then enforced by an elected body that singled out communism as a legally intolerable
ideology.
Although Roth’s novel has little to do with the plot of the aforementioned film,
the same title is used by actress Eve Frame, ex-wife of the novel’s central character, radio
star Ira Ringold (stage name Iron Rinn). An anti-communist rant that tells how she was
duped and her daughter was a victim of Ira’s attempts to indoctrinate her, the book was
the brain-child of the politically ambitious couple, Bryden Grant and Katrina Van Tassel
Grant, who bullied Frame into writing the book. Similar to Updike and Morrison, Roth
demonstrates the irony of how the zealous attempt to define and codify American identity
63
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actually makes us less American. Roth explores right-wing American extremism and Ira
and Johnny O’Day’s communism. As much as Nathan Zuckerman seems unattached to
the events in the novel—he is chiefly a passive listener—Zuckerman concludes that
American identity at its very heart is that of the independent, critical thinker, who
constantly probes and questions with which ideologies he is faced. He sees this ideal in
his father and the novel’s main narrator Murray Ringold, Ira’s older brother, whose
independent teaching and ideas get him temporarily fired from teaching high school and
factors into HUAC’s investigation of him and his brother.
How much independent thought can America tolerate—the novel asks—before it
begins to behave as a totalitarian state bent on crushing those who challenge hegemony?
Not much, according to I Married a Communist. Aspects of American Pastoral are
deemed as a conservative retrospective on the 1960s antiwar movement, and I have
argued that it is conservative in the context of demythologizing aspects of sixties’
counterculture and in its reverence for certain values of Lou’s and Swede’s generations.
As a follow up, though, I Married a Communist wants to take a sledgehammer to the
brand of conservatism that leads to nationalistic frenzy—or the American unthinking, as
Murray Ringold puts it. Written forty years after the main events of the novel take place,
I Married a Communist is not limited to the time period it portrays. America’s intense
nationalism survived HUAC, McCarthyism, the Vietnam War, and was revitalized with a
vengeance during the Reagan years. Its nationalism, a type of American conservatism,
absolves all sins committed by the nation’s greatest sinners. One of the overarching
similes of the novel is Murray’s comparison of the elaborate funeral held for a canary in
the Italian ward of Newark—its carnivalesque atmosphere, the spectacle of the absurd,
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everyone but Ira and the canary’s owner in on the joke—to Richard Nixon’s funeral and
its parade of right-wing players and his centrist apologists. The “masters of the most
shameless ways of undoing an opponent,” Murray declares, “those for whom moral
concerns must always come last, uttering all the well-known, unreal, sham-ridden cant
about everything but the dead man’s real passions” (I Married a Communist 278).
Kissinger, Ford, Reagan, “Iran-Contra arms dealer Adnan Khashoggi seated next to
Donald Nixon. The burglar G. Gordon Liddy there with his arrogant shaved head. The
most disgraced of vice presidents, Spiro Agnew, there with his conscienceless Mob face”
(279). Among them, within the fiction of the novel, are Ira’s enemies Katrina Van Tassel
and Bryden Grant. “In my ninety years,” Murray concludes, “I’ve witnessed two
sensationally hilarious funerals, Nathan. Present at the first as a thirteen-year-old, and the
second I saw on TV just three years ago,” the funeral for the canary and the one “when
they buried Richard Milhous Nixon with a twenty-one-gun salute” (280). Both are
spectacles to behold; Jimmy the canary’s funeral is a grotesque funeral, a parody of the
grand productions that the Italian community normally puts on for its religious holidays
and saints’ feasts. With Nixon’s funeral, everyone, though, is oblivious to the irony. The
canary’s funeral is not Bakhtin’s medieval carnival or spectacle, since it is not a ritual;
the canary’s owner, Russomanno, is actually sincere in his grief, and it lacks the subtle
complexities of medieval carnival. So it is what Bakhtin referred to as the “negative”
parody “of modern times” as Russomanno is laughed at rather than laughing with
(Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World 11). The distinction is important because Murray
wants Zuckerman to see the simile. Since Nixon’s funeral in Murray’s eyes is as
ridiculous as the canary’s, it too becomes a negative parody, in which, according to
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Bakhtin, nothing is renewed or gained for its participants from the experience.
Additionally, the “modern” spectacle of Nixon’s funeral is more in line with Toni
Morrison’s description of it. We should see the narrative of the spectacle underlying the
funeral itself. “They aren’t mysterious events,” Murray muses, “They don’t require a
genius to ferret out their meaning. . . . I only wish the Italians from the old First Ward
could have been out there at Yorba Linda with Dr. Kissinger and Billy Graham. They
would have known how to enjoy the spectacle” (280). Recall, then, that Morrison
describes the spectacle as where the “official story is formed and is a superior mechanism
for guaranteeing its longevity. Spectacle offers signs, symbols, and images that are more
persuasive than print and which can smoothly parody thought” (Morrison, Birth of a
Nation’hood, xvii). The official story forming at Nixon’s funeral is that Nixon had a
“towering intellect,” and Kissinger, quoting from Hamlet, decrees, “He was a man, take
him for all and all, I shall not look upon his like again” (I Married a Communist 278).
President Clinton praises Nixon for his “remarkable journey” and thanks him for his
“wise counsel” (278). The signs and symbols are all present: the American flag wrapping
Nixon’s coffin; the music: “Hail to the Chief,” “America,” “You’re a Grand Old Flag,”
“The Battle Hymn of the Republic”; and “the national narcotic, “The Star-Spangled
Banner,” there to “make everybody momentarily forget everything” and “induce
catalepsy in the multitude” (278). The parody of thought is present, as the elephant in
Yorba Linda is Nixon’s abuses and crimes, and for Murray, not just during his presidency
but dating back to his communist-witch-hunting days in the forties. Thought is parodied
in the strained and disingenuous pondering and reframing of Nixon’s legacy. His
nefariousness is not discussed, because it blights the uniting narrative of Nixon the great
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American that is building at his funeral. The spectacle wipes away Nixon’s
transgressions, but not just Nixon’s, America’s as well. The people destroyed along the
way, the laws broken, the Constitution ignored, the secret bombings, all hidden beneath
the stars and stripes and drowned out by the choruses from the national songbook. The
spectacle is the unthinking American’s tonic. Murray, though, deconstructs the Nixon
panegyric. Kissinger, Murray says,
has no idea of the equivocating context in which Hamlet speaks of the
unequaled king. But then who, sitting there under the tremendous pressure
of sustaining a straight face while watching the enactment of the Final
Cover-up, is going to catch the court Jew in a cultural gaffe when he
invokes an inappropriate masterpiece? (279)
The spectacle of Nixon’s funeral is a continuation of the “first postwar flowering
of the American unthinking”—McCarthyism—“that is now everywhere” (284). The
McCarthy era, Murray explains, inaugurated “the postwar triumph of gossip as the
unifying credo of the world’s oldest democratic republic” (284). Murray observes that
McCarthy really was interested not in rooting out communists, but performing before the
public, the theatricality, or as I refer to it, as another spectacle that exhibits and
galvanizes power and ideology. The accompanying persecution is an ugly part of
American identity, the need for “moral disgrace as public entertainment” (Roth revisits
this with a vengeance in The Human Stain) (284). But also, the moral disgrace is not just
a form of political sadism—and it wasn’t in 1692 either—but a way of inscribing the
power of the state into the public consciousness via the spectacle, for McCarthy was not a
lone wolf, but an avaricious bandwagoner who took his cue from HUAC and Nixon. If he
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were a more tactful politician, McCarthy could have continued on for years, but he was
stupid and reckless and was stopped only when he turned his sights on US Army
personnel. HUAC, in contrast, lasted until the late sixties. McCarthy was HUAC’s
senatorial monster, and HUAC was the monster that gained strength from the concoction
of two lethal products of the postwar period: hubris and fear.64 The hubris of rising
nationalism and military power and the fear of communism catalyzed the US government
to delineate the limits of American identity. As Ira points out, HUAC considered
communism more un-American than racism. Instead of hauling segregationists, suspected
lynchers, and admitted white supremacists before its hearings, HUAC focused on
communism, certainly for a number of reasons, but one of the chief reasons was the
threat it posed to America’s consumer-capitalist economy. As Morrison dramatized in her
trilogy, the limits of American identity had already been prescribed along racial lines. But
with the New Deal, Franklin Roosevelt enraged conservatives by implementing vast
changes to the American economy. Regulatory and more pro-worker than ever before,
Roosevelt heightened fears among conservatives, already on the alarm for anything that
sniffed of communism. Additionally, by focusing on enemies from the outside or
infiltration of enemies and philosophies from the inside, the country could unite around a
common threat and mask its internal fractures. The postwar fervor was such that even
liberals “rode the anti-Communist bandwagon,” as the Truman administration pursued
the agenda aggressively; Hubert Humphrey tried to make the Communist party illegal
and spearheaded an effort to set up “detention centers” for “suspected subversives” (Zinn
422-23, 427). Murray explains that the framing of domestic unions and communists was
that they were foreign: HUAC had “gone after the United Electric Workers,” the
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complicit media calling “the picketers’ appearance ‘an invasion of forces hostile to the
congressional inquiry.’ Not a legal demonstration as guaranteed by rights laid down in
the Constitution but an invasion, like Hitler’s of Poland and Czechoslovakia” (I Married
a Communist 6). Murray points out that a member of the committee, “without a trace of
embarrassment at the un-Americanness lurking in his observation,” explicitly pointed out
that many picketers spoke Spanish in order to highlight their otherness (6). Racial and
ethnic issues become apparent because non-Anglo Americans had to display their
“Americanness” more so than others since their differences more easily aroused
suspicion. Murray, though, epitome of Jewish intellect and critical thinking, counters that
the rabid Americanness” runs counter to American principles—and law.
Nathan Zuckerman explains how the barrage of nationalism affected him as a
boy. From Norman Corwin’s On a Note of Triumph, a tribute to American troops on V-E
Day, Zuckerman becomes inspired by the theme of the common man unifying Americans
under “the myth of a national character to be partaken by all.” He “was a Jewish child”
but “didn’t care to partake of the Jewish character. I didn’t even know, clearly, what it
was,” he tells us (38). “I wanted to partake of the national character” (38). “History . . .”
he continues, and “America had been scaled down and personalized; for me that was the
enchantment not only of Norman Corwin but of the times” (39).65 The “high demotic
poetry that was the liturgy of World War II” allowed you to “flood into America” and
America to flood “into you” (39). Zuckerman’s comment that he wanted to partake of the
national character rather than in his Jewishness identifies a distinction between the two—
as if Jews made no contribution to the Americanness. The “clearly” interposed between
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the clauses suggests some regret about being unaware of the Jewish character.
Zuckerman’s father and Murray both represent a significant Jewish contribution to
American identity: the belief in an intellectual, dialectical, liberal democracy that
contributed to American progressivism. Mr. Zuckerman attempts to engage his son by
asking sensible questions about his support for Henry Wallace’s 1948 candidacy in the
presidential election. This passage comes when Nathan reminisces about Ira’s influence
on him as Nathan begins to turn toward extremism. Although Nathan has not adopted
communism, his passion makes him susceptible. With Ira’s influence, Zuckerman picks
out the theme of the common man in Corwin’s broadcast. “Corwin’s ‘little guy,’”
Zuckerman exclaims, “was American for ‘proletariat’” (38). Zuckerman’s passion for the
progressive cause leads him to shout at his father “Red-baiter!” after a disagreement over
Wallace (33). Zuckerman’s anger should remind us of Merry screaming about politics at
the Swede in American Pastoral. Swede had attempted to get Merry to protest the
Vietnam War by organizing locally and using democracy by encouraging her to
accompany him on a trip to discuss it with their senator. Merry, though, refuses, spouting
on about revolution, which eventually leads to her killing an innocent civilian. As a boy,
Zuckerman grows more defiant against his father and ridicules his father’s patient belief
in the Democratic Party’s uneven progressivism. Zuckerman refers to himself as Little
Tom Paine, after the indefatigable Thomas Paine, who is a hero to Ira Ringold and with
the help of Ira’s influence to Zuckerman himself. Zuckerman reads Howard Fast’s
historical novel Citizen Tom Paine and is already mesmerized by Fast’s common-manhero picture of Paine when Ira intensifies the spell. “He did it all alone,” Zuckerman
thinks, repeating a line from Fast’s book as well Paine’s declaration that he belonged to
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no religion: “My own mind is my own church,” Zuckerman quotes (25). And he states
that reading Paine angered and emboldened him. But the novel begins to demythologize
Paine as his credo is more of a sign of a megalomaniac, an obstinate, uncompromising
figure; brilliant, articulate, and effective for sure—Paine, as depicted in this mythical
garb, is the man you want when you need to tear down, not to build; “My only friend is
revolution” Paine famously declared.66 For Zuckerman, Fast romanticizes Paine as a
“folkloric belligerent . . . bearing a musket in the unruly streets” and that he died alone
with his “defiant independence” (25). Zuckerman concludes, “There was nothing about
Paine that could have been more appealing” (25). Ira’s death mirrors Paine’s, as Ira dies
alone in rural New Jersey a broken man. Of course, in Fast’s account the “it” in “He did it
all alone” means he stood up for the common man alone among his fellow
revolutionaries, but the vagueness of the “it” hangs there as if Paine started the
Revolution by himself. Either way, neither is true. Certainly, Paine’s rhetorical
contributions were loudest and vital to the morale of the revolutionaries and winning over
a reticent American public about the Revolution, but alone he was not—he was aided in
the publication, printing, and editing of Common Sense, most notably by Benjamin Rush,
and was helped by the network of revolutionaries who had laid the groundwork for
American independence. And it is this myth of Paine alone that the novel wants to
deconstruct, for it was not necessarily Paine’s political philosophies that earned him
enemies, but his attack on organized religion that led to charges of atheism—this was the
taboo that Paine breached (as well as a vicious letter he sent to the most popular man in
America, President George Washington, over his administration and Paine’s French
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imprisonment). Until Paine’s ostracizing, he actually used his connections well and in
that sense he was able to maneuver politically and accomplish goals, something Ira and
Johnny O’Day are unable to do. Because of this, Paine had power and influence which
are lacking in Ira and O’Day except for O’Day’s influence over Ira and Ira’s influence
over the boy Zuckerman. Though Ira’s radio program is successful, it is so mainly
because of his rhetorical skill and his dressing up as figures such as Abraham Lincoln—it
is the performative aspects of the program and his appearances, the entertainment to
which his audience is drawn. Mr. Zuckerman tries to get Nathan to understand what
makes political processes effective rather than attempt to force change on demand.
Nevertheless, Nathan chooses to believe in the most romantic aspects of Paine and Ira.
Thus, Nathan looks upon Paine and Ira uncritically, as Ira looks upon Johnny O’Day.
O’Day, in fact, renames Ira “Iron Man Ira,” and Ira starts going by the name of
“Iron Rinn” when he lands his radio gig. O’Day takes charge of Ira’s education, telling
him what books to read, how to write, and he draws up a paper called “Some Concrete
Suggestions for Ringold’s Utilization” (37). Seeing Ira as a cog, O’Day offers didactic
advice. Nathan begins to write radio plays for Ira’s program, and Ira, “as though he and
O’Day were together,” would alter them to reflect the “workingman’s argot” (37).
Zuckerman reflects that just as he “was the perfect target for Ira’s tutorials, the orphaned
Ira was the perfect target for O’Day’s” (43). As Ira begins to take Nathan under his wing,
he gives Nathan a record of Soviet propaganda music to listen to, mainly military songs;
Nathan interprets this as Ira’s next move, to get him to turn toward communism. Roth,
thus, makes no distinction between nationalist/capitalist propaganda and communist
propaganda as both resort to jingoism, patriotism, and celebration of the military. Roth
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illustrates the blind allegiance to communism by its followers by pointing to their
accommodation and rationalizing of Stalin’s brutal regime as Mr. Zuckerman interrogates
Ira about the murder of Jan Masaryk at the hands of Soviet communists. Murray recalls
that “Ira obeyed every one-hundred-eighty-degree shift of [Communist] policy. Ira
swallowed the dialectical justification for Stalin’s every villainy . . . another innocent guy
co-opted into a system he didn’t understand. . . . But my brother abased himself
intellectually the same way they all did” (181).
Both Nathan and Ira break from the tradition of Jewish intellectualism because of
their rash zealotry. As alluded to earlier, Nathan believes that there lies an essential
American identity apart from his Jewishness. However, Nathan’s assumption is an
ignorant one since Jews have been a powerful force in shaping American identity,
especially in the twentieth century. Since Communist focuses strongly on the critical and
intellectual thinking of Murray and Mr. Zuckerman and their political views, the novel
shows how vital Jewish skepticism is to American liberal democracy. Important here is
the history of the Jewish Diaspora. Since Jews have had to live as minorities in other
nations, culturally they have been skeptical of nationalist propaganda. Because nationalist
propaganda in predominantly Christian nations where millions of Jews lived was often
primarily anti-Semitic, Jews had good reason to be skeptical and even downright fearful.
Of course, the most obvious and horrific example is Nazi Germany, nationalism run
amok, but many Jews also distrusted American nationalism since it, too, was fueled by
strains of anti-Semitism. Before World War II, many nationalistic American politicians,
often representing the WASP elite, were isolationists and suspected Nazi sympathizers
(Roth’s novel The Plot Against America focuses on this very issue). Such is the suspicion
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that Ira has for the WASPish Grants, whom, marking the beginning of his downfall, Ira
accuses of having ties to Werhner von Braun, a scientist who engineered rockets for the
Nazis. As Mr. Zuckerman tries to make clear to Nathan, his support for Truman in the
1948 election was meant to defeat the Republicans, regardless of Truman and the
Democratic Party’s flaws. Since Wallace stood little chance of winning, votes for him
might ensure the Republican Thomas Dewey’s victory (plus, Mr. Zuckerman was wary of
Wallace’s Communist Party ties). Mr. Zuckerman further explains to his son that
Republican rule during the Great Depression almost led to his own joining of the
Communist party. Mr. Zuckerman, though, saw Franklin Roosevelt as a pragmatic
defender of working people against Republicans wanting to hand over the nation to the
interests of big business: “A great man saved this country’s capitalism from the
capitalists and saved patriotic people like me from Communism” (103). Indeed, history
shows that the Jewish vote shifted dramatically to the Democratic Party under Roosevelt,
helping to usher in the electorate’s reevaluation of progressive politics after twelve years
of Republican administrations. Thus, politically, Jewish support for the New Deal was
already helping to redefine American identity politically. Furthermore, as Andrew Heinze
argues in Jews and the American Soul, the myth, which Nathan naively believes, that
America’s identity is absent of Jewishness discounts the important role Jewish ideas had
in shaping American ideas about democracy and freedom. Specifically, Heinze focuses
on the Jewish intellectual tradition that profoundly influenced American culture and
politics during the early part of the twentieth century. Jewish skepticism and scholarship
in America rose to prominence especially after World War I, mainly through, Heinze
argues, Jewish leadership in psychology. By not acknowledging the Jewishness of
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America, Nathan fails to see the value in his father’s and Murray’s pragmatic and
reflective thinking since he wants to partake of what he sees as a separate “American”
(non-Jewish) character. Here, as in American Pastoral, the problem is not so much the
abandonment of Jewishness for Americanness, but rather failing to see the Jewishness
within America. Nathan, instead, imagines an uninfluenced American identity, springing
not from a century and a half of development, but rather from the radio episode of
Norman Corwin and the victory in World War II. Nathan falsely believes that America
and Jewishness have no history outside of his experience of it, and more importantly that
they have no history together. Similar to Merry in American Pastoral, Nathan’s naiveté is
that America can simply be reimagined anew, and through the force of his own and Ira’s
will this new America can come into being. This new America in Nathan’s mind is absent
of Jewishness.
Nathan’s attempt to erase his Jewishness, to deny Jewishness as part of American
identity, is paralleled monstrously by Eve Frame, who tries to remake herself as
“American” by covering up her Jewish past. Born Chava Fromkin, Eve changes her name
and marries movie star Carlton Pennington to help her acting career. Eve is a social
climber who is willing to cut herself off from her Jewish roots in order to be successful
and accepted among society’s elite. Eve, Murray explains, tries to “launch [her]self
undisturbed by the past into America” (158). She claims that she is the descendant of sea
captains of a Yankee Clipper from New Bedford, Massachusetts, her father a patent
lawyer, her mother running a tearoom, linking herself to the industrial, entrepreneurial
class and capitalistic adventurousness of early America. Under pressure from the Grants,
Eve further attempts to assert her American identity by claiming in her “memoir” it is her
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duty as an “American actress to fight the Communist infiltration” which is attempting to
“tear down the American way of life” (244). Murray senses the anti-Semitism since the
memoir was mainly orchestrated by the WASPish Grants, as he suspects the memoir
intimates that communism and anti-Americanness are perpetrated secretly by Jews. The
title of the memoir I Married a Communist and the theme, thus, suggest that Jews cannot
be trusted and their deceit is so subtle that all Americans are susceptible—it has all the
subconscious camp of the B-movie of the same name. Eve’s need to hide her Jewishness,
though, beckons her repressed anxiety. After Pennington, she marries two Jewish men
successively and takes out her guilt on Ira. More importantly, Eve’s masking of her
Jewishness leaves her susceptible to the machinations of the Grants. Just as Roth
elaborates more intensely in The Human Stain, the belief that one can totally extricate
herself from her cultural identity and create her own identity is self-deceiving. In denying
her Jewishness, Eve loses her critical awareness since she herself becomes anti-Semitic.
Murray observes that her willingness to play a role led to “unthinking. . . . The thing
that’s happening to her is unobserved by her” (157). One does not have to be Jewish to be
a critical thinker or intellectual for sure, nor is Roth laying out an “essence” of
Jewishness but a tradition, the result of cultural survival, in which Jews have emphasized
the intellect. As Heinze observes, the Jewish scholar plays an important part in the Jewish
community not just as keeper of a sacred history but as an exemplar on how to live and
conduct one’s life. Without Jewishness, a self-denying Jew becomes susceptible to
others’ manipulation of her identity just as the Grants manipulate Eve.
As Murray relates Ira and Eve’s story, Zuckerman increasingly reflects on his
own past. Zuckerman’s break with Ira comes when he goes to college and begins to study
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under Leo Glucksman, a Ph.D. candidate in literature at the University of Chicago.
Trying to impress Glucksman, Nathan hands in a copy of his radio play The Stooge of
Torquemada, an example of his propagandist literature. Glucksman, though, rebukes him,
beginning another phase of Nathan’s tutelage: “It began to seem that just about
everybody gave me a shot,” he recalls (222). “Educate Nathan. The credo of everybody I
dared say hello to” (222). Glucksman espouses apolitical or a disinterested aesthetic
theory and sees the working class contemptuously. But he is just as didactic, and
Zuckerman observes that his life has been “one long speech that I’ve been listening to . . .
how to think, how not to think; how to behave, how not to behave” (222). Although
Glucksman rejects Nathan after Nathan does not return his sexual advances, Zuckerman
does not necessarily disavow Glucksman’s theories about art. Instead, Zuckerman reflects
that the “one long speech” is “sometimes original, sometimes pleasurable, sometimes
crap (the speech of the incognito), sometimes maniacal, sometimes matter-of-fact, and
sometimes like the sharp prick of a needle” (222). He concludes his Hamlet-esque
soliloquy by asking “was I from the beginning, by inclination as by choice, merely an ear
in search of a word?” (222). Zuckerman’s self-reflection demonstrates the need of the
artist to self-analyze, to question him or herself. Zuckerman instead exemplifies the
constantly self-reflective, self-doubting artist who tries to make sense of the sound and
fury of the “book of voices” and “arias” around him (222). Both Ira and Eve as actors are
themselves artists, but neither possesses the necessary introspection to strive for
authenticity. Instead of using art to locate their authentic selves they use it to mask them.
Ira plays the roles of certain American figures such as Abraham Lincoln, Nathan Hale,
Orville Wright, Wild Bill Hickock, and Jack London on a show called The Free and the
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Brave, which, ironically, functions as the type of nationalist propaganda broadcasts of the
1940s. Ira hides his politics behind the masks of those he impersonates. Iron Rinn,
Murray concludes, “never discovered his life” (319). Interestingly, Roth points to the
notion that the artist constructs his identity from the cacophony of propaganda.
Zuckerman recalls the line from Murray’s reading of Macbeth that “would assert itself . .
. the remainder of my life: But I must also feel it as a man.” Zuckerman remarks that the
line is his “first encounter with a spiritual state that is aesthetic and overrides everything
else” (314). The line comes from Macduff who upon learning of his family’s murder at
the hands of Macbeth replies, “He has no children” (314). Murray asserts that Macduff is
referring to himself, contrary to “the standard interpretation” (315). But Murray implies
that Macduff, in this moment of grief, is able to step outside of himself and question
himself because “They were all struck for thee! Naught that I am,/Not for their own
demerits but for mine” (Shakespeare, Macbeth, 4.3.224-225). Malcolm has told Macduff
to “Dispute it like a man” (meaning revenge); Macduff declares that he will, but not
before he must “feel it as a man” by internalizing it and recognizing the possibility of his
own faults. It is a moment of Shakespearean complexity because a man must on one hand
be sure of himself to take revenge and seek justice, but also to be as unsure of himself in
the role of the injustice: a man thinks about who he is. And it is through his talks with
Murray that Zuckerman thinks about himself and his life. To do so, Zuckerman retreats
from the world, living in the physical space of the American pastoral, overlooking a pond
and mountain range “apart from people” (I Married a Communist 71). Zuckerman
observes that his retreat in itself is unoriginal: “it’s the earliest images—of independence
and freedom, particularly—that do live obstinately on, despite the blessing and
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bludgeoning of life’s fullness. . . . It has a history. It was Rousseau’s. It was Thoreau’s.
The palliative primitive hut” (72). To the end, though, Murray asks Zuckerman to even
reexamine his choice to live in isolation: “Beware the utopia of isolation” (315).
The novel ends with Zuckerman remaining in his isolation and pondering the
cosmic meaninglessness of the entire episode of Ira Ringold—it has been all just sound
and fury—another allusion to Macbeth. But what is also implied through the entire novel
is the respect for the patient, thoughtful lives and words of Zuckerman’s father and
Murray Ringold. Zuckerman may have made his choice to leave most of his Jewishness
behind in attempt to become his own person in the wilds of America, but the meaning of
Murray’s last words to him resonate—never stop thinking about the consequences of his
choices. It is this introspection that is vital to Zuckerman’s Jewish and American identity.
The Human Stain: Arcadia Asunder
Two aspects of American identity bracket The Human Stain, Philip Roth’s
concluding novel to his trilogy. The first, forming the novel’s opening salvo, is America’s
obsessive, Puritanical heritage driven by the “ecstasy of sanctimony” (The Human Stain
2). The second, the one that ends the novel and, thus, the trilogy, is an image carried over
from I Married a Communist: the ascetic man, living “atop an arcadian mountain in
America” (361). In The Human Stain, the targets of America’s Puritanical wrath are both
President Bill Clinton and Coleman Silk. Their ordeals become a narrative spectacle of
American identity played out—one on the scaffold of American television, the other in
the American microcosm of rural New England—symbol of the American pastoral. The
latter is a place where a black man passing as a Jewish one believes he can cut himself off
from his cultural and racial heritage and avoid the pervasive cloud of blame, self-
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righteous morality, and punishment that simultaneously enwraps the President of the
United States. The environs of Athena College, Coleman’s former employer, are tucked
away in the pastoral setting, seemingly beyond the reaches of a society caught up in a
frenzy of persecution. But that solitary man atop the Arcadian mountain in the American
pastoral is Lester Farley, a broken, murderous veteran traumatized by his tour in the
Vietnam War. Caught between Coleman and Lester is Faunia Farley, Lester’s much
abused ex-wife and now Coleman’s lover, who, like Coleman, attempts to reconstruct her
identity apart from her past when she was a victim of unspeakable domestic horrors.
Nowhere is safe in Roth’s America: society is filled with twentieth-century Roger
Chillingworths, both male and female, in the personas of Kenneth Starr and Delphine
Roux—and the throngs of morally indignant voyeurs; shattered, angry, and armed men
roam the American interior; the domestic space is a sanctuary of freedom for depraved
patricians preying on women and children. Not even the castle walls of Athena College,
shrine of enlightenment, can keep out America’s dark-aged desire to purify itself through
the spectacle.
Mark Shechner posits Coleman as the “modern Dimmesdale” and his scarlet
letter is “‘R’ for racist,” but abruptly leaving the The Scarlet Letter analogy behind,
Shechner reframes The Human Stain as Greek tragedy (152). But The Scarlet Letter
reference is worth revisiting because just as Hawthorne wanted to explore the darkest
roots of American identity, Roth, as he does in I Married a Communist through HUAC
and McCarthyism, continues to allude to the Puritanical witch hunts of the seventeenth
century. At the beginning of The Scarlet Letter, Hawthorne presents some of the defining
images of the Puritan Utopia—the prison, the scaffold, and the gallows—the signs and
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mechanisms of ultimate state power over the body. Since these mechanisms were often
used to punish the morally corrupted body, they served to purify the offending individual
of his or her sin as well as ritualize through the spectacle the purgation of sinful
influences. Though the scaffold and gallows have been discarded as punishments for
moral transgressions, the desire to enact the ritual of corporeal purgation remains deeply
entrenched in twentieth century America. The HUAC and McCarthy hearings from I
Married a Communist, though, differ in certain significant respects from The Human
Stain’s Clinton-Lewinsky spectacle and Coleman Silk’s ordeal. In the 1950s the
communist witch hunt was exacerbated by real fears of communist infiltration and
eventual revolution. The external threat was also felt to be real as communism spread
throughout Eastern Europe, across Asia, and into the Western Hemisphere. But the
Clinton-Lewinsky spectacle and Coleman’s ordeal center solely on the tangential
connection to the Puritan past: the performance of the profane that enables the
reinscription of state, or in Coleman’s case, administrative power. With the end of the
Cold War, America’s new enemy, terrorism, had not yet reached the level of public
concern it would just a few years after 1998. With no apparent visceral threat, America
turned its attention to, as Zuckerman bluntly puts it, “cocksucking,” or the obsession with
the nation’s alleged moral degradation as supposedly embodied by President Clinton
(Stain 2). The fixation on the profane spectacle of Clinton-Lewinsky offers the
opportunity for “a piety binge” where the moral outrage can be transformed into state
power for the persecutors (2). A similar spectacle occurs at Athena College when
Coleman’s colleagues use his ordeal to seize power. What is being reinscribed is a moral
and political authority that the persecutors seize from Clinton and Coleman. So, while no
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scaffold, pillory, or gallows are present to punish the body of Clinton, the explicit
references to body parts and details of sexual acts incessantly regurgitated throughout the
media serve as the figurative flagellation of Clinton’s sinful corpus. As Zuckerman points
out, there is a desire to punish Clinton’s body: “The syndicated conservative newspaper
columnist William F. Buckley wrote, ‘When Abelard did it, it was possible to prevent its
happening again,’ insinuating—what Buckley elsewhere called Clinton’s ‘incontinent
carnality’—might best be remedied [by] . . . castration” (3). Coleman’s alleged
transgression is also a moral one: a moral instituted through political correctness in which
the profane is an utterance that supposedly unveils a taboo flaw present in the offender’s
character. In this case, it is both racism and sexism, loosely defined or defined not at all,
or if defined, defined retroactively and strategically by an institutional, pious elite.
What should not be overlooked is that although Coleman’s utterance of “spook”
provides the opening for his colleagues to attack, the primary accuser is more motivated
by Coleman’s perceived sexism than racism. The sanctimony turns more vicious and
corporeal when Delphine Roux sends Coleman an anonymous letter about his affair with
Faunia Farley, accusing him of exploiting her sexually. But Roux uses the sexual angle to
exploit the situation in order to humiliate and exact further vengeance upon Coleman. In
his reconstruction of the incident, Zuckerman attempts to find a motive for such villainy.
Delphine believes that her academic theories and training allow her to “read” the
situation in the same way she might read a text, but in doing so she objectifies both of
them, especially Faunia, denying her agency in her own decisions while at the same time
sneering at her lower class status. In her feminist self-righteousness, Delphine, after
reading about Faunia, decides that Coleman’s affair with Faunia is nothing more than a
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way to “psychologically” terrorize women, thinking “that it’s me, in effigy, you
[Coleman] are out to get” (195). To Roux in her ivory tower, Faunia “intellectually does
not even exist” and is “the weakest woman on this earth” in contrast to Roux’s success,
attractiveness, and her “first-rate education” (198). Delphine, according to Zuckerman, is
sexually repressed: all book and no life, she knows nothing of real experience outside of
the classroom, Coleman tells her. The female Chillingworth, also a too-bookish European
transplant, she secretly desires none other than Dean Silk, the bane of her existence. Her
motivations are political and private, but never are they benign, for the spectacle is never
altruistic, but meant to reinscribe and/or reconstitute the power dynamic. Delphine’s
maniacal fixation on tearing down Coleman stems from her own desire to fit into
America, in Zuckerman’s reimagining, as her anxieties over her Frenchness persist. In
fact, to some degree she embodies a particular type of immigrant American who fled
Europe to escape provincial aristocracy. Delphine wants to leave her mother and her
Walincourt family and their traditions. Delphine is in “revolt against her Frenchness,”
and like Coleman she seeks to forge her own identity—she comes to America in the
“admirable effort to make herself” (272). Delphine detests her mother’s family’s respect
for traditions rather than “the individual (down with the individual!)” (275). However,
Delphine becomes frustrated because she understands only “academic American,” and
“the cabal” of American feminists at Athena wield so much power over her (276, 271).
Instead of making herself, she fears that she might become like them, judging every
woman on her perceived commitment to feminism. As part of her assimilation, though,
she partakes in the petty politics of the American academy. As dean, Coleman had
reconfigured the department, getting rid of academic deadwood by purging the old-
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fashioned WASPish professors from the school (for he was, as much as anyone knew, the
only Jew)—in large part to reinvigorate Athena’s academics. Silk’s power play also has
other motivations, but Delphine’s are fueled by a moralistic crusade. While not religious
in nature, her motivations are a new form of piety for political correctness and identity
politics that seek to purge this old-curmudgeon-chauvinist-dictatorial male in favor of her
progressive-dictatorial high-mindedness. For example, upon becoming chair of the
department, she calls Coleman into her office to interrogate him about his teaching
because a female student claims that the plays he teaches are sexist. Delphine, now in a
position of power, tries to dictate how he should teach courses and handle students. She
succeeds in displacing him only when he utters the gaffe, but even then it’s not enough.
By attempting to humiliate Coleman sexually by writing a letter excoriating him for his
relationship with Faunia, she tries a figurative castration since her goal is to shame him
into celibacy and, thus, powerlessness. For Coleman, his and Clinton’s biggest sin was
not acting “[a]pproriately. Appropriate. The current code word for reining in most any
deviation from the wholesome guidelines and thereby making everybody ‘comfortable’”
(152). He calls it the tyranny “of propriety” and sarcastically thinks that the crime is that
the “luxury of these lives [was] disquieted so by the inappropriate comportment of
Clinton and Silk,” the hallmark of “American puritanism” (153-154).
As Coleman ponders his predicament, he reflects on the pervasiveness of the
American puritanical spirit as a salve in which all aspects of American culture are
steeped. As “a dominatrix in a thousand disguises” it infiltrates
civic responsibility, WASP dignity, women’s rights, black pride, ethnic
allegiance, or emotion-laden Jewish ethical sensitivity. It’s not as though
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Marx or Freud or Darwin or Stalin or Hitler or Mao had never happened—
it’s as though Sinclair Lewis had not happened. It’s, he thought, as though
Babbit had never been written. It’s as though not even that most basic
level of imaginative thought had been admitted into consciousness to
cause the slightest disturbance. A century of destruction unlike any other. .
. . (153)
Coleman thinks of Sinclair Lewis,67 champion of individual thought against groupthink
and conformity, especially the kind that has now pervaded the American academy. Marx
and Freud may have been original thinkers, but adherence to Marxism and Freudian
exegesis are unquestionably en vogue, especially among the theories of someone like
Delphine Roux. Coleman rages against this atmosphere of cultural sadism with the
tenacity of his boxing days when he enjoyed pummeling his opponents. His plan to fight
back is with his memoir, Spooks, that he now finds himself unable to write, and for which
he decides to bring in Nathan Zuckerman. Coleman’s inability to write his own story may
come as a surprise since he has spent his entire life fiercely dedicated to his own selffashioning. Indeed, in the atmosphere of postwar America, the virulent racism threatens
to undo his ambitions and contributes to his decision to live as a white Jew. For Coleman
hopes to explain to Steena, the first white woman he falls in love with, that the bigotry in
America made his decision to pass “the most natural thing for someone with his outlook
and temperament and skin color to have done” (120). Why “leave it to an unenlightened
society to determine his fate” (120)? Like Lewis’s George Babbitt, Coleman longs for
something more than “the tyranny of the we that is dying to suck you in” (120). But
Coleman’s suffering is different from Babbitt’s since Coleman is experiencing America
67
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as a black man, “a Negro and nothing else”—this is how America sees him, which Steena
cannot reckon with (120). Although Coleman’s decision to pass as white seems to come
suddenly, in reality the culmination of events works him over. First, he sees as a teenager
that he can pass as white while boxing for the Knights of Pythias. Second, while in
Washington, D.C. he is called a nigger after being refused a hot dog at Woolworth’s.
Third, he feels degraded by the black elite while at Howard; he begins to understand
“nigger” as having an economic tinge to its racism—he would even be “a nigger” among
people of his own color because he lacked the pedigree. While in the Navy, he is beaten
up for being black, and then the final rejection by Steena seals his decision. Coleman’s
sister, in trying to explain Coleman’s rejection of their family, tells her brother Walt to
“[s]ee him [Coleman] historically” and that “Coleman couldn’t wait to go through civil
rights to get to his human rights, and so he skipped a step” (327). The postwar American
Dream, Coleman realizes, will elude him as long as he remains black.
Convinced of his own innocence, Coleman sets out to separate from history.
While not heading out west, Coleman instead, as Zuckerman puts it, becomes “the
greatest of the great pioneers of the I” (108). Coleman is the latest incarnation of the
American new man, Jay Gatsby reemerged from his humble beginnings. Although like
Gatsby he cannot get his Daisy in the Anglo-American Steena, he gets her Jewish version
in Iris Gittelman, because just as Daisy would have helped Gatsby complete his
American Dream, Iris helps Coleman complete his modified version of it. Just as the
section is called “Slipping the Punch,” Coleman slips the punch that Steena’s rejection
would have been and adapts. As a pioneer of his new American self, Coleman tries to
disconnect himself from his history: “Free to enact the boundless, self-defining drama of
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the pronouns we, they, and I” (109). Coleman heads into the American pastoral of rural
New England to live anew, where he believes the meanings of race will melt away, but
they come back only to haunt him in the momentary return of the repressed through a
mechanism Coleman believed he had ultimate control over: language. Shechner argues
that “spook” is Coleman’s Freudian slip, Coleman “dying to be found out” (154). Thus,
Coleman might, in fact, be referring to himself; in a double entendre, he refers
disparagingly not only to his blackness, but to the ghost of his former self. His brother,
Walt, had ordered Coleman not to show his lily-white face around the family again; sure
enough, Coleman repeats the very phrase forty years later to his lawyer, Nelson Primus,
after Primus tells him to stop seeing Faunia. “First ‘spooks,’ now ‘lily-white’—who
knows what repellent deficiency will be revealed with the next faintly antiquated
locution, the next idiom almost charmingly out of time that comes flying from his
mouth?” Coleman asks himself (Stain 84). Indeed, it is “out of time” in the sense that
these comments are out of his past—certainly, the first was not directed at the black
students he had never seen before, but his careless language suggests that Coleman
wants to reveal his secret. In the previous novels, we have seen Roth make use of the
return of the repressed, and so it reappears in The Human Stain as well. Perhaps on some
psychological level Coleman does desire to be found out, but we might also consider that
the return of the repressed comes across in Roth as inevitable, and in this case it
undermines Coleman’s belief that he can, in fact, create himself totally new, cut off from
his past, and that he cannot control his own identity.
Although the novel shows Coleman brazenly asserting and sure of himself,
beneath the surface Coleman actually loses control of his own narrative. And, in fact, the
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very delusion that he could create himself from nothing seems to be the main reason that
he cannot finish Spooks and needs Zuckerman to write it. He never was the author of
himself in the way that he had imagined. “Was he merely being another American and, in
the great frontier tradition, accepting the democratic invitation to throw your origins
overboard if to do so contributes to the pursuit of happiness?” Zuckerman asks (334). But
rather than overthrow his origins Coleman has not thrown everything overboard; his
decision to pass is greatly influenced by the teachings of his father. Indeed, the education
of the Silk household is steeped in the Western canon and tradition. Mr. Silk, we learn,
had a “way of beating you down. With words. With speech. With what he called the
language of Chaucer, Shakespeare, and Dickens” (92).The children’s middle names are in
honor of “Mr. Silk’s best-memorized play, in his view English literature’s high point,”
Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar (92). The children become like the characters they are
named for: Walt is Walter Antony, and, in fact, does become the family’s more
politically-inclined son and he is fiercely loyal to his father, the Caesar of the Silks, while
Coleman is Coleman Brutus, who does become, at least in his mother’s view, the traitor.
But Coleman, like Brutus, is also the most complex, and he figuratively kills his father by
denying him as such: “No!” Coleman exclaims, “No you’re not!” as in Mr. Silk is no
longer his father (92). The Silks “read all the old classics,” and the children were taken to
Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York “to see the armor” (94). Mr. Silk also took his
children to see George Cohan, writer of patriotic American music. Later, Ernestine
complains to Zuckerman how students today are not familiar with Moby-Dick. Although
Mr. Silk abhors racism and he himself is a victim, he raises his children to be fluent in
European and white American texts and art. From what we know, Mr. Silk does not
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introduce his children to black cultural achievement. True, Ernestine explains to
Zuckerman that there should be more knowledge of black contributions (she chastises
Zuckerman for not recognizing black historical figures), but as a teacher herself, she must
have learned this independently since there is no indication Mr. Silk saw black history as
a priority. Although Mr. Silk does want Coleman to attend Howard University, it is
because he wants Coleman to gain access to the bourgeois black intellectual elite.
Therefore, Mr. Silk’s plan for his children’s social mobility appears informed more by
Booker T. Washington than W.E.B Dubois. Mr. Silk’s faith that steady mobility through
hard work will eventually earn his family access to American success never seems to
waiver. There is a hint that Mr. Silk has disdain for poor blacks, as he believes that the
Newark Boys Club is “for slum kids, for illiterates and hoodlums bound for either the
gutter or jail” (97). Although he despises Dr. Fensterman, a Jewish doctor, Mr. Silk hopes
that Fensterman might show “an intelligent colored family” a “way in” to middle-class
acceptance (97). Jews are the model for assimilation success in Mr. Silk’s view, not
blackness. Walt and Earnestine adopt social and cultural responsibility either in spite of
Mr. Silk or they build from Mr. Silk’s emphasis on education to develop their own
independent thinking. Coleman, though, takes this immersion into Western culture as the
impetus for his zealous individualism. In fact, Coleman’s inspiration comes from his
father’s favorite play, Julius Caesar: “‘What can be avoided / Whose end is purposed by
the mighty gods?’ Lines also from Julius Caesar quoted to him by his father and yet only
with his father in the grave did Coleman at last bother to hear them—and when he did,
instantaneously to aggrandize them. This had been purposed by the mighty gods! Silky’s
freedom” (108). Not surprisingly, Coleman becomes the professor of the cradle of
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Western thought, Greek literature, which his brother Walt refers to as the whitest of
subjects to teach. Although Coleman declares that he is free of his father, he is actually
the one most influenced by him. Furthermore, Coleman’s apparent pedantry also
resembles his father’s dictatorial style. Just as his father demanded exactness in using
language, Coleman also demands this of his students, and in defending himself against
the racism charges he goes precisely through not only the definitions of the term spook
but the context in which he said it: “My father,” he explains, “insisted on precision in my
language, and I have kept faith with him” (84). True, Coleman refers to an invented
version of his father—the Jewish saloon keeper—but only in terms of his occupation and
ethnicity since the anecdote is consistent with Mr. Silk’s depiction. Plus, just as Mr. Silk
sees Jewishness as a model of assimilation, so does Coleman, as he chooses to pass as a
Jew for social mobility. Additionally, Coleman, in his dictatorial tenure as Dean, either in
the return of the repressed or from a guilty conscious, breaks up the “WASP
establishment” of Athena and hires Herb Keble, “the first black in anything other than a
custodial position” (19, 16). Coleman’s attempt to diversify the faculty in the face of antiSemitism present in the old guard might be an example of, as Ernestine says, doing the
battle his way (327). Thus, instead of escaping his past, Coleman is influenced, driven,
and haunted by it, in much the same way that Americans, rather than escaping from
history, were shaped more by their attempt to escape it.
Escaping history is exactly what both Faunia and Lester Farley attempt to do.
Each of the main characters attempts to recreate their identities irrespective of the past:
Coleman, Delphine, and even Zuckerman himself, who admires Coleman, for Coleman,
from Zuckerman’s point of view, “had the system beat;” although, Zuckerman reflects
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that history eventually did catch up to him (335). In Faunia, the novel presents the reader
with a John Fowles-esque moment. For most of the novel, the reader has been led to
believe that Faunia is an illiterate woman, only to learn toward the end that she had been
faking illiteracy all along. After hearing of her diary, Zuckerman realizes Faunia’s act
was a declaration of independence from the world. Faunia finds power by rejecting
literacy, and in ways she is much more powerful than Delphine, whose identity is greatly
controlled by the pettiness of the academy. She has outsmarted both Coleman and
Delphine’s attempts to “read” her simply by lying about her illiteracy. All interpretations
of her stemming from that premise prove to be false: “‘Everyone knows,’” Zuckerman
observes, “is the invocation of the cliché . . . You can’t know anything. The things you
know you don’t know. Intention? Motive? Consequence? Meaning? All that we don’t
know is astonishing. Even more astonishing is what passes for knowing” (209). We do
get to know Coleman more than Faunia, but she remains elusive to the reader and to
Zuckerman. Coleman attempts to characterize her, and even names her “Voluptas,” after
a Roman love goddess. Indeed, she is the sexual elixir that reinvigorates Coleman after
the loss of his wife, job, and reputation. Coleman, essentially a dead man, arises from the
cold New England grave with Faunia and a bottle of Viagra, the latter of which he said
should be renamed Zeus. With the full amorous awakening of the rapacious king of gods,
Coleman finds the natural nymph who had eluded him his whole life. She is not part of a
game or scheme he tries to play, like Steena or Iris. As heavy-handedly as Roth attempts
to shove Faunia toward us as the stereotypical sexpot sent to save the senior citizen
septuagenarian, he at least attempts to thwart such a reading. Certainly, by making the
reader think she is illiterate, Roth anticipates the reading of Faunia as woman au
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naturale. But, perhaps unsuccessfully, Roth tries to add dimension to Faunia by allowing
Nathan Zuckerman to attempt to wrest Faunia from Coleman’s mythological
objectification of her. In Zuckerman’s The Human Stain, he knows Faunia’s secret from
the outset and some about her hellish life with the crazed and abusive Lester Farley.
Fascinating to Zuckerman is how Faunia rewrote her identity while pretending to be
illiterate, which is why he craves to read her diary that her stepmother withholds from
him. Unable to access it, Zuckerman believes this is where he comes in: “I can only do
what everyone does who thinks they know. I imagine. I am forced to imagine. It happens
to be what I do for a living. It is my job. It’s now all I do” (213). Piecing together
information from Faunia’s life, Zuckerman delves deep into the heart of the nightmare of
American domesticity. Having been abused by her stepfather in her upper class
upbringing, she tries to escape into what she imagined was the American pastoral. From
Coleman’s retelling, we gather that Faunia “married this farmer, older than herself, a
dairy farmer, a Vietnam vet, thinking that if they worked hard and raised kids and made
the farm work she could have a stable, ordinary life” (29). In Roth’s handling though, the
Vietnam vet is different from the World War II vet (Roth’s World War II vets never
suffer from PTSD in the trilogy). Perhaps delving too much into the stereotype of the
shattered Vietnam vet,68 Roth nevertheless attempts to show the damaging effects of that
war on the men who fought in it and the social destruction its aftermath wreaked,
particularly on the American family. In Lester’s visit to the portable Vietnam memorial,
Americans all around search for their lost loved ones: dead uncles, cousins, sons. As in
American Pastoral, Vietnam is the bomb that shatters the American dream, especially for
Lester and Faunia, since Lester’s abuse of her, in Zuckerman’s reimagining, results from
68
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the violence he brings home from the war. Faunia, though, is the woman caught up in
Lester’s nightmare and her stepfather’s depravity. Her real father’s indifference and her
mother’s greed lead to the childhood abuse, American WASPness gone berserk. Through
their relationship, both Faunia and Coleman try to escape out of time, unleash themselves
from history, to create their own pastoral. Coleman comes to understand this
phenomenon through his esotericism, which is why he prefers to think of her through the
lens of Greek mythology; she plays nymph to him, the god. By feigning her illiteracy,
Faunia, too, wants to withdraw from history as a way of coping with the trauma her
experience in American domesticity has wrought. She, thus, attempts to remove herself
from the American text, to live naturally with no real ties to society other than her need to
make a living. Her sexuality is, like Hester Prynne’s, her scarlet letter because other
characters persecute her for it. Because of this persecution, her sexuality liberates her
since from others’ points of view she is invisible because of it. Her and Coleman’s
relationship is out of step with time as their age differences indicate. Coleman’s children,
supposedly enlightened and educated (two of them college professors as well), see her as
a disgrace and “not the ideal woman to have linked with our father’s legacy” (308). They
assert that Faunia is a “cheap little cunt” (308). Lester obsesses over his ex-wife’s love
affairs particularly with “the Jew professor,” but to him she is just a “bitch” (70). To
Coleman, though, Faunia is “morally speaking, the least repellant person he knows,” as
the pair want their relationship to exist in an ahistorical suspension (164). While dancing
with Coleman, she tells him to “imagine sustaining this”—the dance, being alone
together all the time: “We’ve got all we need,” she declares (231). Coleman attempts to
read the newspaper story about Bill Clinton, but Faunia sees no connection between
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“these escapades in Washington” and her life (235). To Faunia and Coleman, age, race,
and ethnicity mean nothing. Zuckerman imagines that she knew Coleman’s secret but did
not care just as Coleman does not care about her sexual past, her economic class, or her
social status. However, she takes Coleman’s reading to her as some attempt to rehistoricize her, to introduce her back into the America she despises and from which she
flees.
But both Faunia’s and Coleman’s identities cannot be recreated out of a vacuum.
Lester is the force of history that returns to destroy them. Faunia’s past literally comes
back to kill her, and Coleman’s choice of passing as a Jewish man does as well. Part of
Lester’s hatred for Coleman is his very Jewishness, since Lester believes that “fancy
pants professors” protested the Vietnam War and that there “weren’t too many kikes in
Vietnam, not that he can remember. They were too busy to getting their degrees. Jew
bastard. There’s something wrong with those Jew bastards” he thinks (70). Additionally,
Lester blames the “Jew girl” for distracting Clinton while “the budget goes down the
drain” (247). Lester’s anti-Semitism fuels his hatred for Coleman and leads to their first
violent encounter when he trespasses onto Coleman’s property. As a veteran, Lester sees
himself as a loyal American who is being cuckolded by the Jewish other—the “enemy”
(66). True, Zuckerman only suspects that Lester ran Coleman and Faunia off the road, but
his eerie encounter with Farley seems to confirm such suspicions. Farley, who may have
heard that Zuckerman was asking questions about the accident, ominously tells Nathan
that “[t]he only time a secret gets out, Mr. Zuckerman, is when you tell a secret” (360).
Zuckerman realizes his five year foray into the American pastoral has ended because he
fears Farley will harass or kill him as long as he lives in the area. The final word of the
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trilogy is “America,” but it is an America where a damaged war veteran has marked the
pristine American frontier off for himself—he warns Zuckerman not to tell anyone about
it. For Farley, the only pure America that exists is one unspoiled by others: “That’s why
it’s clean and that’s why I come here,” he tells Zuckerman, “If man has to do with it, stay
away from it” (360). Beware the utopia of isolation.
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CHAPTER V
CODA
In striking contrast to the outward theme of Henry Luce’s “The American
Century,” the series of novels that I have examined in this dissertation explicitly look
inward at the American nation. At the forefront of these novels is the incongruence
between America’s material and ideal identities. Significantly, two wars primarily hover
around the edges of these works: World War II and the Vietnam War. The United States’
victory in World War II and the subsequent Cold War provided the political capital for
both the country’s foreign and domestic policies, both of which were designed to decide
the US’s permanent role in the world. Consequently, many in the government and much
of the media were attempting to craft the role, the identity, of its citizens to help the
United States carry out what Luce and others believed to be America’s rightful destiny.
In American Pastoral, Zuckerman refers to the end of the Second World War as “the
greatest moment of collective inebriation in American history,” a moment when “the
clock of history reset and a whole people’s aims [were] no longer limited by the past”
(40-41). Zuckerman’s retrospective examination of Swede Levov’s life forces him to
reconsider one of the legacies of World War II. While the end of the war inspired many
Jews to assimilate and to adopt the patriotism of mainstream American society, it also
emboldened the government to enact the plan of global domination. In Rabbit Redux,
Rabbit Angstrom believes that the war was fought so he could live in an American
paradise of perpetual happiness. The Morgans of Toni Morrison’s Paradise are more
skeptical about the postwar promise than the young Zuckerman and Rabbit, and their
reaction to America’s continuing racism sparks their decision to forge their version of a
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black utopia. Nevertheless, they mimic WASP America, reject the Civil Rights
Movement, and pay little attention to the Vietnam War, even when it wreaks havoc on
their community. Thus, collectively these novels show that the postwar period was indeed
a defining moment for the rest of the twentieth century in terms of the identity of the
United States. The novels illustrate and investigate how the legacies of World War II, the
Cold War, Vietnam, and the Reagan Era shape conceptions of American identity even
today. The postwar era was not a time of consensus as advertised by the government and
the media of the era or in nostalgic representations of it but an anxious time when
Americans grappled with their own identities and their nation’s.
Each series of novels explicates the divergence from America’s founding ideal
identity. John Updike’s Rabbit Angstrom shows that much of the anxiety that plagues
Rabbit Angstrom throughout the tetralogy comes from his difficulty with a nation that is
changing rapidly around him in the postwar era. In regard to Rabbit’s predicament in
Rabbit, Run, Updike states that there “was no painless dropping out of the Fifties’ fraying
but still tight social weave” (Rabbit Angstrom x). This “fraying” was the undercurrent of
social unrest and disillusionment with postwar American society while part of the “social
weave,” from Rabbit’s perspective, was the increasing pressure to belong and conform to
a new postwar American ideal that Rabbit senses undermines his individuality. “Rabbit,”
Updike declares, “is, like the Underground Man, incorrigible, taking direction from his
personal, also incorrigible God” (Rabbit Angstrom, xx). 69 Updike’s conception of
American identity, individuals with their private God, is what sets people free from the
restrictive trappings of a politically constrained and enforced identity—for as long as this
relationship is protected and respected, each individual, Updike states, is left to “their
69
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own minds and to enact in their own enlightened self-interest, with necessary respect to
others” (Higher Gossip, 475). Where America has failed it has failed in its promise to
live up to these ideals, which Updike posits as the spirit of the Protestant heritage, which
is also ingrained into the ideals of the nation’s founding. If there is a utopia that humans
are capable of creating, it is not the perfection of human behavior and human systems or
a “static paradise” but a society that is renewable and allowed to change through
democracy (476).
In Rabbit Redux, Skeeter insists that Rabbit understand black history in America.
Without this understanding, Skeeter knows that Rabbit cannot empathize with his anger
toward the United States and its institutions. One of Toni Morrison’s chief goals in her
trilogy is to recover black history in order to force recognition of blacks’ vital
contributions to the making of America. If American means white to Morrison, her
trilogy challenges the white paradigm of American identity by recovering a lost past. Just
as “somebody forgot to tell somebody something” about black history in the postwar
period, Morrison declares “somebody has to tell somebody something” about blacks and
black women’s role in American history (qtd. in Bland 286). First, like Skeeter, Morrison
asserts that history and literature are essential to destroy harmful black stereotypes.
Second, Morrison sees that the omission and/or the marginalization of blacks from and in
American history will continue to deny blacks their American identity. In the climate of
the Reagan Era, Morrison felt the threat of historical annihilation. In 1990, for example,
Morrison stated, “if we don’t know it (what our past is) . . . then nobody in the world
knows it” (qtd. in Bland 286). As Paradise illustrates, Morrison sees postwar middleclass black society repeating mainstream American culture, the world of Rabbit
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Angstrom and Swede Levov, especially its patriarchal structure. Therefore, Morrison’s
retelling of black history focuses on the importance of black women’s roles as leaders
within the black community and as recorders and tellers of their history.
In telling Sethe’s story in Beloved, Morrison counters the spectacle of the white
narrative, which protects white hegemony; for instance, whites controlled the meaning of
black history and the interpretation of how blacks experienced slavery. Baby Suggs
attempts to help the ex-slaves redefine their identity outside of the plantation; however,
just as Updike’s Rabbit Redux demonstrates the tortured progress of race relations,
Beloved shows the similar tortured progress of the black community’s ability to cope
with their limited, new freedom. Postwar assimilation for Morrison came at the price of
accepting American identity on the premise of whites’ narratives of history and literature.
In Beloved, though, Morrison establishes the chronotope of the ship as a site of memory
for its characters. Characters move through this collective memory of the ship as
Morrison posits it as a site of rebirth, healing, and a symbol of American identity. At the
end of Paradise, Morrison refrains from offering an alternative to the dystopia of Ruby,
refusing to advocate another system—“I don’t subscribe to patriarchy and I don’t think it
should be substituted with matriarchy” (Morrison, Conversations 141). Paradises
imagined seem to offer nothing more than an alternate set of restrictions or exclusions,
and perhaps this is why Morrison avoids attempting to theorize one. But, at any rate, the
past must be first recovered in order to uncover aspects of American identity with diverse
origins. These origins, Morrison shows, are rooted in the hidden history of not just black
Americans, but also in the stories of women (who are erased from Haven’s founding),
black men, and other cultures and peoples that have lived within America’s borders.
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For Roth’s trilogy, postwar American identity is the primary subject. Although
American Pastoral centers on the downfall of Swede Levov in the Vietnam Era, the
narrator, Nathan Zuckerman, locates the beginnings of this tragedy in the immediate
postwar era. In fact, Swede’s life reads so tragically not just because his daughter, Merry,
turns into a murderous radical, but also because Swede had embodied the best of the
postwar American Dream. In Zuckerman’s retelling, Swede, a Jewish American, had
seamlessly assimilated into American society—something that the previous generation of
Jews, Zuckerman claims, did not accomplish or even seek to accomplish. The Jews of
Swede’s community praise and worship him for his mainstream American qualities: his
athletic achievements and his patriotic military service. But Roth deconstructs the idea
that any identity can protect an individual from the machinations of history. There is no
innocent American pastoral because postwar American wealth and power is predicated
on militarism as its sinful involvement in the Vietnam War demonstrates; the Vietnam
War had awakened the American berserk. Similar to Rabbit Angstrom, Swede is forced
to deal with the reality of the worst of 1960s radicalism, and for Swede, this radicalism
enthralls his sixteen year-old daughter. Roth’s target is not the Swede, who is simply “an
instrument of history,” but the postwar mythologizing of American identity (American
Pastoral 5).
In Roth’s The Human Stain, like Golden Gray in Morrison’s Jazz, Coleman Silk
believes he can control his own identity irrespective of history. Unlike Gray, Coleman
enacts a plan and appears to have succeeded. However, Zuckerman’s narrative reveals
that Coleman’s identity was never his own creation; rather, it was influenced by his father
and the conditions of history. The racism of the postwar period persuaded Coleman that
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he could not achieve his version of the American Dream as a black man. History, though,
returns in Coleman’s Freudian slip when he uses the word “spook” in class, an incident
that begins his ordeal. In addition, as in American Pastoral, the Vietnam War haunts
America as Lester Farley, a traumatized veteran, roams the American pastoral of rural
New England and terrorizes Coleman and his lover Faunia, Lester’s ex-wife. Nathan
Zuckerman finally takes Murray Ringold’s advice and ends his exile spent in the
American pastoral exploring the trappings of its allure. The end of The Human Stain
seems to stick a despairing period on the end of Roth’s American trilogy. With Lester
Farley in Arcadia, who wants to go there? However, Roth’s trilogy attunes us to the
propaganda, makes us aware of the nation’s mythic fashioning, and demands that we
critically look at the nation in which we live.
Updike, Morrison, and Roth examine the myth of the postwar paradise, and they
posit that much of this myth is based on assimilation into an American identity while
leaving behind individual identity as well as black and Jewish identities respectively.
Therefore, the propaganda of the postwar counters the American ideal of a democratic
and pluralistic nation. As I discuss in the Introduction, critics have written about the
possibilities for and argued the productiveness of reading these authors in tandem. While
reading these authors separately might help us understand the ethnic, gender, and
religious explications that each author so richly illustrates, by reading them collectively,
we might also see the larger picture of how these authors explore the questions of
American identity that now surround us and will in the future. My subtitle is called “The
Politics of American Identity,” and throughout this dissertation I have attempted to
demonstrate not only the social, cultural, and historical matrices of American identity, but
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I have also attempted to provide a critical overview of its political origins and
dimensions. From HUAC to Reaganism, the real political backlash against those who
challenge its dominant paradigms shows that the consequences of how American identity
disseminates in our nation are very real. John Updike, Toni Morrison, and Philip Roth
offer us literature that counters the exclusive and prescriptive narratives of national
identity that are counterintuitive to the American spirit.
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